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ABSTRACT 
 
 
There is not one, single theory of virtue ethics that commands general 
agreement in the field.  The aim of this dissertation is to help resolve 
this problem by positing that eudaimonia and phronesis are necessary 
for a comprehensive virtue ethics theory.  I argue for this thesis in two 
ways: positively and negatively.  In a positive way, I give arguments 
supporting the thesis.  Eudaimonia justifies the virtues.  We need the 
virtues to enable us to live a characteristically good human life.  
Phronesis is necessary to ensure the proper functioning of virtues.  It 
plays four roles: (1) determines the mean of a disposition (2) 
establishes the means to achieve proposed ends (3) contributes to 
determining the end (4) helps motivate actions.  On the negative side, I 
critique the work of authors who reject or downplay eudaimonia and 
phronesis, thereby strengthening support for my thesis. 
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Our challenges may be new.  The instruments with which we meet 
them may be new.  But those values upon which our success depends – 
honesty and hard work, courage and fair play, tolerance and curiosity, 
loyalty and patriotism – these things are old.   These things are true.  
They have been the quiet force of progress throughout our history.  
What is demanded, then, is a return to these truths. 
 
...With hope and virtue, let us brave once more the icy currents and 
endure what storms may come. 
 
 
Barack H. Obama 
44th President of the United States 
Inaugural Address 
20 January 2009* 
                                                        
*  Financial Times, 21 January 2009, p. 2 (emphasis added). 
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INTRODUCTION 
 
 
Something like this lack of regularity is found also in good 
things…We must be content, then when talking about things of this 
sort and starting from them, to show what is true about them roughly 
in outline, and when talking about things that are for the most part, and 
starting from these, to reach conclusions too of the same sort.  For it is 
a mark of an educated person to look for precision in each kind of 
inquiry just to the extent that the nature of the subject allows it. 
 
Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, 1094b15-25 (emphasis added). 
  
 Virtue ethics (VE) is nearly as old as philosophy itself.  Yet, contemporary 
virtue ethics is, by the standards of the academic study of philosophy, at its infancy.  
As the new kid on the modern ethics block, VE is in the process of defining itself.  
Critics argue VE is inchoate and is represented by not one, but many strains of 
thought.  Both aspects of Aristotle’s insight above are correct: there cannot be 
precision in the field of ethics, nevertheless philosophy as a discipline should 
nevertheless aim to be thorough when developing an ethical system.  Thus, the 
objective of this work is to fortify VE thinking by arguing that two pillars, 
eudaimonia, or (loosely) flourishing, and phronesis, or practical wisdom, are 
necessary for a comprehensive VE theory.  
 In truth, like many recent intellectual developments marketed as original, VE 
is a rediscovery of ancient ideas.  The VE approach is part of a long, sophisticated, 
and fairly continuous tradition.  Not only does the approach have origins almost as 
ancient as philosophy itself, but also its history includes extensive work by such 
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philosophical luminaries such as Socrates, Plato, Aristotle, the Stoics, and Aquinas.1  
There is general agreement that modern VE began in 1958 with a landmark article by 
Elizabeth Anscombe entitled “Modern Moral Philosophy”.  Anscombe seriously 
undermines the foundations of two of the most prominent contemporary ethical 
theories, deontological and utilitarian theories.2  Anscombe finds the notion of a 
universal moral law, which is not the command of a deity, i.e., a “special moral 
‘ought,’” unintelligible.  To flourish, she suggests that we “look for norms” that are 
grounded in the facts about what we need.  She calls for a return to virtues to remedy 
this foundational problem.  Alasdair MacIntyre vigorously took up this call in his 
1984 book, After Virtue.3  A year later, Richard Taylor also provided a clear but a 
somewhat different version of VE from MacIntyre.4   
 Thus began the cacophony of voices that would discuss, formulate, and design 
VE theories.  As a consequence of the relatively short life span of modern VE and a 
good number of contributors to this new field, there is now a diverse range of modern 
VE “theories.”  The latter word is in quotes because there is currently a debate (once 
                                                        
1  Simpson (1997) argues that Aristotle does not have a moral theory in the modern 
sense and therefore, does not offer a good place for modern virtue ethicists to start if they 
want to develop such a theory. 
2  Anscombe, Elizabeth, “Modern Moral Philosophy”, Philosophy 33: 1-19, 1958 
reprinted in Virtue Ethics, eds. Roger Crisp and Michael Slote.  Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 1997. 
3  MacIntyre, Alasdair, After Virtue.  Indiana: University of Notre Dame, 1984 
4  Taylor, Richard, Ethics, Faith and Reason.  Englewood-Cliffs, New Jersey: Prentice-
Hall, 1985. 
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again, sparked by Anscombe and later elaborated by Williams and others)5 whether 
VE and ethics in general are amenable to unifying and universal theories.  By “moral 
theory”, anti-theorists mean a systematic organization of our principles and 
obligations that provides a universally valid answer to every moral question.  These 
skeptics urge no such organization is possible.  One possible result of this moral 
skepticism is the fragmented and inchoate character of VE work.   
To be sure, not all proponents of VE share this view of moral theory.  Slote 
explicitly detaches himself from this view, and argues we should take seriously the 
idea of ethical theory, mainly to overcome the inconsistencies in our intuitive moral 
thinking.6  More VE theories have emerged recently, as VE research and thinking 
progresses.  Yet, the nature of VE means that the majority of them tend not to 
necessarily provide, and even eschew, universally valid answers to every moral 
question. 
THESIS 
 The centrality of virtues and the character of the moral agent are two common 
features of VE thinking.  The basic judgments in VE are judgments about character.  
Trianosky notes the concept of virtue justifies that of right conduct, that is, virtue 
explains right conduct.7  Within this broad description lie a variety of approaches in 
VE thinking.  According to Annas, modern VE theories have not yet achieved the                                                         
5  Anscombe (1958), Williams, Bernard, Ethics and the Limits of Philosophy.  London: 
Fontana Press, 1985.  Other anti-theory proponents include John McDowell, Martha 
Nussbaum, and Annette Baier.  
6  Slote, Michael, From Morality to Virtue.  Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1992. 
7  Trianosky, Gregory, “Supererogation, Wrongdoing and Vice: On the Autonomy of 
the Ethics of Virtue,” Journal of Philosophy: 83 26-40, 1986. 
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critical mass of argument and theory that classical VE theory developed and refined 
over hundreds of years. 8   Unsurprisingly, the modern VE theories fall short of being 
unifying or universal. 
 In sum, modern VE theories are partial and fragmentary.  The resolution of 
this problem should be a general agreement among professional philosophers and 
ethicists about the essential features for a comprehensive VE theory.  Simply put, the 
thesis of this dissertation is that eudaimonia and phronesis are necessary for a 
comprehensive virtue ethics theory.9 That is, if VE theory aspires to be complete, to 
be systematic, then both eudaimonia and phronesis are essential pillars for it.  Drop 
one, the other, or both, and VE regresses to an impressive intellectual curiosity. 
DEFINITIONS 
Eudaimonia 
 Eudaimonia is an Ancient Greek word combining eu meaning “good” with 
daimon meaning “spirit.”  The word often is characterized as “happiness”.  This 
translation is not without loss.  Happiness is a thin description for eudaimonia.10  In 
ordinary usage, happiness connotes a feeling of pleasure, or of feeling good.  
However an Ancient Greek, knowing someone is in this state, either in general or 
about something in particular, would not on that account attribute eudaimonia to that 
person.  In the current use of the term, one can be “happy” about one thing and                                                         
8  Annas, Julia, “Virtue Ethics,” in The Oxford Handbook of Ethical Theory, ed. David 
Copp.  Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2006. 
9  The other elements that should be part of a comprehensive VE theory are a thorough 
description and justification of the virtues and consideration of the role of emotions.  A 
discussion of them is beyond the scope of this dissertation. 
10  Annas (2006). 
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“unhappy” about something else.  However, one cannot be eudaimon about one thing, 
and the opposite (duseudaimon) about something else.11  This is because eudaimonia 
is not about something; it is not a feeling or an attitude that has an object.12  
Eudaimonia is the end or telos towards which human good aims.  This understanding 
of eudaimonia, as an ultimate end, means an individual pursues her ends and 
priorities.  Regarding someone as eudaimon is more like ascribing a status.  It is to 
honor the person and imply she is admirable and an exemplar of life at its best.  This 
significant gap in meaning between eudaimonia and happiness is a primary reason the 
former will not be translated as the latter in this dissertation.   
A broader interpretation of the concept of eudaimonia that is faithful to the 
Ancient Greek understanding is human flourishing.  This term is more akin to the 
original sense of eudaimonia, because it takes the view of life as a whole.  Other 
terms that closely resemble eudaimonia are well-being, a well-lived life, and a 
worthwhile life.  Still, the term eudaimonia will be used in this dissertation rather than 
the unsatisfactory English translations for the term.   
I define eudaimonia as living according to virtues that are guided by reason, in 
a complete life.  This definition is derived from that of Aristotle.  But my definition 
disregards his so-called ‘metaphysics’ of the psyche, often translated as soul.  I argue 
later that this metaphysics is not a necessary part of the eudaimonist tradition. 
Eudaimonia is grounded in human nature, such that human beings need the virtues in                                                         
11  Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, trans., Sarah Broadie and Christopher Rowe.  Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 2002, Introduction. 
12  Ibid. 
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order to live a characteristically good human life.  This approach derives from ethical 
naturalism.  In addition, since Aristotle, the following features have become common 
to the eudaimonist tradition:  
(1) eudaimonia is the ultimate end of a human being  
(2) it justifies the virtues  
As virtues are the common element in all VE theories, these features of eudaimonia, I 
argue, make the concept necessary for a comprehensive VE theory.  For there must be 
a reason why virtues are virtues and why we need virtues in order to be good.  
Eudaimonia is that reason, because eudaimonia is the basis for virtues. 
Phronesis 
Phronesis has to do with reason; in particular, the reasoning required for moral 
decisions.  The concept is often translated as “practical wisdom”.  I do not take issue 
with this translation and will use it interchangeably with phronesis.  For Aristotle, 
phronesis is an intellectual virtue.  According to his classification, virtues are divided 
into moral virtues (virtues of character) and intellectual virtues (virtues of the mind).  
Moral virtues are character dispositions that are habituated in us from childhood.  
Phronesis is called practical wisdom because it is the part of reason that is involved in 
decisions in the arena of practical, moral issues.  It works closely with moral virtues, 
so that the latter can function properly and be acted upon.   
It is my claim that practical wisdom plays four roles in virtue ethics.  
Phronesis:  
(1) determines the mean of a disposition  
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(2) establishes the means to achieve proposed practical ends  
(3) contributes to determining the end  
(4) helps to motivate actions   
These roles are indispensable.  Without practical wisdom, virtues cannot work well, 
be chosen appropriately, or be activated (i.e., applied) correctly in different contexts.  
Thus, practical wisdom is necessary for a comprehensive virtue ethics theory. 
Comprehensive  
So what do I mean by a “comprehensive” theory of virtue ethics.  Examples of 
such aspects are reason, emotion, virtues, and the reason or reasons for being 
virtuous.  A comprehensive virtue ethics theory is one that includes all aspects of 
morality that are relevant to virtue ethics.  A comprehensive VE theory is helpful for 
applying VE to real situations.  Put differently, by “comprehensive” I mean a 
standard VE to which we can call upon, instead of having to refer to idiosyncratic 
notions, like, “Hursthouse’s VE”, or “Swanton’s VE”, or “Slote’s VE”.  These VE 
theories are not surprisingly, different from each other.  If VE remains piecemeal and 
incomplete, it is unsatisfying as a theory. 
METHODOLOGY 
Chapter 1 
The arguments supporting my thesis rely to a good extent on many of the rationales 
from Aristotle.  It is not unreasonable to say that Aristotle’s virtue ethics is the 
prototype for contemporary virtue ethics.  We always can learn from prototypes. This 
fact is sometimes acknowledged but also largely ignored by contemporary virtue 
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ethicists.  Typically with little discussion of Aristotle, nearly all work on this subject 
today agrees that a focus on virtues is the core of any VE theory.  Yet as Aristotle’s 
virtue ethics is the precursor of modern virtue ethics theories, a review and analysis of 
his theory is indispensible to inform us of the influence (whether positive or negative) 
that Aristotle has on today’s theories.  We can learn from Aristotle’s model by the 
rediscovery of concepts that are useful to, and as I argue, even necessary for, 
contemporary virtue ethics.   
Accordingly in Chapter 1, I lay out the primary concepts of Aristotle’s virtue 
ethics: eudaimonia, moral virtues, and phronesis.  I argue his approach is a holistic 
one where there is no hierarchy of elements such that one component is ascendent 
whereas others are dependent on it.  The primary features of his ethics are 
interdependent.  Together, they form a whole.  Thus, I attempt to show how 
eudaimonia, moral virtues, and phronesis are necessary in Aristotle’s virtue ethics.   
Chapter 2 
A review of the current literature on VE highlights the problem that this 
dissertation seeks to address.  Virtue ethics is diverse in views, generally fragmented 
in research focus, occasionally lacking in cogency, and deficient in agreement on how 
a VE theory should look.  VE is, therefore, incomprehensive.  One reason for these 
deficiencies is that the movement started from dissatisfaction with current ethical 
theories, specifically deontological and utilitarian ethical systems.  Consequently, 
philosophers have expended, and continue to spend, a prodigious amount of energy 
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on distinguishing VE from the latter two systems.  To strengthen VE, I argue we must 
move on from what it is not to what it is.   
The sources of virtue ethics are myriad: Aristotle, Stoics, and Aquinas.  
Among the focus and foundations of VE are virtues, naturalism, and reason.  From 
this cacophony, I suggest a distillation to give VE some agreed principles and a 
cohesive strain of thought. This distillation means my analysis is on six thinkers: 
Hursthouse, who is a neo-Aristotelian in the VE field, Slote and Foot, who disregard 
eudaimonia in their work, Swanton, who takes a pluralistic view of VE, and Driver 
and Merritt, who underplay the role of practical wisdom in VE.    
Chapter 3   
I argues that eudaimonia is necessary for a comprehensive VE theory in two 
ways.  In a positive way, arguments developed by Aristotle and neo-Aristotelians 
Hursthouse and Annas evince that eudaimonia is necessary for a comprehensive VE 
theory.  In a negative way, the work of Slote and Foot are flawed because they 
disregard eudaimonia.  A gulf of two and a half millenia divide us from the Ancients.  
I will endeavor to bridge this gulf by updating the ethical concept of eudaimonia so 
that it comports with our contemporary sensibilities.  That effort is aided by the work 
of Rosalind Hursthouse, a neo-Aristotelian virtue ethicist, and Julia Annas, who has 
written extensively on classical eudaimonist theories.  An interdisciplinary approach 
also assists in this effort.  I apply results from psychological research on happiness 
conducted in the past two decades in order to integrate into the concept of eudaimonia 
modern views of happiness. 
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Chapter 3 gives the arguments why eudaimonia is necessary.  It begins by 
defining eudaimonia as a complete life, lived according to the virtues, that is guided 
by reason.  Why should we live according to the virtues?  Eudaimonia is the purpose 
of every human.  It is a natural purpose for human beings qua human beings.  
Eudaimonia is grounded in human nature, such that human beings need the virtues in 
order to live a characteristically good human life.  This approach derives from ethical 
naturalism.  We flourish when we are good human beings qua human beings.  Being 
a eudaimon human being requires we act virtuously, because we need the virtues to 
live a characteristically good human life.  To be a good human being requires we 
ensure our individual survival and the continuance of the species.  Thus, the virtues 
are grounded in eudaimonia and eudaimonia is grounded in our human nature. 
Chapter 4 
The dissertation updates the concept of practical wisdom and uses the 
arguments in Aristotle’s ethical works as well as modern academics, Zagzebski, 
Richardson, Nussbaum, and Chappell to argue that practical wisdom is necessary for 
a comprehensive VE theory.  On the positive side, it explains the four roles practical 
wisdom plays in ensuring the proper functioning of virtues and the correct use of each 
virtue in different contexts.  On the negative side, Chapter 4 goes on to show that the 
arguments of Merritt and Driver are flawed because they reject phronesis in their 
work on VE.   
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Chapter 5 
 Objections to my thesis are likely to take three tracks.  First, eudaimonia is 
such a flawed concept that it cannot be necessary for a complete VE.  Indeed, 
including eudaimonia hinders rather than helps VE theory.  Supporting this claim, 
objections may take the form of a list of criticisms of eudaimonism.  Second, critics 
may argue phronesis is not a necessary concept in VE theories.   Emotivists may 
claim that emotion, not reason direct and motivate our actions.  Third, the thesis 
argues that both eudaimonia and phronesis are necessary for a comprehensive virtue 
ethics theory.  Critics may contend this claim is too broad because both are not 
necessary at the same time.  We need only phronesis but not eudaimonia or vice 
versa.  I attempt to answer these objections in Chapter 5.  A summary of the 
dissertation is subsequently given, followed finally by the conclusions. 
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CHAPTER 1 
 
THE PROTOTYPE: ARISTOTLE'S VIRTUE ETHICS 
 
1.1 Introduction 
 
 Why should we study Aristotle and his version of virtue ethics?  Two reasons: 
first, it is the prototype of virtue ethics theories.  Second, we can learn from the 
prototype.   Aristotle’s ethical theory is the original, comprehensive virtue ethics that 
we have on record.  It is not unreasonable to say that Aristotle’s virtue ethics is the 
prototype for contemporary virtue ethics.  This fact is sometimes acknowledged but 
also largely ignored by contemporary virtue ethicists.  Nearly all work on this subject 
today agrees that a focus on virtues is the core of any virtue ethics theory.  However, 
apart from this agreement, as we shall see in Chapter 2 that there is a cacophony of 
views on what a virtue ethics theory looks like.    
However, as Aristotle’s virtue ethics is the precursor of modern virtue ethics 
theories, some study and analysis of his theory is instructive in informing us of the 
influence (whether positive or negative) that Aristotle has had on today’s theories.  In 
addition, among contemporary virtue ethics theories, there has been widespread 
conceptual cherry picking from Aristotle’s theory.  It is also instructive to know the 
original context in which we find the Aristotelian concepts that various virtue 
ethicists use, how Aristotle stands on them, and the different interpretations of his 
views.  After a couple of decades of research in this area, virtue ethicists should have 
some agreement on the necessary features of a virtue ethics theory.  An agreement 
 13 
would give the field greater credibility.  We can rediscover some of these features 
from their prototype. 
Second, we can learn from Aristotle’s model through the rediscovery of 
concepts that are useful and as I argue, some are even necessary for contemporary 
virtue ethics.  In this chapter I lay out the primary concepts of Aristotle’s virtue 
ethics: eudaimonia, moral virtues, and phronesis.  I argue that his approach is a 
holistic one where there is no hierarchy of elements such that one component is 
ascendent while others are dependent on it.  The primary features of his ethics are 
interdependent and together they form a whole.  Thus, I attempt to show how 
eudaimonia, moral virtues, and phronesis are necessary in Aristotle’s virtue ethics.  
Later, in Chapters 3 and 4, I borrow in large measure from Aristotle to argue that 
eudaimonia and phronesis are also necessary in a contemporary virtue ethics theory.   
Admittedly, there are other elements of Aristotle that are outdated.  He holds 
illiberal views on women and slaves.  His conception of the soul and the hierarchy of 
intellectual virtues are difficult to justify today.  Aristotle focuses (arguably) on the 
aristocratic class for ethical training.  Today, there is a widespread belief that ethics 
are not restricted to the elite.  Finally, where I also diverge from Aristotle is in his 
much debated conception of what constitutes the paragon of an eudaimonic life.  I 
agree with Aristotle when he describes eudaimonia as a complete life lived according 
to the virtues, guided by reason.  However, I will not take the second version of 
Aristotle’s description of a eudaimon life i.e. the supreme achievement of this kind of 
life is one that is lived in theoretical contemplation.  In this sense, Aristotle’s view of 
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eudaimonia requires some modernization.  His version of virtue ethics cannot be 
taken wholesale the way utilitarians more or less adopt Mill and Kantians adopt Kant.  
But I argue that the concept of eudaimonia, as a final end towards which we aim, 
remains foundational for a virtue ethics theory.   
In later sections of this chapter I go on to examine Aristotle’s view of virtue 
and phronesis.  In doing the latter, I hope to develop from an Aristotelian basis, a 
theory of the role of phronesis in a virtue ethics theory.  Thus, in this chapter I will 
therefore, do the following: 
1.  Examine in detail the primary concepts of Aristotle’s virtue ethics: 
eudaimonia, moral virtues, and phronesis.  
2.  Examine some of the difficulties with these concepts and the scholarly 
discussions on them.   
3.  Discuss how Aristotle relates each of these concepts to each other, so that 
we may use the relationships in a modern version of virtue ethics. 
1.2 Features of Aristotle’s Virtue Ethics 
 There are five primary features in the ethical process that Aristotle advances.  
First, Aristotle proposes that we have a chief good.  This chief good is our ultimate 
end.  This ultimate end is eudaimonia.  Eudaimonia is a well-lived, complete life of 
virtuous activity and it is the target towards which we aim (1094a23).  Second, 
Aristotle describes a process whereby an individual becomes virtuous under the 
presupposition that by nature humans are neither virtuous nor not virtuous.  Instead, 
we have the capacity (dunamis) for moral virtues and are able to acquire them 
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through habit (1103a25-26).   Aristotle’s argument, in the ageless debate of whether 
humanity is naturally good or bad, is that it is neither but it has the capacity to be 
either.  To ensure that our capacity to be good is fulfilled it is therefore crucial that we 
acquire virtues through right training.   Just as we become harpists by playing the 
harp, so too, “we become just by doing just actions, temperate by doing temperate 
actions, brave by doing brave actions” (1103b1-2).  Conversely, just as we have the 
capacity to become virtuous through correct training, we also may acquire vices 
through poor instruction.    
The third feature of Aristotle’s system is the robust emphasis placed on action 
(praxis).  Aristotle is interested in how to become good and not merely examining 
what is good.  In a subtle critique of his teacher, Plato, he states that his “examination 
is not to know what virtue is, but to become good, since otherwise the inquiry would 
be of no benefit to us” (1103b29-30).  Becoming virtuous requires us to be active.  
Aristotle is interested in behavior modification through action.  Aristotle has been 
called a “thoroughgoing behaviorist” because he believes that “life or psyche is the 
behavior of the organism as a whole in its environment”13.    Since behavior is 
molded by praxis, it is important to understand Aristotle’s analysis of motion.  What 
causes us to move and therefore to act?  The answer to this question is given in some 
detail in 1.5.1 (3) but in short, the reason for movement in all organisms is desire 
(orexis) and it is the object of our desires (to orekton) that causes us to move.   
                                                        
13  Randall, John Herman, Aristotle. Columbia University Press, New York, 1960, p. 66. 
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The fourth notable feature is that Aristotle’s ethical system is not absolutist 
but contextual.  In order to judge a deed as virtuous one must take into account the 
situation, the time, and the individual involved.  Aristotle makes it clear that questions 
of virtue, like questions of health, have no fixed answers.  This is true of a general 
theory of ethical behavior but even more so of moral decisions and behavior in 
particular cases – they are “inexact” (1104a6).  Aristotle points out that we should 
aim for the mean (mesotes) in our action, because excess and deficiency are vices.  
However, the mean that we should aim at is the one that is relative to us, not to the 
object (1106b7).  In order to determine the mean, we make use of phronesis or 
practical wisdom.  Aristotle sums the argument up thus, “Virtue, then, is a state that 
decides, consisting in a mean, the mean relative to us, which is defined by reference 
to reason, that is to say, to the reason by reference to which the prudent person would 
define it” (1107a1-3).  Hence, the contextual nature of ethical situations promotes 
phronesis as a key element in making the correct choices in Aristotle’s ethics. 
The fifth feature of Aristotle’s theory of how one becomes virtuous is his view 
of the psyche, broadly translated as soul.  Briefly, the psyche possesses both emotion 
(pathos) and reason.  Emotions are the well-spring of moral virtues such as courage, 
justice and magnanimity.  Reason is the well-spring of intellectual virtues such as 
intellectual accomplishment (sophia), intelligence (nous), scientific knowledge 
(episteme), and practical wisdom (phronesis).  Emotions and reason work together to 
produce virtuous action.  Thus, Aristotle does not disregard the emotional side of 
human beings in his analysis of virtue formation.  Indeed, virtue is about emotions in 
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that it is about pleasure and pain.  Aristotle understands that “pleasure causes us to do 
base actions, and pain causes us to abstain from fine ones” (1104b10-11).  He states 
very clearly that, “virtue of character is about pleasures and pains” (1104b10).  
Therefore, it follows that people have to be habituated to find enjoyment or pain in 
the right things.  Habituation is achieved through praxis and it is praxis (if done 
correctly) that reinforces the correct emotions that are linked to virtues.  The emotions 
play another role in the ethical process because they are tied with desire (orexis) – a 
constituent cause of motion.  Desire guided by right reason causes us to act.  
 The five features discussed above point to five important concepts in the 
ethical process.  (Two of these, moral virtue and desire interact and relate closely with 
practical wisdom.)  The first concept, an ultimate end, eudaimonia, that guides our 
actions, is necessary for a comprehensive VE theory.  The second relates to the 
development of moral virtues – the focus of VE theories.  If humans are morally 
neutral by nature but possess the capacity to be good or bad, then moral virtue can be 
taught through a method that Aristotle calls habituation.  This method allows us to 
develop good dispositions or hexeis.  Third, praxis is a vital part of virtue.  It thus 
constitutes a good disposition.  Praxis is also relevant to practical wisdom because 
practical wisdom results in praxis.  Fourth, practical wisdom is another important 
concept in the ethical process.  In simplified terms, phronesis guides emotions, 
determines the mean and decides on the correct praxis in particular ethical situations.  
Finally, emotion is another concept in the ethical process.  Desire provides the final 
motivation for virtuous action.  Desire does not do its work in isolation.  Practical 
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wisdom and desire work together.  We desire the good and practical wisdom shows 
us how to achieve it.  Together they result in action.  By doing virtuous deeds 
repeatedly, our emotions are shaped to take pleasure in virtuous actions.  The pleasure 
we obtain from virtuous actions in turn determines the desire of future actions so that 
they align with the good.  Therefore, it is not surprising that Aristotle begins his 
ethical treatise with an examination of eudaimonia, the chief good and ultimate end.  
1.3 Eudaimonia 
 From the fifth century BCE until the modern period, the dominant ethical 
theory has been some version of what we call virtue ethics.14  The classical tradition 
of VE is clearly stated in Aristotle, although it underlies all of ancient ethical theory.15  
Classical VE is concerned with what is the highest or chief good for a human being.  
The answer to this question is the end or telos towards which virtues aim.  Aristotle 
begins and ends the Nicomachean Ethics with an investigation into this highest 
good.16  There are many goods such as health, wealth, pleasure, honor and respect, 
beauty, love and friendship.  Yet, they are not ends in themselves because we want 
them as means towards a higher good.  The latter becomes that for the sake of which.  
If one achieves success in any of the other goods at the expense of the highest good, 
then nothing is gained.   
                                                        
14  Annas, Julia, “Virtue Ethics,” in The Oxford Handbook of Ethical Theory, ed. David 
Copp.  Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2006, p. 515. 
15  Ibid. 
16  Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, trans. Sarah Broadie and Christopher Rowe.  Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 2002.   
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 Aristotle follows Greek convention when he proposes that the highest good is 
eudaimonia.  As pointed out in the definitions section of the Introduction, “happiness” 
is a thin description for eudaimonia17.  While most of Aristotle’s contemporaries 
would agree that eudaimonia is a goal of life, there would be disagreement about 
what eudaimonia actually is.  Aristotle argues that the highest good, eudaimonia, is 
the activity of reason in accordance with excellence, in a complete life (1098a16-19).  
The highest good is the most complete of human ends.  We choose the highest good 
for its own sake and never for anything else, and it is self-sufficient.   Many moral 
philosophers, virtue ethicists included, have a problem accepting that there is a 
highest good that is also an ultimate end in our lives.  Even if there is, we cannot 
define it.  Even if we can define it, what does it have to do with any moral system? 
We must answer these questions before we propose eudaimonia as a necessary feature 
of virtue ethics.  Aristotle is a resource for some justification of the proposition.  (The 
next chapter contains responses to specific objections, such as MacIntyre’s, to the 
claim.) 
1.3.1 Aristotle’s Arguments for Eudaimonia 
 Aristotle’s ethical theory is as much eudaimonistic ethics as it is virtue 
ethics.18  His ethics, as indeed ancient ethical theories, are concerned with the agent’s 
life as a whole, and with her character.  Notions of the agent’s final end, of                                                         
17  Annas (2006), Taylor, Richard, Virtue Ethics.  Amherst: Prometheus Books, 2002, 
Irwin, T.H., “Reason and Responsibility in Aristotle,” in Essays on Aristotle’s Ethics, ed. 
Amelie Oksenberg Rorty.  Berkeley: University of California Press, 1980. 
18  Annas, Julia, The Morality of Happiness.  Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1993, p. 
367. 
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eudaimonia, and of the virtues are what Annas calls primary.19  We start from these 
notions (eudaimonia and virtues), which set up the framework of the theory, and we 
introduce and understand the other notions in terms of them.  These notions are thus 
primary for understanding and they establish the fundamentals of the theory.  
However, they are not basic in the modern sense.  Other concepts are not derived 
from them, nor reduced to them.  However, the notions of final good i.e., eudaimonia, 
virtue, phronesis, are systematically connected.  It would be difficult and undesirable 
(from a pragmatic and aesthetic sense) to tease out any one of these three primary 
ones, that we feel are unsatisfactory or outdated, and then try to make sense of a 
virtue ethics theory as a whole.  Just as Aristotle’s ethical theory is concerned about 
the agent’s life as whole, the theory itself is a holistic one.  Virtue theories, which 
profess to derive from Aristotelian ethics, largely choose to neglect or reduce the role 
of eudaimonia, and instead to focus, at times solely, on virtues.  Consequently, such 
theories lack proportion because they lack a foundation.   
I am not arguing that we must take all of Aristotle unquestioningly, without 
changes.  Clearly, there are some aspects of his virtue ethics that do not comport with 
modernity, such as his illiberal views on women, slaves, his hierarchy of intellectual 
virtues, and the supremacy of a contemplative life.  I am simply arguing that 
eudaimonia, virtues, and practical wisdom are primary notions in his virtue ethics 
theory and that there is good reason for this primacy.  This is not to say that we need 
to take Aristotle’s conception of eudaimonia, virtue, or phronesis wholesale.  Of                                                         
19  Annas (1993), p. 9. 
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course, these concepts in terms of what they are constituted of should be updated.  
For instance, it would be unrealistic to accept that the supreme form of an eudaimon 
life is the contemplative one.  Yet, the general concept of an ultimate end that is, the 
good of humans is relevant and necessary if one is to make sense of a virtue ethics 
theory.   
Thus, I argue that eudaimonia and its role in virtue ethics is still relevant 
today.  Eudaimonia is a necessary base for a comprehensive virtue ethics because 
eudaimonia is the reason to be virtuous.  To be virtuous requires the use of phronesis 
because we must know which virtues are appropriate in different situations.  Thus, the 
three concepts of eudaimonia, virtue, and phronesis are core concepts for a virtue 
ethics theory.  They are interrelated – there cannot be one without the other two.  
Thus, if virtue ethicists include and focus on virtues (as they all seem to) in their 
theories, then they must also include eudaimonia and phronesis.   
Aristotle’s bipartite view on eudaimonia is, of course, infamous.  One version 
is that is elucidated in Book 1 of the NE is a life that is lived in accordance with 
virtue, guided by reason.  This life is an active one in which a person engages fully in 
the world and the life includes all the external goods as far as possible.  Book 10 
describes the contemplative life that is the pinnacle of the highest intellectual virtue, 
i.e. sophia or intellectual accomplishment.  For reasons of focus, this dissertation will 
not spend time debating the interpretations or supremacy of the two versions.  Some 
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have argued that the two positions are irreconcilable.20  The life governed by practical 
wisdom is at odds with the philosophic life because these two lives arise out of the 
hybrid nature of man – the divine versus the human.  I will simply argue that the 
contemplative or philosophical life is one among many that can be eudaimon. 
Writers such as Tuozzo argue that eudaimonia is theoretical contemplation.21 
Tuozzo takes the position that choosing virtuous action is for the sake of 
contemplation.   Ackrill, Cooper, Irwin and Nussbaum claim that choosing virtuous 
action is choosing it for the sake of itself and for eudaimonia.22  This inclusivist 
version is advanced here.  Tuozzo argues that eudaimonia as contemplation is an 
ultimate basis for virtuous actions.  Such actions “effect the psychic leisure that is the 
pre-condition for contemplation.”23  According to the view that I take, virtuous 
actions are done for the sake of eudaimonia, the ultimate good for humans.  
Eudaimonia is an essential part of being a good human being qua human being.  This                                                         
20  Akrill, J.L., "Aristotle on Eudaimonia" and Irwin, T.H., "Permanent Happiness: 
Aristotle and Solon," both in Aristotle's Ethics: Critical Essays, ed. Nancy Sherman.  
Lanham, Maryland: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, 1999.  Wilkes, Kathleen V., “The 
Good Man and the Good for Man in Aristotle’s Ethics,” in Mind, Vol. 87, Np. 348, (October, 
1978), pp.553-571. 
21   Tuozzo, Thomas M., “Contemplation, the Noble, and the Mean: The 
Standard of Moral Virtue in Aristotle’s Ethics”, in Aristotle, Virtue and the Mean, eds. 
Richard Bosley, Roger A. Shiner, Janet D. Sisson.  Edmonton, Alberta: Academic Printing & 
Publishing, 1996.  See also Tuozzo, Thomas, M., “Aristotle’s Theory of the Good and Its 
Causal Basis” Phronesis Vol. 40 No. 3 (1995), pp. 293-314. 
22  Akrill, J.L., “Aristotle on Eudaimonia,” in Essays on Aristotle’s Ethics, ed. Amelie 
Oksenberg Rorty.  Berkeley: University of California Press, 1980; Cooper, John M., Reason 
and Human Good in Aristotle.  Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing, 1986; Irwin, T.H.,  “Stoic 
and Aristotelian conceptions of Happiness,” in The Norms of Nature: Studies in Hellenistic 
Ethics eds. M. Schofield and G. Striker.  Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1988; 
Nussbaum, Martha C., The Fragility of Goodness.  Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
2001 (updated edition). 
23  Tuozzo (1996), p. 150. 
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naturalistic view is one put forward by Rosalind Hursthouse and will be discussed in 
detail in Chapter 3.  Briefly, there are two measures for validating the virtues.  First, 
virtues benefit the possessors.  Secondly, living in accordance with the virtues enables 
us to live as good human beings qua human beings.  These two features spring from 
the claim that virtues are required for eudaimonia, and are in turn interrelated.  As 
such the basis of virtuous actions is our human nature and not contemplation.   
My position on eudaimonia means that I will abandon Aristotle’s hierarchy of 
the intellectual virtues that are described in section 1.5.  I do not think that his 
categorization of the intellect into practical and theoretical reason is unreasonable.  
However, unlike Aristotle, I will not make any claims as to the superiority of one 
over the other.  As pointed out in the previous section, there are various reasons for 
the discomfort some virtue ethicists have for eudaimonia.  I believe that if we update 
the concept of eudaimonia by taking an inclusivist, naturalistic view of it and 
broadening its definition to include contemporary views of happiness (see section 
3.4), we can perhaps make the concept more palatable to virtue ethicists.    
 While Aristotle’s high regard of intellectual accomplishment may be outdated 
and unnecessary for modern virtue ethics, his arguments for an ultimate end, and why 
this ultimate end is eudaimonia are still relevant.  He provides arguments for his use 
of eudaimonia as a primary concept in his ethics.  The arguments are both empirically 
based and logically argued.  By and large, the inquiry proceeds by dialectical 
argument, beginning with the accepted beliefs (ta endoxa).  Thus, Aristotle frequently 
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employs an endoxic procedure for justifying his ethical propositions.24  His 
investigation usually starts with a survey of the opinions of reputable people (the wise 
and the notable) and of ordinary people who have some experience of the 
phenomenon under study.  He works through the difficulties and puzzles (hai 
aporiai), and arrives at first principles that are essentially a refined and systematized 
version of some subset of accepted beliefs.  Aristotle’s arguments in Book 1 of the 
Nicomachean Ethics move as follows.   
(1) There is an ultimate end that is the chief good.  
(2) This chief good, our ultimate end, is eudaimonia. 
(3) Eudaimonia is complete and self-sufficient. 
(4) Moral virtues aim towards the ultimate end, which is eudaimonia.  Virtuous acts 
are done for the sake of eudaimonia. 
(5) Moral virtues are realized in action (praxis).  Therefore, from (4), action is aimed 
towards eudaimonia. 
(6) Phronesis involves choice and initiates action.  
Moral virtues are the affective part of the virtues while phronesis is one of the two 
categories of intellectual virtues, the other being intellectual accomplishment 
(sophia).  This chapter covers Aristotle’s view of moral virtue in section 1.4 and 
phronesis in 1.5.  Meanwhile, statements (1) to (3) require elucidation.   
                                                        
24  Kraut argues strongly for the endoxic method of justifying propositions.  However, 
Aristotle uses other methods such as logical arguments and analogy as well.  See Richard 
Kraut, “How to Justify Ethical Propositions: Aristotle’s Method”, in Blackwell’s Guide to 
Aristotle’s Nicomachean Ethics, ed. Richard Kraut.  Oxford: Blackwell Publishing, 2006. 
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(1) There is an Ultimate End that is the Chief Good 
 The first part of Book 1 in NE argues that there is a highest good that Aristotle 
considers the ultimate end of rational, living beings.  The celebrated first two 
sentences of the Nicomachean Ethics state: 
Every art and every inquiry, and similarly every action and choice, is 
thought to aim at some good; and for this reason, the good has rightly 
been declared to be  that at which all things aim.  (1094a1-2) 
 
Commentators accuse Aristotle of committing a fallacy in these opening lines.  He 
moves from ‘Each thing aims at a good’ to ‘there is a good at which each thing aims’.  
However, this accusation proves false because Aristotle has merely jumped ahead of 
his arguments, which he proceeds to give in the following two chapters.  Broadie 
ventures that the second sentence is, for Aristotle, a hypothetical at this point.25  First, 
he must argue for its antecedent. 
 Empirical evidence bolsters the proposition that there is a good towards which 
all things aim.  Surely, we see (and it seems virtually tautological) that every craft 
aims at some goal, the achievement of which would constitute an effective 
performance of the craft.  He gives examples of the end of medicine being health, 
generalship being victory, and economics being wealth.  If something like medicine 
aims at health, and health is a good, then broadly stated, the objective of medicine is 
good.  Therefore, in a sense this objective is the same as the objective of navigation, 
namely safe passage at sea, because the latter is good also.  Thus, the good is the                                                         
25  Broadie, Sarah, Ethics with Aristotle.  Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1991, p 8-9. 
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formal object of aiming.  One could object that not all our actions or activities may be 
aimed at a good.  Some deliberated actions have aims that we recognize to be no good 
or positively evil.  Yet, the agent sees something good in the outcome he was trying 
to bring about.  Even the case where an agent aims at something she considers evil, 
the action is incomprehensible unless there is some aspect somewhere of the aim 
which gives the agent a good to try to bring it about even if it is the pleasure of 
revenge.26  The claim that all action is aimed at some good has intuitive plausibility, 
arising from the thoughts we have when we try to understand the actions of others 
and ourselves.27  From the proposition that every craft and action has an end that is its 
good, Aristotle moves on to say that similarly life as a whole should have an end.  
Aristotle argues that this end is the ultimate end and is also the highest good. 
 Once again, Aristotle’s argument that there is a highest good rests on both 
empirical evidence and argument.  There are many goods, but some goods are higher 
than others.  Health and wealth are limited goods because we wish to have them for 
their own sakes as well as the sake of a higher good.  Indeed, there is a hierarchy of 
goods such that some goods are aimed for the sake of a higher ranked good.  Life is 
not simply one end after another.  Even if we do not realize it consciously, our ends 
are part of a hierarchy in which they are subordinate to other ends.  
 Some interpreters have criticized this argument that it is vain and empty to 
have a progression of higher goods going into infinity as being a simple fallacy, or 
                                                        
26  Annas (1993), p. 31. 
27  Ibid . 
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one with extreme but hidden complexity.28  Anscombe finds an illicit transition from 
all chains must stop somewhere to the claim that there is somewhere where all chains 
stop.29  Hardie however is inclined to acquit Aristotle of this fallacy in view of the 
fact that the possibility of a plurality of ends is mentioned in I.7 (1097a22-24) and 
that he certainly knew that men enjoy and desire many different objects.  If the 
sentence is read in the context of the passage it has a coherent meaning.30  It is best to 
draw out the intuitive consequences of Aristotle’s observations.31  Any action is 
intuitively understood as being aimed at the production of some good.  If asked why I 
pursue this good, the answer will typically be that it is part of a hierarchy of goods.  
Thus, in modern capitalist societies, individuals do not pursue wealth just for the sake 
of wealth but for other ends, such as power, recognition, winning a perceived 
competition with peers.  We cannot have this sequence of aiming towards a higher 
level good extend into infinity because it would make our desire empty and vain 
(1094a21).  If we ask why the limited ends aimed at by crafts and activities are good, 
in no case will the answer rest simply with a description of the product or activity 
itself.32  Thus, why pursue wealth that is for the sake of recognition?  Recognition is 
for the sake of assurance that we are successful.  This progression of ends leads to the 
ultimate end that is some (in this case, ill-conceived) notion of eudaimonia.  In each                                                         
28  See Kenny, Anthony, “Happiness” in Feinberg, J. (Ed.) Moral Concepts, p. 43-52, 
Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1969; Williams, B. “Aristotle on the Good”, Philosophical 
Quarterly Vol. 12, 1962, pp. 289-96; Kirwin, C. “Logic and the Good in Aristotle”, 
Philosophical Quarterly Vol. 17, 1967, pp. 97-114. 
29  Anscombe, G.E.M., Intention.  Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1957, p. 34. 
30  Hardie, W.F.R., Aristotle's Ethical Theory.  Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1980, p.17. 
31  Annas (1993), p. 31. 
32  Broadie (1991), p. 9. 
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case, the enjoyment contributes to something that is not, and is not the product of, any 
one of these limited goods such as health, wealth, or honor.  The pleasure contributes 
to the good life.  Therefore, there is a chief and final good towards which all goods 
aim. 
 To counter the rejoinder that aiming towards a higher good can continue onto 
infinity without encountering a final good, Aristotle turns, once more, to our human 
experience to show that there is an ultimate end.  Human societies exist and they are 
organized.  This organization is a result of rational activity of government that aims 
towards the good of all.  The good at which all things aim has been identified as the 
objective of those who govern.  It is the objective of the politikos or statesman 
(1094a25-b10).  The good of the polis towards which the statesman aims is the same 
conceptually as the good that an individual aims towards so that, “the good is the 
same for a single person and for a city (1094b8)”   
 Aristotle remarks in later chapters of Book 1 that we may have more than one 
aim in life, which we want for its own sake, like health and honor.  These goods can 
be aimed at for themselves as well as for the sake of a further or wider aim.  
However, there will only be a single aim in our life, which we aim at solely for its 
own sake and not for the sake of any further aim.  Aristotle’s argument is not one 
about what we should do, but an explication of what we do do.33  We may not realize 
consciously that we are doing this, or perhaps we do not take the time or have the 
capacity to understand that we have a final end.  McDowell argues that Aristotle’s                                                         
33  Annas (1993), p. 32. 
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thesis that eudaimonia is the chief good, the end for all that we do is indeed an 
indicative thesis and not a gerundive one.34  In other words, the thesis is claiming that 
eudaimonia is that for whose sake all action is undertaken. 35  The thesis is not 
claiming that eudaimonia is that for whose sake all action ought to be undertaken.  
People do not just aim at health just for its own sake, but also for the sake of an 
ultimate end.  We do pursue the limited goods because we see them as contributing to 
our telos, or ultimate end, which is our highest good.   Aristotle recognizes the 
possibility of living a life in which one has several ends, not subordinated to an 
ultimate end.  He speaks of this possibility at the end of Eudemian Ethics I 1, when he 
writes about people who think that living happily is composed of two or more aims, 
such as virtue, pleasure and so on (1214b3-5).  These people are however, 
unreflective.  Either they have not yet thought through the implications of considering 
one’s life as whole or dissonance between two or more uncoordinated ends will 
pressure the agent to continue towards recognizing a single ultimate end.    
(2) The Ultimate End, that is the Chief Good, is Eudaimonia 
 This single ultimate end is eudaimonia.  Both ordinary people and people of 
quality agree on this view.  They also agree that living well and doing well are the 
same thing as being happy (1095a17-19).  However, the agreement ends here because                                                         
34  McDowell, John, “The Role of Eudaimonia in Aristotle’s Ethics” in Essays on 
Aristotle’s Ethics, ed. Amelie Rorty.  Berkeley: University of California Press, 1980, p. 359. 
35  The thesis that we have a final end that is empirically based does not mean that it is 
the end of ethics.  People still need to think about what that final end is, and how one reaches 
it.  We need to investigate what is the final good, how we can achieve it, what are the virtues, 
how one becomes virtuous, and how we develop into people who allow reason to guide our 
emotions. 
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people differ on the finer definitions of eudaimonia.  From Aristotle’s detailed 
discussion, we derive the following definition of eudaimonia: 
1. It is complete 
2. It is self-sufficient 
3. It is the chief good of a happy human life 
4. It requires the use of our reason 
5. Our reason is employed in the practice of virtues 
6. It is accomplished in a complete life 
 We start our inquiry into eudaimonia from what is knowable (1095b5).  There 
are three kinds of lives that one might pursue: the life of consumption, the life of 
honor, and the life of contemplation.  The first two are dismissed as candidates for 
eudaimon lives because honor and wealth are pursued for the sake of something else.  
If eudaimonia is the ultimate end, then it is not pursued for anything else.  Indeed it is 
that for which everything else aims.  Eudaimonia is therefore complete without 
qualification because it is desirable for itself and not for something else.  We choose 
health, wealth, honor, intelligence, beauty because of themselves but we also choose 
them for the sake of happiness.  We do not seek happiness for the sake of these other 
goods, nor in general for anything else (1097a34-b6).  Eudaimonia is also self-
sufficient because in itself it makes life desirable and lacking in nothing (1097b15).  
Thus, the completeness and self-sufficient aspects of eudaimonia qualify it as the 
chief good.   
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 Aristotle feels that the term needs further refinement for to merely say that 
eudaimonia is the chief good is a little empty in content.  At this juncture, he turns to 
the ergon or function argument.    We judge whether an activity, such as sculpting, or 
a thing is doing well by the degree of excellence in the performance of its main 
function.  Aristotle argues that if a carpenter or shoemaker has a function surely, 
human beings must have one too (1097b25-30).  What is the function that is peculiar 
just to human beings?  It is not the nutritive function because we share that with 
plants and animals.  Nor is it the perceptual function because we share that with 
animals.  Humans are the only animals that can reason.  Therefore, reasoning is the 
activity that is peculiar to human beings.  This ability distinguishes our species from 
all others on the planet (as far as we know; there are no signs of whale civilization as 
yet).  If happiness is living well and doing well, then according to the function 
argument, the achievement of these two goals is through the best use of our reason.  
In addition, the words “living” and “doing” are active verbs.  These words suggest 
that we must engage in an active life (1099a5).  It is no good simply sitting and 
thinking about virtue, we must be actively engaged in the practice of virtue in order to 
be eudaimon.  Aristotle writes: “Just as at the Olympic Games it is not the finest and 
the strongest that are crowned but those who compete (for the winners come from 
among these), so too in life it is the doers that become achievers of fine and good 
things – and rightly so” (1099a4-6).  Nor can we be eudaimon with just one day’s 
worth of virtuous activity.  “For a single swallow does not make spring, nor does a 
single day” (1098a20).  We must live a complete life of virtue guided by reason.  
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Finally, according to the function argument, the good of a thing or activity is in the 
excellent use of its prime function.  A good pianist plays the piano well.  Similarly, a 
human being is good who lives a life of virtuous activity according to reason. 
  Aristotle argues that his account of eudaimonia is in agreement with views 
held by the Ancients and people of high reputation.  Moreover, being virtuous is not 
painful to the virtuous.  Indeed, it would feel good (1099a13-15).  There is a 
naturalness to being virtuous.  Aristotle sums up eudaimonia so, “the human good 
turns out to be activity of soul in accordance with virtue (and if there are more virtues 
than one, in accordance with the best and the most complete).  But furthermore it will 
be this in a complete life” (1098a16-19).   
1.3.2 Eudaimonia: Inclusivist versus Dominant View 
 There has been some discussion of whether eudaimonia consists in one good 
alone, or a composite of all intrinsic goods.  J.L. Akrill and Irwin take the latter or 
inclusivist view.36  Akrill defines an inclusive end as a combination of two or more 
values, activities, or goods.  Kraut, Hardie, and Kenny expound the former or 
dominant end view of eudaimonia.37  According to this view, eudaimonia consists in 
just one type of good i.e., virtuous activity according to reason.   In I.8, Aristotle 
identifies the end with activities of the soul rather than with goods of the body or 
external goods.  If he thought eudaimonia was a composite of health, physical 
                                                        
36  See Akrill, J.L., "Aristotle on Eudaimonia" and Irwin, T.H., "Permanent Happiness: 
Aristotle and Solon," both in Aristotle's Ethics: Critical Essays, ed. Nancy Sherman.  
Lanham, Maryland: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, 1999. 
37  Kraut (1999), Hardie (1984), Kenny (1965) 
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pleasure, friends, etc. he would have stated that eudaimonia is not only a good of the 
soul but also an external good and a good of the body.38  Kraut argues that external 
goods are desirable for the sake of eudaimonia and that they therefore, lack one of the 
characteristics of the chief good (self-sufficiency).    
 In a related question as to whether virtuous activity is necessary and sufficient 
for eudaimonia, Aristotle admits that we require a minimum level of wealth, health, 
honor, and fortune in order to be ideally eudaimon (1100b20-1101a5).  Misfortunes 
may obstruct virtuous activity.  However, "a eudaimon man will never become 
miserable, though neither will he be blessed if he meets with fortunes like Priam's” 
(1101a6-8).   Even though an individual may require a minimum level of other goods 
to be fully eudaimon, the cause of their goodness is eudaimonia.  For, "[eudaimonia] 
is a principle; for it is for the sake of eudaimonia that we all do everything else we do, 
and we lay it down that the principle and cause of goods is something honorable and 
godlike” (1102a2-4).  Thus, Kraut claims on textual grounds that external goods will 
support virtuous activity, but are not themselves "components of the ultimate end of a 
happy life."39 
 On modernity grounds, however, the inclusivist view is more appropriate. 
Aristotle's ergon argument and subsequent definition of eudaimonia seem to support 
the dominant view.  Yet, he does add that eudaimonia is found in a complete life.  
One that is enjoyable and worthwhile all through.  Eudaimonia is a compound of a 
                                                        
38  Kraut (1999), p. 82 
39  Kraut (1999), p. 85. 
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life lived according to virtue that includes pleasure, success, friendship, and other 
enriching relationships.  This version of eudaimonia is more in accord with 
contemporary society.  We can interpret Aristotle in an inclusivist way when he says 
that eudaimonia is final, self-sufficient, and more desirable than everything else by 
arguing that eudaimonia includes everthing desirable in itself.  When Aristotle says 
that A is for the sake of B, he need not mean that A is a means to B but he may mean 
that A contributes as a constituent of B.40  He could mean that good actions are for the 
sake of eudaimonia, not that eudaimonia consists in single type of activity.  Hence, 
just because we pursue an activity because it leads to the final end of eudaimonia, 
does not mean that we do not find the activity to be intrinsically worthwhile.  
Eudaimonia is the most desirable sort of life, the life that contains all intrinsically 
worthwhile activities.41  Chapter 3 expounds on this line of thought when it examines 
the foundational role of eudaimonia in virtue ethics. 
Having established a working definition of eudaimonia in Book 1, Aristotle 
moves on to describe the virtues and how they are directed towards this highest good.  
There are two kinds of virtues or human virtues: those of intellect and those of 
character.  The former are intellectual virtues and the latter are moral virtues.  In 
Book VI of the Nicomachean Ethics, Aristotle distinguishes two main forms of the 
former: a theoretical one, which he names ‘sophia’ and a practical one, which he calls 
                                                        
40  Akrill (1999), p. 73. 
41  Akrill (1999), p. 63. 
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‘phronesis’.  To aim for virtuous actions would require attaining both moral virtue 
and phronesis.   
1.4 Moral Virtue 
 To understand Aristotle’s views on moral virtues is to consider his formal 
definition:  
 [Moral] Virtues, then, is a disposition issuing in decisions, 
depending on intermediacy of the kind relative to us, this being 
determined by rational prescription and in a way in which the wise 
person would determine it.  And it is intermediacy between two bad 
states, one involving excess, the other involving deficiency. 
       (II, 6, 1106b36-1107a3) 
Dispositions are properties of things which give rise to fixed patterns of behavior.  A 
habitual disposition, which Aristotle calls a hexis, also has a basis in nature, in that 
we are naturally capable of developing such a habit.  In II 6, Aristotle develops his 
account of the way in which the emotions are involved in moral virtue.  The habitual 
disposition to respond emotionally will be a virtue only if the pattern of emotional 
responses is appropriate.   
1.4.1 Hexis 
 Aristotle gives a detailed description of the mechanism that results in hexis 
formation.  Although the word ‘mechanism’ may imply that the process is 
mechanistic, it is certainly not.  Rather, the process is organic and fluid because we 
are after all, studying human behavior.  It is generally accepted that the critical 
faculties do not play a significant role in hexis formation.  However, Sherman has 
offered another interpretation in which she argues that critical faculties such as the 
perceptual, affective and deliberative capacities are a resource and at the same time 
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developed during hexis formation42.  Her theory is aimed at answering the question of 
how a person transitions from childhood to moral maturity that is not addressed in the 
theory of habituation.  How does a child with merely habituated virtue ever develop 
the capacities requisite for practical reason and inseparable from full virtue?  Her 
overall claim is that, “if full virtue is to meet certain conditions, then this must be 
reflected in the educational process.  The child must be seen as being educated 
towards that end.  This will require a developmental conception of cognitive and 
affective capacities, as well as a conception of habituation as in varying degrees 
reflective and critical.”43  Hence, for Sherman critical faculties are used in the 
habituation process.  Burnyeat44 and Sorabji45 have also argued for the significance of 
critical faculties in the habituation process.  Sorabji writes, “The first thing to notice 
is that it [habituation] is not a mindless process .… habituation involves assessing the 
situation and seeing what is called for.  So habituation is intimately linked with the 
kind of intuitive perception (nous) …. Habituation is concerned with desire as well as 
with reason.”46  It is his opinion therefore, that induction, as well as habituation, 
forms part of moral education. 
 The purpose of moral education is to develop an individual’s virtuous hexeis. 
Hexeis have a central role in Aristotle’s ethical process because virtue is not a feeling                                                         
42  Sherman, Nancy, The Fabric of Character: Aristotle’s Theory of Virtue. Clarendon 
Press, Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1989, Chapter 5. 
43  Sherman (1989), pp. 159-161. 
44  Burnyeat, Miles, “Aristotle on Learning to be Good”, in A.O. Rorty (ed.), Essays on 
Aristotle’s Ethics (University of California Press, Berkeley, 1980). 
45  Sorabji, Richard, “Aristotle on the Role of Intellect in Virtue”, in A.O. Rorty (ed.), 
Essays on Aristotle’s Ethics (University of California Press, Berkeley, 1980). 
46  Sorabji (1980), p.216. 
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or a capacity but it is a hexis (NE II.5).  To become virtuous therefore, one has to 
possess the right hexeis.  Formation of good hexeis must begin early in one’s life (NE 
1103b23-25).  The reason for this is that Aristotle believes that a hexis develops from 
habituation and early childhood training is crucial in instilling the correct hexis in an 
individual.  As habituation is best begun at an early age the most influential teachers 
will be parents and the immediate family unit, perhaps older siblings.  Trainers will 
also include close members of the extended family, teachers and the larger 
community.  The virtues that they teach will be the ones that are valued by their 
society and especially by the particular socio-economic group to which they belong.   
Parents and other teachers instill virtue through practice, encouraging the 
young to do the right things repeatedly with the right feeling.  Aristotle writes:  
But these actions are not only the sources and causes both of the emergence 
and growth of virtues and of their ruin; the activities of the virtues [once we 
have acquired them] also consist in these same actions.  For this is also true of 
more evident cases; strength, for instance, arises from eating a lot and from 
withstanding much hard labor, and it is the strong person who is most capable 
of these very actions.  It is the same with the virtues.  For abstaining from 
pleasures makes us become temperate, and once we have become temperate 
we are most capable of abstaining from pleasures.  It is similar with bravery; 
habituation in disdain for frightening situations and in standing firm against 
them makes us become brave, and once we have become brave we shall be 
most capable of standing firm (NE 1104b2-4).      
 
As Aristotle says more simply in the Rhetoric: “Acts are done from habit because 
individuals have done them may times before” (Rh 1369b6).  Through repetition an 
acquired hexis becomes almost natural, or second nature, “For as soon as a thing 
becomes habituated it is virtually natural.  For habit is similar to nature.  For what 
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happens often is akin to what happens always, natural events happening always, 
habitual events being frequent and repeated” (Rh 1370a6).   
In forming a hexis through habituation one therefore works on the pathe, and 
the resulting praxis.   In shaping the pathe, one works on two aspects:  pleasure and 
pain and determining the mean of every pathos.  Aristotle is clear that virtue is about 
pleasure and pain (NE 1104b9).  The basis for this assertion is based on the argument 
that virtues are concerned with praxis and pathe.  Every pathos and every praxis 
implies pleasure or pain, hence for this reason virtue is about pleasure and pain (NE 
1104b114-16).  Pleasure causes a person to do base actions, and pain causes a person 
to abstain from fine ones.  Hence, a virtuous individual must be taught to feel 
pleasure or to bear the pain of right actions.   This goal is not easy because even if 
man is not inherently good or bad, he does tend to naturally pursue pleasure and avoid 
pain.  Countering this natural instinct is difficult but failure to do so will lead to vice.                                                                                                                                        
1.4.2 The Mean                                                                                      
The other aspect of guiding the pathe in order to develop a good hexis is to 
practice determining the mean or intermediate of each pathos.  To be virtuous is to 
find the mean of every pathos and praxis in each particular ethical situation.    
Aristotle believes that vice lies in the excess or deficiency of some virtue.  For 
instance, an excess of bravery is rashness and a deficiency is cowardice; an excess of 
generosity is wastefulness and the deficiency is ungenerosity.  It is important 
therefore to aim at the mean, a task that is not at all easy, in order to have any virtue.  
Not only should we aim at the mean of a pathos but we should also target the mean in 
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our actions since virtue is both feelings and deeds.  The mean cannot be realized 
unless reason comes to our aid.  Cultivating the hexeis to feel fear, anger, compassion 
or pity appropriately will be bound up with learning how to discern the circumstances 
that warrant these responses.  Hitting the mean in our feelings and action cannot be 
achieved without critical judgment47. 
 A rather prosaic (for others, though not for me) example of hexis formation is 
how we are teaching our eight year old daughter, Shera, a.k.a. Peanut, to be brave, not 
in battle but in facing new situations, people and activities.  As we wish to cultivate a 
sense of adventure in her, we want her to try new things.  When she is clearly afraid 
of a new situation, we try to calm her fears by explaining how much fun it will be to 
try out the new activity, the new friends she will make, and other pleasurable 
outcomes.  Hence, in this way we lessen her fear to a more intermediate (mean) level 
and show her the pleasurable effect of the action of trying a new thing.  All this we do 
through reason, as far as possible for her age.  Although young, she is not closed to all 
reason because as Sherman states, “to lack deliberative skills at a certain stage does 
not imply the absence of other cognitive capacities specific to ethical response”48.  
Aristotle has made it clear that critical activity and its enjoyment characterize all 
stages of development.49  Often we persuade by example, i.e., we perform the task or 
enter the situation that we advocate.  In fact, at early stages, discriminatory activity 
                                                        
47  Sherman (1989), p.167. 
48  Sherman (1989), p. 161. 
49  Sherman (1989), p. 167. 
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will often take the form of mimesis.50  Through imitation, Peanut and almost every 
child learns to size up situations that then adds to her store of experience and trains 
her cognitive abilities.  These abilities then go on to inform her future reactions and 
emotions. 
1.4.3 Desire  
In the same vein reason also informs desire, which is another element that 
goes towards forming a hexis.  From Aristotle's description of the soul, the non-
rational part (to orektikon) i.e. appetites, emotions and in general pathe, does not 
engage in reasoning but can listen to reason and thus partake of reason in a certain 
way51.  The role of desire is to provide a telos towards which the organism moves.  
Aristotle believes that reason is not the source of motion but rather it steers desire so 
that it becomes focused and controlled in specific ways.  Hence, while telos is 
supplied by desire, it is also focused and directed by reason.   In the Rhetoric, 
Aristotle outlines that passions are selective responses to articulated features of our 
environment.  This sort of selectivity characterizes, on Aristotle’s view, the desires of 
both humans and animals.  The agent moved by thirst or hunger responds cognitively 
to those features of the environment that can satisfy the need.  In the case of ethical 
situations, the need is focused on the good.  In this way, desires are prepared by 
cognition.52   In the formation of hexis, desires provide the ethical telos that cause us 
to act.  In acting virtuously repeatedly, our emotions are shaped to appreciate virtuous                                                         
50  Sherman (1989), p.168. 
51  Sherman (1989), p. 162 
52  Sherman (1989), p. 169. 
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action.  In turn, it is the pleasure that we derive from a particular virtuous activity that 
shapes our future desire so that we desire to perform that activity again. 
A more exalted example of hexis formation through habituation can be given 
of the training of a warrior (in modern parlance, military person) to be brave.  She is 
first trained for bravery in boot camp.  She learns the skills and then she learns to get 
the right feelings of bravery in battle.  Close comrades whose views of the individual 
matter a great deal to that individual reinforce these feelings.  Therefore, she must be 
brave so that her comrades think of her as brave.  If a hexis of bravery is ingrained, 
eventually the individual will not need other people in order to assess herself.  She 
will associate bravery with the noble and an end in itself. 
   The discussion can be summed up in the figure below that gives a 
diagrammatic representation of the elements and their relationships that make up a 
hexis.  Two thoughts should be noted.  First, it can be seen that emotion is a part of 
desire.  It is not uncommon knowledge that our desires are stirred by our passions.  
The definition of anger illustrates this: ‘Anger is a desire [orexis] accompanied by 
pain towards the revenge of what one regards as a slight towards oneself or one’s 
friends that is unwarranted” (Rh 1378a30-32).  Second, the entire system of a hexis is 
self-perpetuating, as Aristotle makes clear, “These actions are not only the sources 
and causes both of the emergence and growth of virtues and of their ruin; the 
activities of the virtues [once we have acquired them] also consist in these same 
actions. Hence, the ontology of a hexis is like an actualization (entelechy) or essence 
(ti en einai).  It is therefore self-maintaining. 
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    The Character of a Hexis 
    [Orexis------to orekton]------(gives telos)----Critical Faculties 
    --------- Emotion<--------<-guides-------------- 
 The Mean (Moral Virtue) 
    --------- Praxis<--------<-guides------------- 
           
    External Environment 
 
When Aristotle speaks of moral virtues as a mean position between excess and 
deficiency, he is not saying that the virtuous person is one who is by character 
disposed to have only moderate emotional responses.  The appropriate emotional 
response depends on the situation: "to be affected when one should, at the things one 
should, in relation to the people once should, for the reasons one should, and in the 
way one should, is both intermediate and best, which is what belongs to excellence” 
(1106b21-24). 
 Appropriate responses are ones that are in accord with the judgment of a 
person who has practical wisdom or the phronimos.  For an emotional response to be 
virtuous, it must accord with what reason judges to be the true demands of the 
situation, because reason aims for the truth.  Aristotle does not believe that it is 
possible to be truly virtuous unless one has already acquired the ability to think 
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correctly about moral decisions.53  For Aristotle, virtue is not simply a habit in 
accordance with right reason, but a habit, which exists alongside right reason.  It is 
not possible for someone to be fully virtuous without practical wisdom, nor to have 
practical wisdom without virtue (VI, 13, 1144b26-32). 
1.5 Phronesis 
 First, the caveat.  We go through Aristotle’s metaphysics of the soul in order 
to see how reason and emotion interact and connect.  We need not and should not 
accept the metaphysics completely.  His hierarchy of the soul is not necessary to 
support the argument that reason and emotion work together to form a desire for 
correct action in a situation.  Yet, we can agree with Aristotle that humans possess 
both reason and emotions.  We wish to see how Aristotle arrives at his theory of 
virtuous actions, involving eudaimonia, virtues and practical wisdom.  His 
elaboration of practical wisdom continues to be relevant to our current understanding 
of the concept.  It is not surprising that some modern virtue ethicists dissect practical 
wisdom in much the same way as Aristotle.54  A study of his theory of the soul is 
instructive for these reasons. 
For Aristotle, the soul has two parts: one that is non-rational and the other that 
possesses reason (1102a28).  Part of the non-rational soul participates, in a way, in 
reason.  The self-controlled person is the object of praise because she controls her 
emotional impulses by following the lead of reason.  The moderate and courageous                                                         
53  Hughes, Gerard, Aristotle on Ethics.  London: Routledge, 2001, pp. 108-109. 
54  For instance, Rosalind Hursthouse in On Virtue Ethics, Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 1999. 
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person is even more willing to listen to reason.  The appetitive or desiring part 
participates in reason, in that it listens and obeys reason (1102b25 – 29) at least in the 
continent person.  From Aristotle’s discussion of the two parts of the non-rational 
soul, we infer that the importance of any component of the soul correlates with the 
measure of its engagement with reason.  In the NE, the appetitive part of the soul is 
described as participating in reason but distinct from reason, fighting reason in the 
incontinent man, obeying reason in the continent man, and harmonizing with reason 
in the virtuous man.  In the Eudemian Ethics (EE) the appetitive part of the soul also 
participates in reason, having by nature the power to obey and listen and to follow the 
rational part (1219b28 – 30; 1220a9 – 11).  Aristotle goes on to categorize the virtues 
pertaining to the appetitive part of the soul as virtues of character.  The virtues are 
dispositions to feel emotions (and do actions) of the appropriate sort.  Aristotle makes 
it very clear that there can be no phronesis without moral virtue and no moral virtue 
without phronesis (1144b40 – 43).   
 Aristotle characterizes the types of intellectual excellences according to the 
types of data, which they assimilate, and the ends of these excellences.  The rational 
soul has five states which can know the truth: techne (technical expertise), episteme 
(systematic knowledge), phronesis (wisdom), sophia (intellectual accomplishment), 
and nous (intelligence).  Episteme, nous, and sophia are intellectual dispositions that 
are concerned with knowledge of the things that cannot be otherwise.  Techne and 
phronesis deal with knowledge of the changeable.  Aristotle first distinguishes 
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between the three “theoretical” intellectual dispositions before he classifies nous and 
episteme as parts of sophia.   
 It is phronesis that has to do with things human (1141b8).  While sophia is the 
proper arête of the epistemonikon (scientific part), which is concerned with eternal 
truths, phronesis is the proper arete of the logistikon (calculative part and named from 
the sense of logizesthai in which it is equivalent to bouleuesthai, or deliberation)55.  
Phronesis is closely identified with deliberation and is defined as, “that [which] has to 
do with things human and with things one can deliberate about” (1141b8 – 10).  
Aristotle emphasizes the importance of deliberation in connection with phronesis, 
particularly in NE VI.9.  Yet, other intellectual excellences are also required for 
phronesis and he discusses them in later chapters of the book.   
 According to Bostock, phronesis has six primary aspects.  First, phronesis is 
an intellectual virtue concerned with truth about mutable matters and with particulars.  
Second, phronesis is ends driven where the end is the whole good of the person.  
Third, phronesis results in action.  Fourth, phronesis is deliberative rather than 
intuitive.  Fifth, as we shall show in section V, phronesis is irretrievably connected 
with moral virtue, providing the right reasoning for achieving the ends that are 
determined by moral virtue.  Sixth, the union of phronesis and moral virtue is 
dependent on the pre-existence of natural qualities, intellectual and affective56.   In 
                                                        
55  Bostock D., Aristotle’s Ethics. Oxford: Oxford University Press, (2000), p.166. 
56  Bostock (2000), p.163. 
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chapter 4, we discuss these aspects at greater length, especially as they relate to the 
essential role of phronesis in a virtue ethics theory. 
 Chapters 9, 10, and 11 of NE VI list the other intellectual virtues, which are 
required for phronesis.  However, these chapters also distinguish phronesis from these 
intellectual virtues.  Deliberation, comprehension, sense, and cleverness are required 
for and yet, are not the same as phronesis.  We mean by deliberation, the virtue of 
good deliberation (euboulia).  Comprehension (sunesis) is the capacity to sum up a 
situation and it looks at things over which one puzzles and about which one 
deliberates (1143a7).  It helps phronesis to discriminate in different situations.  
Comprehension is a capacity that phronesis requires but phronesis encompasses much 
more than comprehension.  Phronesis is prescriptive, it informs an action, whereas 
comprehension is merely discriminative (1143a10).  Like comprehension, sense 
(gnome) has a function that has to do with selection for Aristotle describes it as 
making correct discrimination of what is reasonable (1143a21 – 22).  Sense is an 
intellectual excellence that engages in sympathy so that we speak of having a “shared 
sense”  (1143a20).  
 There is a further capacity that Aristotle explicitly says is requisite for 
practical wisdom (1144a28 – 29).  This capacity is cleverness.  Aristotle defines 
cleverness: “…such that, when it comes to the things that conduce to a proposed goal, 
it is able to carry these out and do so successfully”  (1144a25 – 26).  Bostock argues 
 47 
that cleverness is simply a new name for deliberation57.  The difference is just that 
cleverness is an ethically neutral term and defines someone who is good at achieving 
a stated goal, whether the goal is good or bad.  Good deliberation applies to those 
whose goals are good.  Urmson disagrees arguing that cleverness is not the same as 
deliberation because it is an executive skill rather than a planning skill58.  For 
deliberation is “not about ends, but about what forwards those ends.”  Deliberation is 
about planning towards a goal while cleverness implements that plan.  Cleverness has 
its place after deliberation has ended and the plan made.  Cleverness cannot discern 
between a good goal and a bad goal.  It merely implements a plan towards a goal.  To 
discern between good and bad goals is the job of phronesis.  A wicked man may 
possess executive ability as well as a wise one.  Such a man may execute a plan 
towards a bad goal.  Bostock’s and Urmson’s views stand at two extremes; that 
cleverness and deliberation are basically the same or that they are completely 
different.  I would suggest that they are closely connected.  Under the right conditions 
and if aimed at the right goal cleverness can become phronesis, which is concerned 
with deliberation.  Cleverness is a kind of ability to deliberate that becomes modified 
when that deliberation has been effectively and habitually directed toward the right 
end59.  Thus, phronesis is not identical with cleverness but is conditional upon it 
(1144a29 – 30).  Aristotle stresses that phronesis and moral virtue are not two 
                                                        
57  Bostock (2000), p.89 
58  J.O. Urmson, Aristotle’s Ethics.  Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1978, p.82. 
59  T. Tuozzo, discussion notes, 2006. 
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separate and distinct faculties, but are intimately connected.  Phronesis necessarily 
requires the presence of virtue of character to be itself and not cleverness. 
1.5.1 The Roles of Phronesis 
(1) Determining the Means 
As we have seen in section II, deliberation is important in phronesis.  Indeed, it is 
integral.  Aristotle covers deliberation in NE III.3 and IV.9.  In these sections, he 
clearly says as the example in the last section shows, that deliberation is about what 
forwards the end.  Aristotle makes this quite explicit at least in most of the clear texts 
on the point (1112b11 – 12, 1112b24 – 25, 1113b3 – 5, 1142b32 – 34 and 1144a7 – 
10)60.  The examples of how to produce health (1141b12 – 22) assume that the major 
premise of a practical argument is simply given; doctors aim at health.  What needs 
deliberation is how to act in such a way that the desired outcome results.  Therefore, it 
is reasonable that many scholars hold the opinion that for Aristotle, phronesis 
determines the means towards the ultimate end61.  The problems about which we 
deliberate are problems about means, not about the ends to be achieve.  
                                                        
60  D.J. Allan argues that Aristotle treats a restricted and technical notion of deliberation 
in Book III that is never of ends but always of means.  In contrast, Book VI has a much less 
restricted notion of deliberation and choice.  This difference has led to two distinct modes of 
phronesis, means-end deliberations, and rule-case deliberations.  D. Wiggins refutes this 
interpretation and sees a straightforwardly continuous account in Books III and VI of 
deliberation, prohairesis, and phronesis.  See D. Wiggins, “Deliberation and Practical 
Reason”, in Essays on Aristotle’s Ethics, ed. A.O. Rorty. Berkeley, 1980. 
61  See Broadie (1991), Reeve C.D.C., Practices of Reason.  Oxford, 2001, Urmson 
(1988).  
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 In addition, we know that prohairesis62 proceeds from deliberation.  What is 
prohairesis?  Aristotle defines it as “deliberative desire for things that depend on us; 
for it is through having selected on the basis of having deliberated that we desire in 
accordance with our deliberation” (1113a10 – 13).  First, prohairesis is an intellectual 
thing63.  It is not “something shared by non-rational creatures, whereas appetitite and 
temper are.”  (1111b12 –14)  Second, and in support of the first characteristic, 
prohairesis comes after deliberation and the two are therefore, tied to each other 
(1112a15).  To give some weight to this argument, Aristotle remarks that reasoning 
and thought accompanies prohairesis (1112a16 –17).  Third, in order to be virtuous 
one must decide to do what a just man would do.  There is an implication that every 
virtuous act involves exercising prohairesis (1112a8 –10).  Fourth, prohairesis is 
therefore, a combination of reason and desire (1139a31 – b5).  Fifth, just as 
deliberation seems to consist in working out the means, in particular situations or 
types of situations, of achieving given, relatively concrete ends, so therefore, 
prohairesis since it follows deliberation, also is about what forwards the end 
(1111b27 – 28).  Aristotle makes the latter point in a number of passages in NE 
(111b27 – 30, 1113a10 – 15).  Prohairesis is not just about what promotes the end to 
some extent; it is about what best promotes the end, and about what better promotes it 
                                                        
62  Broadie and Rowe translate prohairesis as ‘decision’, while Ross translates it as 
‘choice’. 
63  R. Sorabji, “Aristotle on the Role of Intellect in Virtue,” in Essays on Aristotle’s 
Ethics, Ed. A.O. Rorty.  Berkeley (1980).  Sorabji notes that whether scholars believe that the 
choice is of a means to being virtuous, or an instance of a virtuous act, the choice involved is 
still a rational thing, p. 201. 
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than anything else available64.  When we have judged what best promotes the end our 
desire to do it expresses our wish.  We wish for eudaimonia; we deliberate about what 
will promote it; we desire to do it, and that desire, which is deliberative desire, is a 
prohairesis. 
 It is therefore, phronesis that deals with what leads to the end, i.e. the means.  
Some say that phronesis takes the ends as given and devotes itself to investigating the 
ways of achieving them.  Aristotle claims that excellence makes the goal right, which 
is taken to mean that normally it is moral virtue that makes the virtuous man pursue 
the right goals65.   
(2) Contributes to Determining the End 
 If phronesis determines the means, we should conclude that the mean is a 
means towards the ultimate end of eudaimonia.  The other conclusion that we may 
draw is that the mean is an end and because it is an end, phronesis does have 
something to do with determining ends.  Even though Aristotle writes moral virtue 
determines the end, some scholars argue that the calculations of phronesis have moral 
significance and help determine the end66.   
 There is a lone passage in Aristotle’s Ethics where we find together two 
subjects that are usually kept quite separate in Aristotle’s thought, i.e. the distinction 
between ends and means and the theory of the mean: 
                                                        
64 C.D.C. Reeve (2001), p. 88. 
65 Reeve (2001), p. 81-84. 
66 G. J. Hughes (2001), Wiggins (1980), Natali C., The Wisdom of Aristotle.  New York, 
2001. 
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(1) But the end is the object of the action; for all choice 
is of something and for the sake of some object.  (2) 
The object, then, is the mean, and excellence is the 
cause of this by choosing the object.  (3) Still choice is 
not of this but of the things done for the sake of this.  
(4) To hit on these things – I mean what ought to be 
done for the sake of the object – belongs to another 
faculty; but of the rightness of the end of the choice the 
cause is excellence.   
    EE 1227b36 – 1228a2 
 
The interpretation of this passage is quite difficult and controversial.  The second line 
may be interpreted as saying the mean is the end (object).  It also says that excellence 
determines the mean because excellence chooses the end.  The latter thought is 
consistent with Aristotle’s doctrine of ends, which states that the end is determined by 
moral virtue.  Aristotle addresses the question of ends and means without referring to 
the problem of whether the end in question is the ultimate end or an intermediate end, 
and in his discussion of this subject, he never mentions the concept of “ultimate end.”  
Broadie argues that there is no ultimate or “Grand End” towards which practical 
thinking aims; instead, there are a series of intermediate ends67.  Since the mean is an 
end (it is not the ultimate end, because it is not eudaimonia), phronesis through 
prohairesis is not involved in choosing it.  Line 3 of the passage states that 
prohairesis is involved with deciding what things need to be done in order to achieve 
the end.  Line 4 assumes that we have been reading Aristotle’s thoughts on phronesis 
because he does not name it but calls it “another faculty.”  Line 4 reiterates the 
doctrine that phronesis chooses the means whereas excellence chooses the end.  It 
                                                        
67  Broadie (1991).  
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also reaffirms, indirectly, that excellence determines the mean.  This passage is 
apparently contradictory to Aristotle’s definition of moral virtue where he states that 
the mean is determined by correct logos or reason. 
 There are two ways of interpreting this apparent contradiction about the role 
of phronesis.  First, even though the mean is an end in the passage above, it may also 
be a means to an end.  Cooper holds the view that Aristotle thinks that there is an 
ultimate end, eudaimonia, which is pursued constantly.  However, the constant 
pursuit of this ultimate end does not rule out his having other ends as well, that is, 
other things desired for their own sake68.  It entails only that any such end is at the 
same time pursued as a means to the ultimate end.  Other things may be pursued as 
ends provided that, at the same time they are pursued as means to the ultimate end.  
These subordinate ends may be deliberated about by considering whether they will 
contribute to the attainment of the ultimate end.  Therefore, the pursuit of these ends 
can be explained, and hopefully justified, by reference to the ultimate end, to which 
they serve also as a means.  If we treat moral virtue and its mean as a means to 
eudaimonia, then we may argue that phronesis is involved in determining the mean.  
 Furthermore, it is true that Aristotle says that we do not deliberate about ends, 
but it is also true, some may argue, that his illustrations about this point in EN III.3 
are examples of ends that one could deliberate about, even if at the time the are being 
taken for granted.  Hence, Aristotle’s position may be that deliberation will always 
                                                        
68  J.M. Cooper, Reason and Human Good in Aristotle.  Indianapolis, Hackett 
Publishers, 1986, p.15 – 22. 
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take some end for granted though on another occasion that end itself may be 
questioned, in the light of some higher end that it is supposed to serve.  There is a 
hierarchy of ends, and it is only the highest end of all, namely eudaimonia that is 
never subject to deliberation; in this case, we can only deliberate about what conduces 
to it.  It is nowadays almost universally conceded, with Kraut as the exception, that 
Aristotle’s phrase ‘what conduces to the end’ includes not only what we might 
naturally call ‘means’ to that end but also what may be called the ‘parts’ or 
‘constituents’ or ‘ingredients’ of that end69.  However, Aristotle when discussing the 
issues of ends and means does so without referring to the problem of whether the end 
in question is the ultimate end or an intermediate end.  This leads Natali to conclude 
that, “In general an end – any end – is not an object of deliberation; therefore recent 
attempts to maintain that, in the final analysis, all ends except happiness are the object 
of deliberation (since all ends are means for the ultimate end, i.e. happiness) are not 
convincing.70  He goes on to argue that even if this interpretation were accepted, the 
intermediate ends would be the object of deliberation as means and not as ends.  This 
would therefore, confirm Aristotle’s thesis that ends are not the object of deliberation.  
I find it somewhat unsatisfying to maintain that deliberation is involved in 
determining intermediate ends and yet (since the evidence is undeniably strong) has 
nothing to do with determining the ultimate end of eudaimonia.  
                                                        
69   Bostock (2000), p. 95. 
70  Natali (2001), p. 45. 
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 The second avenue for trying to connect phronesis with the determination of 
the end i.e. to show the very intimate link between phronesis and moral virtue is a 
better way of dealing with the previous problem of the total exclusion of phronesis 
from setting the ultimate end.  Aristotle is quite clear that both phronesis and moral 
virtue are inextricably intertwined and one depends on the other: “It is clear, then, 
from what has been said that it is not possible to possess excellence in the primary 
sense without phronesis, nor to be wise without excellence of character” (1144b31 – 
33).  Phronesis works through deliberation, which gathers and processes the relevant 
data e.g. the right time, the right way, for the right reasons (1106b 21 – 23).  Based on 
assimilation and analysis of the data, prohairesis follows.  Phronesis chooses the right 
action to take according to the circumstances.  Phronesis is always targeted towards 
an end, one that is determined by excellence.  Its aim is made true by excellence.  
Indeed, it is absurd to say that one acts badly on the basis of phronesis, as it, qua 
phronesis, can have only good ends.  It is thus impossible to be phronimos without 
being good.  As Aristotle describes in NE VI.12 – 13 and discussed in section II.1, 
phronesis without moral virtue ends up as cleverness, while moral virtue without 
phronesis is simply natural excellence.   
 Indeed, just as phronesis is not itself without moral virtue, so too moral virtue 
is not itself without phronesis.  Possession of phronesis makes those who already 
possess natural virtue able to find the means and ways needed to actualize their good 
tendencies.  Phronesis has the task of finding the ways of achieving the end, which is 
given by moral virtue.  However, moral virtue, which determines the end, cannot be 
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itself without phronesis.  The respective functions of moral virtue and phronesis 
cannot be performed independently of one another, and at different times.  Aristotle 
forges a close link between phronesis and moral virtue when he writes in NE X: 
…and phronesis too is yoked together with virtue of  
character, and this with phronesis, given that the 
starting points of phronesis are in accordance with the 
character-virtues, and the correctness of the character-
virtues is in accordance with phronesis.   
     (1178a 16 – 19) 
 
Aristotle says that moral virtue is not only a “disposition according to the correct 
logos, but the disposition accompanied by the correct logos” and in the context of 
practical knowledge it is phronesis that ‘correctly prescribes’ (1144b27 –29). Thus, 
when moral virtue chooses the correct end, it does not do so without the presence of 
phronesis.  Both moral virtue and practical knowledge are each compounds of desire 
and reasoning, although in different forms and mixtures71.  In moral virtue, reason 
and desire join forces and become one. 
 We can further clarify the role of phronesis in setting the end by 
distinguishing a difference in how phronesis acts when it is involved in determining 
the mean from how it acts when it is determining the means.  Phronesis determines 
means via deliberation.  Rational deliberation establishes which means are effective 
for reaching a given end.  Cleverness, which helps find the means, plus moral virtue, 
which has the right ends, is phronesis.  Deliberation connects the end to be reached 
with the actions that it is up to us to perform.  The desire to perform these actions 
                                                        
71  Natali (2001), p. 45. 
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causes the body to act.  Thus, desire as regards the means, follows reason.  Does 
phronesis determine the end (mean) in the same way?  We know from earlier 
discussions that Aristotle separated natural virtue from moral virtue; the latter is 
natural virtue plus phronesis.  Young children and adolescents have a vague grasp of 
the end, which they hold as a simple opinion or notion.  They derive this notion from 
personal experience, education, society, or the laws of the city.  From these sources, 
they draw the opinion that certain behaviors are good and acceptable in a community.  
Aristotle emphasizes the importance of experience because it is through experience of 
concrete situations, while investigating the best way that conduces to the end, that one 
comes to see what is a good end.  Experienced and older people as well as the 
phronimoi have, “an eye, formed from experience, they see correctly” (1143a14).  
This is the way in which practical ends first form in an individual.  With deliberation, 
this opinion transforms into a practical principle, is assigned the role of an end, and 
becomes the object of rational desire.  The grasp of the end (mean) that natural virtue 
has does not count as phronesis until the ability to deliberate is acquired.  
Deliberation not only enables one to find the means, but also gives a greater clarity to 
one’s grasp of the end (mean) so that the grasp can now counts as phronesis.   
 The interdependence of moral virtue and phronesis and the different way 
phronesis acts in determining the mean and the means ameliorates the circularity 
problem72.  This problem emerges as follows: when we ask how we attain moral 
virtues, the answer is that moral virtue is the mean that is determined by reasoning                                                         
72  Bostock (2000), 
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that the practically wise man possesses.  How does reasoning know the end towards 
which it is aiming and therefore, what mean relative to ourselves conduces to 
eudaimonia?  That question in turn must clearly depend upon how the wise man 
conceives of eudaimonia.  Yet, now, when we ask what this conception is, and how 
we obtain it, we find Aristotle replying that the wise man’s conception of eudaimonia 
is given by moral virtue.  The circularity problem goes away when we see that 
phronesis and moral virtue determine one another, and neither prevails.  It is not 
possible to have one of the two elements in one of the two parts of the soul to which 
they belong, without having also the other element in the other part of the soul.  No 
one can be phronimos unless the soul’s emotions are in equilibrium.  Similarly, no 
one’s emotions can be in equilibrium unless one has phronesis.  Both moral virtue 
and phronesis involve a relation of harmony and collaboration between reason and 
desire.  This relation of collaboration is different in the two cases of determining the 
end and determining the means to the end73.   
(3) Initiates Action 
A vital part of a hexis is the praxis.  The latter necessarily involves motion.  
Therefore, a study of Aristotle’s view of motion is helpful for explaining the 
mechanism of a hexis.  What, in Aristotle’s opinion, is responsible for a living 
organism’s motion?  He rules out the nutritive faculty, perception, and reason.  None 
of these faculties inherently have telos, for according to Aristotle, all motion aims 
towards a telos.  What moves the living organism to action is twofold.  There is                                                         
73  Natali (2001), p. 55. 
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something in the situation, the object of desire or to orekton; and there is something in 
the organism itself, desire.  The ultimate mover is the desired, to orekton: some 
practical good which itself is not moved or affected by desire, and is hence an 
unmoved mover.  The immediate mover is desire itself, awakened by the power of 
desiring (to orektikon).  Desire acts through some organ of the body and the organism 
responds and seeks the object of its desire. Desire is the initiator of motion because it 
possesses telos.  It is by “virtue of having desire that an animal moves itself.”74  For 
Aristotle reason by itself cannot initiate action in the absence of desire, while desire 
moves even when it is opposed by reason.75  Thus, Aristotle writes:  “For it is the 
object of desire (to orekton) that moves, and through this reasoning moves, since the 
object of desire is the starting-point of reasoning. … Now nous does not seem to be a 
mover without desire.  … Hence it is the object of desire that moves, but this may be 
either the good or the apparent good.”76 
In sum, all motion and hence, human action proceeds from desire.  This 
interacts with the object of desire (to orekton) to produce the praxis that aims towards 
fulfilling the desire.  However, not all objects of desire are necessarily good and 
reason must act as the guide to our praxis.  If desire is the source our action, then 
reason is the guide that directs our action intelligently and in the best way to reach the 
desired telos.  We can act from intelligent choice of means i.e. from prohairesis.  The 
intelligent choice of means if practiced often, becomes a hexis.                                                              
74  Aristotle, De Anima, transl.  Sir David Ross. Oxford: Clarendon Press,  
75  De Anima, p. 314. 
76  Randall (1960), p. 74 
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Aristotle is careful to say that he is not assuming that the soul has parts that 
are separable, or separately located, but only that the soul as rational and the soul as 
non-rational are distinct by definition.77  Indeed, in the De Anima Aristotle is openly 
cautious about the practice of dividing the soul into parts, warning that any division 
will always be relative to a particular inquiry78.  He argues that desire is considerably 
more complex than the division of the soul into rational and non-rational parts 
suggests.  Hence, a kind of desire – rational desire or boulesis – is distinctive of the 
rational part but intimately connected with the capacities of reflection and revision. 
1.6 Conclusion 
 The discussion in this chapter attempts to show the necessity of eudaimonia 
and phronesis in Aristotle's ethics.  Eudaimonia, as the ultimate end, is a target, which 
virtuous activity aims toward, like an archer aiming at the bull’s-eye.  Virtuous acts 
are done for the sake of eudaimonia.  The latter justifies the virtues.  Moral virtues are 
realized in action (praxis).  In turn, phronesis initiates action through choice.  In sum, 
phronesis is required for four reasons: it is crucial in habituation of a disposition, it 
determines the means, it helps determine the end, and it leads to action.  The concepts 
of eudaimonia and phronesis may need updating so that they comport with 
contemporary sensibilities.  In Chapters 3 and 4, I will argue that this modernizing is 
possible.  Eudaimonia is equivalent to flourishing, which accords with our modern 
sensibilities of a well-lived life.  We do not need to have an Aristotelian concept of 
                                                        
77  Randall (1960), p. 70 
78  Sherman (1989), p. 163. 
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the soul in order to understand the importance of reason in our moral lives.  
Phronesis, updated, is practical or moral reasoning.  Indeed, eudaimonia and 
phronesis are still relevant and necessary in a modern virtue ethics even when we 
detach them from Aristotle’s theory of the soul. 
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CHAPTER 2 
 
THE CACOPHONY: CONTEMPORARY VIRTUE ETHICS 
 
2.1 Introduction 
 The aim of this chapter is to give a general overview of the current literature 
in virtue ethics and so derive an impression of the subject’s present condition.  I will 
attempt to show that there is a plethora of work on virtue ethics, most of which focus 
on specific areas of the theory such as virtue or emotions.  These are fragmented, 
theoretically diverse, and do not offer a complete theory of virtue ethics.  There is no 
one, single theory of virtue ethics that commands general agreement in the field.  
Worse, the familiarity with virtue ethics is not comparable to that which everyone in 
the philosophy profession has with deontology and utilitarianism.  This familiarity is 
not easy to acquire from the existing literature.  There is a range of articles, but so far, 
only three full books that explore virtue ethics systematically and at length.  Each 
offers a different version of virtue ethics: Rosalind Hursthouse’s, Michael Slote’s, 
and Christine Swanton’s.  These authors approach the subject in almost opposite 
directions.  For example, Slote wants to tighten the variables in a virtue ethics theory 
and therefore, distills the evaluation of virtues to one single factor: the motivation for 
any virtue should be benevolence and that is how we should evaluate whether a virtue 
is a virtue.   
In contrast, Swanton recommends a pluralistic approach to virtue ethics so 
that considerations of what constitutes a virtue are deeply contextual.  We must look 
at items in the field of virtue, the forms of responsiveness, the traits that make a 
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virtue, the standards for judging virtues, and the notions of the right.  Evaluating a 
character trait to ascertain whether it is a virtue requires us to draw on these 
pluralities.  Hursthouse, in contrast to Slote and Swanton is a neo-Aristotelian and a 
eudaimonist.  Slote is non-teleological, Swanton is both teleological and non-
teleological,  and Hursthouse is teleological.  Virtue ethics is therefore, diverse in 
views, generally fragmented in research focus, and deficient in agreement on how a 
virtue ethics theory should look. 
  I doubt if virtue ethics can continue in this (lack of) direction.  Theorists must 
arrive at some agreement on what concepts are necessary for a comprehensive virtue 
ethics theory if virtue ethics is to position itself as a serious contender among moral 
systems.  To this end, I posit the thesis of this dissertation: that eudaimonia and 
phronesis are necessary for a comprehensive virtue ethics theory. 
 This chapter gives a review of the most prominent and relevant writers in the 
area to show the diversity of views, conceptual sources, and focus in virtue ethics.  
Yet to give some order to the subject, this chapter categorizes work on virtue ethics 
according to the: 
(1) Source or the theoretical basis of VE work and their contemporary adherents:  
(a) Aristotle: (i) Hursthouse 
  (ii) Nussbaum 
  (iii) Annas 
 
(b) Stoics: (i) Becker 
(ii) Sandler 
  (iii) Gardiner 
 
(c) Aquinas: (i) MacIntyre 
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(2) Focus and/or foundations of VE research and their adherents: 
(a) Virtue: (i) Swanton 
  (ii) Slote 
   
(b) Naturalism: (i) Hursthouse 
    (ii) Foot 
  
(c) Reason: (i) Richardson 
(ii) McDowell 
  (iii) Sherman 
   
(d) Rejecting Reason: (i) Driver 
   (ii) Merritt 
 
It is beyond the scope of this work to examine closely every author featured in this 
chapter.  It is however, the intention of this work to use specific and relevant authors 
to help defend and support the thesis.  Thus, Hursthouse and Annas are proponents of 
eudaimonia in contemporary virtue ethics.  Many of their arguments for this position 
are, naturally, salient to supporting my own position on eudaimonia.  Similarly, 
Richardson and McDowell are useful in backing up my position on the role of 
phronesis in contemporary virtue ethics.  These authors provide scholarly backing on 
the positive side.  On the negative side, I will argue that Slote’s disregard for 
eudaimonia opens his theory up to the criticism that it lacks a more solid foundation 
for evaluating virtues.  Similarly, I also criticize Foot’s earlier work on virtues, where 
she shows open ambivalence to using eudaimonia, for a lack of grounding.  Driver 
and Merritt dispute the importance of reason in virtue ethics.  I will argue that their 
dismissal of reason results in serious flaws in a virtue ethics theory and show how 
their own work exibit problems that arise from a lack of attention to practical 
wisdom.  These authors will therefore, be revisited in Chapters 3 and 4. 
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2.2 A Summary of Virtue Ethics 
  Only since the late 1980s has there been a consensus about the definition of 
Virtue Ethics (VE).79  It now refers to an approach to ethics that has as its central 
focus the judgment of character.   This focus means that the approach is agent-
centered rather than act-centered.  The alternate focus on the agent differentiates VE 
from utilitarian and deontological ethics, which are act-centered.  Statman identifies 
three versions of this agent-centered focus.80  First, the moderate version in which 
most of morality is connected with character, although some actions can be evaluated 
independently of virtue.  Second, the reductionist version in which all judgments of 
rightness are reducible to judgments of character.  Lastly, there is the replacement 
version, where the aretaic notions gain priority by default, after the deontic concepts 
have been eliminated.  Thus, VE is formulated through the idea of a virtuous 
character.  According to most versions of VE the moral goodness of persons is 
determined by the virtues they possess.  Some people are admirable because of the 
character traits they possess and not the other way around.   
 Instead of asking, "what should I do?" as deontological ethics does, VE 
considers what sort of person the agent should be and what sort of life she should 
lead.  This question is not answered by consulting principles, norms or policies that 
apply to situations.  Rather, it is answered by considering the agent's own character 
along with other morally salient features of the situation.  According to most VE                                                         
79  Statman, Daniel, “Introduction to Virtue Ethics,” in Virtue Ethics: A Critical Reader 
ed. Daniel Statman.  Washington D.C.: Georgetown University Press, 1997, p.7. 
80  Statman (1997), p. 9. 
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theories, the virtuous do not act virtuously for the sake of being virtuous.  An honest 
person tells the truth because she loves the truth.81  The virtuous person expresses 
who they are when they act, and in acting, they develop their characters.  Hursthouse 
has neatly summarized the premises that underlie VE's approach to right action in the 
following way:82 
P.1. An action is right iff it is what a virtuous agent would 
characteristically (i.e. acting in character) do in the circumstances. 
 
P.1a. A virtuous agent is one who has, and exercises, certain character 
traits, namely, the virtues. 
 
P.2. A virtue is a character trait that... 
 
The second premise is completed by giving a list, or a criterion such as the one given 
by Hume in the Second Enquiry:  A virtue is a character trait that is useful or 
agreeable to its possessor or to others.  I argue that P.2. should be completed in an 
Aristotelian manner: A virtue is a character trait that a human being needs for 
eudaimonia.  However, even in this general form proposed by Hursthouse, there are 
VE proponents who do not use it (Slote for example), as they do not pursue a 
teleological line in their VE theories.   
 Thus, we can also divide VE theories into those that are teleological and those 
that are non-teleological.  Aristotle's ethics is teleological because it conceives of a 
final end or chief good towards which our actions aim.  I argue that VE must have a 
                                                        
81  Van Hooft, Stan, Understanding Virtue Ethics.  Chesham: Acumen Publishing, 2006, 
p. 11. 
82  Hursthouse, Rosalind, On Virtue Ethics, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999, p. 
28-29. 
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teleological basis in order to justify the virtues and that telos is eudaimonia.  
Trianosky, however, argues that the teleological framework is not different from a 
rich notion of utilitarianism.83  For Watson, only non-teleological views of the virtues 
can be regarded as genuine instances of VE.  Slote holds a non-teleological view of 
the virtues.  He argues that we admire certain traits of character not for their results 
but for their intrinsic character.84  However, I agree with Julia Annas who views any 
VE theory that focuses only on virtues as incomplete because the virtues are not 
located in a theoretical structure that includes a telos.85 
 Deontological and utilitarian theories have the notion of right and wrong acts.  
By contrast, according to VE, especially in the replacement version, the 
recommended method in ethics is an Aristotelian one, in the sense that we can expect 
no precise answer to practical questions.  Virtuous people may therefore, arrive at 
different answers to the same practical problem.  Of course, this then raises the 
question that Schneewind writes about: if two allegedly virtuous agents strongly 
disagree, one of them (at least) must be morally defective.86  If we go through the VE 
                                                        
83  Trianosky, Gregory, “Supererogation, Wrongdoing and Vice: On the Autonomy of 
the Ethics of Virtue,” Journal of Philosophy: 83 (1986), pp. 26-40. 
84  Slote, Michael, “Precis of From Morality to Virtue,” Philosophy and 
Phenomenological Research 54:681, 1994, p.687. 
85  Annas, Julia, “Virtue and Eudaimonism” in Social Philosophy & Policy 15:1 (1998) 
37- 55, p. 41. 
86  Schneewind, J.B., “The Misfortunes of Virtue,” in Virtue Ethics, eds. Roger Crisp 
and Michael Slote.  Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1997, p.200. 
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literature, various thinkers will have different approaches to this question, depending 
on the source, focus, and foundation of their theories.87 
2.3 Sources of Theory 
2.3.1.Aristotle  
 The source of theory for many modern VE theories is Aristotle.  The foremost 
proponents of neo-Aristotelian VE are Rosalind Hursthouse, Martha Nussbaum, and 
Julia Annas. 
2.3.1.1. Rosalind Hursthouse 
 Hursthouse is one of a handful of VE proponents who has written a 
comprehensive VE theory.  She grounds her VE work on Aristotle's ethics, in 
particular in four Aristotelian concepts.  Her first import is eudaimonia.88  Hursthouse 
explicitly claims that, “a virtue is a character trait a human being needs for 
eudaimonia, to flourish or live well.”89  Hursthouse admits that the translation of 
eudaimonia as “happiness”, “flourishing” or "well-being", and each has its 
drawbacks.  Happiness, in its contemporary understanding, connotes something 
subjective.  Flourishing does not have this subjectivity problem but its drawback is 
that we may have a mistaken idea of what flourishing consists of, pleasure for 
instance.  Well-being does not have a corresponding adjective, and is therefore 
clumsy to use.  She proposes that the notion of eudaimonia is close to the idea of                                                         
87 Hursthouse, for example, intentionally formulates VE to allow for such a possibility.  In her 
opinion, VE is more favorable to the conclusion reached by many writers on moral dilemmas, 
who argue, from a different perspective, that it is false to assume that only one uniquely right 
answer exists to every moral quandary.  See Hursthouse (1999). 
88 Hursthouse (1999). 
89 Hursthouse (1999), p.10 
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“true (or real) happiness,” or “the sort of happiness worth having.”90  We would want 
this sort of happiness for our children for their own sakes.   
 Hursthouse takes the view that eudaimonia is an expression of a form of 
naturalism.  The virtues are those character traits that make a human being a good 
human being.  Human beings need those character traits to live well as human beings, 
to live a good, characteristically human life.  "Ethical evaluations of human beings as 
good or bad are taken to be analogous to evaluations of other living things as good or 
bad specimens of their kind.  The analogy is instructive, because it reveals that 
several features of ethical evaluation thought to be peculiar to it, and inimical to its 
objectivity, are present in the quasi-scientific evaluation even of plants."91  Thus, 
Hursthouse thinks that one can (to a certain extent) use an account of human nature to 
base our understanding of virtue. 
 Her second import from Aristotle is the concept of virtue.  She sticks close to 
Aristotle's definition of a virtue as (generally) a state (hexis) of one's character.92  
However, she equates this definition with being a "character trait".   She goes on to 
define character traits as Aristotle defines hexis -- a settled state that involves reason 
and emotion.  A person is honest and does honest deeds "readily, eagerly, 
unhesitatingly, scrupulously, as appropriate."93  She agrees that each of the virtues 
involves getting things right, for each involves phronesis, (she calls it practical 
                                                        
90  Ibid. 
91  Hursthouse (1999), p. 21. 
92  Hursthouse (1999), p.11. 
93  Ibid. 
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wisdom), which is the ability to reason correctly about practical matters.  Unlike 
Aristotle, Hursthouse is unsure if all virtues are morally good.  Someone could be 
honest and generous "to a fault", or her benevolence may lead to breaking a promise 
she should have kept in their desire to prevent other's hurt feelings.  The only virtue 
that Hursthouse can claim to make its possessor good is wisdom.   
 This admission of uncertainty about the moral goodness of virtues is odd, 
especially when she has already brought in the concept of phronesis and eudaimonia.  
Aristotle is clear that the excess or deficiency of a virtue is not the virtue itself.  
Reason and knowledge of the end guides our virtues.  Moreover, her example of a 
"brave" desperado is diffused by arguing that the desperado is not brave because his 
means are not guided by deliberation but by cleverness (which lacks the knowledge 
of the end).  She admits as much when she says that perhaps the desperado is daring 
but does not possess the virtue of courage. 
 The third import from Aristotle is the distinctions between acting from reason 
and the actions small children and animals do, and between rational wanting or 
desire, and the mere passion that drives other animals and small children.  She agrees 
with Aristotle that small children do not have the experience, moral knowledge, or 
mental capacity to make reasoned moral decisions.  They merely have passions.   
 Thus, Hursthouse's adherence to the above concept of rational desire also 
makes her an adherent to another Arisotelian concept -- choice (prohairesis).  
Contemporary debate centers on the question of whether intentional action is 
prompted in part by desire or by belief.  The assumption is that beliefs and desires are 
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entirely different, as is the distinction between rational and non-rational.  Hursthouse, 
however, agrees with Aristotle that choice is either desiderative intellect or 
intellectual desire.  It belongs to both the cognitive and the conative faculties and is 
not broken down into mutually exclusive belief and desire.  Aristotle clearly states 
that the irrational part of the soul listens to reason.  Hursthouse invokes the later 
Wittgenstein to support the rejection of clear-cut distinctions in philosophical 
psychology.94  She readily admits that a minority of philosophers holds this view. 
2.3.1.2. Martha Nussbaum 
 Nussbaum is an original thinker who is neo-Aristotelian in her approach to 
practical and ethical problems.  She endorses the central concepts of Aristotle's 
ethical thinking -- eudaimonia, the centrality of practical wisdom, and Aristotelian 
essentialism.  Her view of eudaimonia is an inclusivist one.  According to this view, 
one that is shared by Irwin and Akrill (see chapter 1), the eudaimonistic human life is 
a life inclusive of a number of different constituents, each being defined apart from 
each of the others and valued for its own sake.95  Part of the account of virtue is the 
stipulation that fine actions are chosen in each case for their own sake, not simply for 
the sake of some further reward or consequence (1105a32).  Aristotle defines each 
virtue separately, as something that has its value in itself.  Moreover, Aristotle asserts 
that we choose many things in life for their own sake.  To value each of these separate 
                                                        
94  Hursthouse (1999), p. 16. 
95  See Nussbaum, "The Discernment of Perception: An Aristotelian Conception of 
Private and Public Rationality" (1999), "Virtue Ethics: A Misleading Category" (1999), and 
The Fragility of Good (2001).   
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items, for what it is, seems to require recognition of its distinctness and separateness 
from every other.  Hence, Nussbaum views the goods that contribute to eudaimonia 
as non-commensurable.  Unsurprisingly, she is also ardently anti-utilitarian.  The 
latter's project of giving a single value to every good, reducing them down to pleasure 
or desire, weighing the alternatives using this single measure and then choosing the 
"best" alternative based on the good consequences it produces is simply mistaken.  
The question is whether this single-valued world can possibly have the richness and 
inclusiveness of the current world.  Nussbaum supports Aristotle's rejection of this 
science of measurement and defends a "picture of choice as a quality-based selection 
among goods that are plural and heterogeneous, each being chosen for its own 
distinctive value."96  
The choice between non-commensurable goods is fraught with difficulty.  
Indeed, tragedy often results from the choice of one good over another.  Nussbaum 
uses Greek tragedies to illustrate ways in which ethical thought comes to terms with 
disaster.  At this point, Nussbaum argues that we cannot make a choice without the 
aid of reason.  She assigns a central role to practical reasoning in the planning and 
arrangement of a eudaimonistic life.  She insists that it is practical reasoning that 
makes all our activities fully human.  She also claims that emotions are forms of 
intelligent evaluative interpretation, and that the reason/emotion dichotomy ought 
therefore to be rejected.  Clearly, her view is very much informed by Aristotle who 
has a sophisticated model for ethical action that results from the interplay of desire                                                         
96  Nussbaum, "The Discernment of Perception" (1999), p.148. 
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and emotion (well trained) and practical wisdom.  Aristototle describes choice 
(prohairesis) as an ability that is on the borderline between the intellectual and 
passional, partaking of both natures.  Choice is either desiderative deliberation or 
deliberative desire (1113a9, 1113a23, b4-5).   Practical wisdom functions in close 
connection with the correctly disposed passions.  It is necessarily interdependent with 
excellence of character, which is a disposition concerning appropriate passion as well 
as appropriate action.  The experienced person confronting a new situation does not 
attempt to face it with the intellect.  She faces it with desires informed by deliberation 
and deliberations informed by desire.  She responds to the situation appropriately in 
both passion and act.  Frequently the perception of the salient features will be 
achieved in a way that relies centrally upon the discriminating power of passion.  The 
passions do not follow the lead of reason reluctantly but with pleasure.  Proper 
virtuous choice requires the combination of correct selection with correct emotional 
response.  Without the right emotional response the choice and action are not 
virtuous.  Thus, a virtuous act is done with good feelings.  Otherwise, the act is 
merely a continent act, where feeling is contrary to reason but follows reason 
nonetheless.  
 Nussbaum imports Aristotle's model almost wholesale in her work on moral 
luck.97  Nussbaum argues that Aristotelian practical wisdom is, up to a point, both 
general and, through proper moral education, teachable.  We can use our practical 
wisdom to expand our control over uncontrolled moral luck or tuche.  Of course, it                                                         
97  Nussbaum (2001). 
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cannot entirely ameliorate the effects of tuche, because as Aristotle has said, we 
cannot achieve a scientific precision in matters of ethics.  But Nussbaum argues that 
in a messy moral world, Aristotle's theory of deliberation gives us flexibility and 
attentiveness to context and contingent particulars.  The theory, claims Nussbaum, is 
better suited to richness, and complexity of the world and to the incommensurability 
of goods.  She disagrees with Williams that we are implacably controlled by the 
forces of fate.  Instead, she sees tragedies as, "a contested place of moral struggle, a 
place in which virtue might possibly in some cases prevail over the caprices of amoral 
power, and in which, even if it does not prevail, virtue may still shine through for its 
own sake."98 
 Nussbaum has also applied Aristotle's thought to develop a political theory 
and a theory of the ethical bases for international development that is a form of 
social-democratic liberalism.  In collaboration with Amartya Sen, Nussbaum has 
developed a normative political proposal.  She proposes that an account of certain 
central human capabilities should provide a goal for political planning.  This goal is 
for humans to be guaranteed a minimum level of these capabilities because it is a 
necessary minimum condition of social justice.   
 Nussbaum concedes the untenability of extreme metaphysical realism.  
However, just because we do not have a transcendent metaphysical grounding for our 
evaluative judgments about human beings does not mean that we have nothing.  She 
criticizes those that fall into extreme relativism or subjectivism.  Instead, she argues                                                         
98  Nussbaum (2001), Preface, xxxvii. 
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that we can use internalist-essentialism to give an account of the most important 
functions of the human being, in terms of which human life is defined.  This list of 
important functions in human life lead us to ask what social and political institutions 
are doing to ensure humans can achieve the functions.  Nussbaum's Aristotelian 
conception that is concerned with ends and with the overall shape and content of the 
human life form guides the list of human functions.  Her list, which includes 
mortality, the needs of the human body, and capacity for pleasure and pain is 
composed of two different sorts of items: limits and capabilities.  Her claim echoes 
the Aristotelian essentialist claim that a life that lacks any of these capabilities, no 
matter what else it has, will be lacking in humanness.  In her development theory, 
Nussbaum continues to stress Aristotelian practical reasoning, its role in making a 
choice within an inclusivist model of human goods. 
 Ironically, despite Nussbaum's adherence to Aristotelian ideas in ethics, she 
argues that the category of  "Virtue Ethics" is a mistaken one.  There is no need for 
this category because VE adds nothing new to ethical theories.  A major drawback, is 
that there is not a unitary approach to virtue ethics.  Another reason that it is a 
category mistake of an elementary kind is that people have been writing and thinking 
about virtue within Kantian and Utilitarian traditions.  Virtue ethics cannot be an 
alternative to those traditions.  Even if we focus on the loosely assorted class of 
thinkers who reject both Kantianism and Utilitarianism and associate ourselves with 
the insights of ancient Greek and Roman thinkers, there is no unity to that group 
either.  They have different focus and views.  The common ground of so-called virtue 
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ethics thinkers, while significant, can be pursued within Kantianism, Utilitarianism, 
neo-Aristotelian and neo-Humean projects of many different sorts.  VE thinkers 
should therefore call themselves neo-Aristotelians, neo-Humeans, anti-Kantians or 
anti-utilitarians.  In other words, we should dispense with this new category of ethical 
thinking because it has little meaning. 
 While Nussbaum has a valid point about the lack of a unitary approach to VE 
(a fault this dissertation attempts to correct), she dismisses VE too readily.  She 
makes a sweeping claim about the similarity of VE with other moral systems that is 
not supported by a close reading of VE and the other moral systems.  VE is 
distinctive from Kantianism and Utilitarianism.  The central focus of VE is the 
character of an agent and how it is expressed in the virtues.  The central focus of 
Kantianism is duty, and that of utilitarianism is the contribution of an action to the 
overall good.  Of course some aspects of these moral systems overlap as Nussbaum 
chronicles.  However, the central foci of these systems are greatly different.  There is 
therefore, good reason to classify VE as a separate moral system requiring its own 
avenue of research. 
2.3.1.3. Julia Annas 
 Annas writes extensively on the use of eudaimonia (or lack thereof) in modern 
VE.  While VE proponents have embraced virtues, eudaimonia is still problematic for 
them.  The important consequence of this discomfort has been the isolation of virtues 
from a larger framework in which the overarching concept is eudaimonia.  This 
approach to VE is in stark contrast to ancient VE, which located virtues in a wider 
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structure in which eudaimonia was the ultimate end and chief good.  Annas points out 
that few if any have thought that virtue can do all the work in a theory.99   By 
studying ancient VE, Annas believes that we can find use in their theories of 
eudaimonism.  One reason why much modern discussion of virtue ethics has 
remained at a relatively discursive and vague level has been reluctance to explore the 
ways in which virtue might be located in a systematic ethical theory.100  If we are to 
take a systematic interest in ancient theories of virtue, we must pay attention to the 
way they locate virtue within an overall theory of eudaimonia.  Thus, Annas tries to 
find commonality between the ancient notion of eudaimonia and our current view of 
happiness in the hopes that there is enough overlap in the two notions so that 
eudaimonia can also become primary in modern VE theories. 
 First, do we moderns agree that eudaimonia (let us call it happiness in this 
section, for the sake of comparison) is the ultimate end?  In Chapter 1, we discussed 
Aristotle's reasoning about the final end.  He does not think that any argument is 
needed to show all agree that our chief good is eudaimonia.  To Aristotle and Plato, it 
seems absurd to deny this.  Our modern attitude towards happiness as the final end is 
more complex.  When the question is raised, it is generally easy to find people 
agreeing to the idea that everything we do is for the sake of happiness.  However, we 
are less likely to agree that happiness is complete in itself.  Annas argues if a 
plausible candidate for happiness lacked something important to human life, the 
                                                        
99  Annas (1998), p.36. 
100  Annas (1998), p. 37. 
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response would be that there is more to life than happiness.  If wealth lacks something 
important, a modern interlocuter might say that a happy life does not just entail 
wealth alone, but rather that happiness is not the only reasonable aim in life.  Annas 
thinks that this is a crucial difference in the ancient versus modern attitude to 
happiness as being complete in itself.  However, if we take an inclusivist view of 
Aristotle's concept of eudaimonia, as Akrill and Nussbaum do, the modern concept of 
happiness is closer to the ancient concept.101  Annas does not take this line of thought 
and pursues the stronger Socratic and Stoic version of virtue and happiness.  An 
Aristotelian interpretation of happiness would be more in tune with our modern 
conception.  He is clear that virtue is necessary but not sufficient for happiness for 
"some goods are necessary to happiness, while others contribute to it by being useful 
tools” (1099b28-29).  Happiness "requires both complete excellence and a complete 
life” (1100a5).   External goods have independent value, and they therefore count as 
intrinsic goods in their own right, quite apart from their role in facilitating the 
exercise of virtue.  This reading opens up the possibility of a more inclusive and 
pluralistic account, in which a number of goods might each make an intrinsic 
contribution to eudaimonia.  If we take this line, we can include a modernized list of 
external goods that appear to make an intrinsic contribution to the quality of life.  We 
are likely to include items such as fulfilling work, autonomy, and contribution to 
                                                        
101  Akrill, J.L., “Aristotle on Eudaimonia,” in Essays on Aristotle’s Ethics, ed. Amelie 
Oksenberg Rorty.  Berkeley: University of California Press, 1980, Nussbaum, Martha C., The 
Fragility of Goodness.  Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001. 
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society.  This view of eudaimonia is easier to (though does not completely) reconcile 
with modern notions of happiness.102   
 Annas points to two other important differences between the modern and 
ancient intuitions of happiness.  First, happiness, in the modern sense, is subjective, 
while the ancients regard it as objective.103  Although a person's life may be going 
well in many respects, it is prudentially valuable only if it is going well for that 
person.  One's happiness depends on one's own concerns and what one considers 
important.  Annas does not think there is agreement about happiness being subjective.  
Sumner argues that it is subjective but Kraut maintains that it is not.104  Happiness 
based on mistakes turns out not to be happiness at all.  The mistaken person would in 
fact decide that she was not happy, though she thought she was.  It would be difficult 
to get a consensus regarding the subjectivity of happiness. 
 The final aspect of the ancient view of eudaimonia that is in discord with our 
modern view is the rigidity of eudaimonia.  According to Aristotle, virtue can 
transform a human life.  It can do so because it can transform one's view of 
eudaimonia.  The virtuous person would put less value to the accumulation of money, 
because virtue enables us to correct ordinary valuations and arrive at a true estimate 
of value.  Eudaimonia is the continuing goal we have, but it can be transformed by                                                         
102  Sumner (1998) regards the weaker version of virtue and eudaimonia to be too 
optimistic for modern society as it gives virtue a special status on the list of prudential goods.  
We are inclined to be more cynical about the unvirtuous not faring well.  See Sumner, L.W., 
“Is Virtue Its Own Reward?” in Social Philosophy & Policy 15:1 (1998) 18-36. 
103  Sumner (1998) p. 25. 
104  Kraut "Two Conceptions of Happiness," Philosophical Review, vol. 88, no.2 (1979), 
pp. 167-97. 
 79 
virtue.  We continue to seek eudaimonia, but our conception of it and how we can 
achieve it changes dramatically.  Compared to the ancient notion of eudaimonia, our 
modern conception of happiness is rigid: "it is not tolerant of much shifting of 
content, certainly not the wholesale redefining demanded by the thesis that virtue is 
sufficient for happiness."105  The rigidity is not tied to one particular content.  There 
are many candidates for happiness such as pleasure, welfare, desire satisfaction and 
so on.  However, Annas contends that the rigidity of modern happiness is of form 
rather than content.  Although there are competing accounts of the contents, once we 
have settled on it we are reluctant to allow that there could be radical change while 
thinking that we are still talking about happiness.   
I am not sure if this obstacle of the rigidity of happiness is unassailable.  If the 
content of happiness is wide ranging, why can we not have as the content of 
happiness, "virtuous activity in accordance with reason, in a complete life?"  Have we 
become so cynical about the possibility of reviving the idea (was it dead or just quiet) 
that the criteria for success in a life should take in virtue and other ends?  Surely, the 
resurgence of virtue in the form of virtue ethics says we can conceive that what 
matters in life is to revise our priorities so that morality has the proper weight in 
relation to other ends?  Perhaps another way to diffuse the rigidity problem that 
Annas puts up is to use another term rather than happiness to convey the idea of 
eudaimonia.  Virtue ethicists such as Hursthouse prefer the term human flourishing.  
Sumner prefers well-being, which contains a more clearly objective notion.  Annas                                                         
105  Annas (1998) p. 52. 
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has been resistant to this until recently.  In her latest article, she uses the term 
flourishing.106   
2.3.2 Stoics 
This section discusses three VE writers who base their theories on stoic 
conceptions of VE.  The current dissertation does not focus on stoic VE but the 
following section is intended to illustrate the diversity of sources for contemporary 
VE theories.  Stoic ethics also emphasize eudaimonia as its central, organizing 
concern.  The authors in the discussion emphasize different aspects of stoic VE.  
Becker wants to expound a new stoically based VE.  Sandler is interested in using 
stoic VE as theoretical support for environmental ethics.  Gardiner investigates how 
VE can accommodate the use of rules through his interpretation of Seneca.  This 
section also illustrates the fragmented nature of VE research that has as its source 
stoic VE.  
2.3.2.1 Lawrence Becker 
Becker recognizes and indeed argues for the eudaimonist doctrine.  His book 
endeavors to provide a neo-stoic outlook on human happiness and virtue107.   He 
develops an ethical theory, which he claims has the structure of ancient Stoicism.  We 
consider our natures as creatures with various wants and consider the means to 
achieve these rationally.  We examine the development of rationality both as 
instrumental means towards achieving our ends and as rational agency.  Thus, we 
                                                        
106  See, Annas, "Virtue Ethics" in The Oxford Handbook of Ethical Theory, (2006). 
107  Becker, Lawrence C., A New Stoicism.  Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1998. 
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develop a conception of ourselves as rational agents, and value this conception in a 
non-instrumental way.  This theory is based on accepted studies and results in 
psychological literature.  It does not require us to be particularly deferential to any 
particular school of psychology because it follows widely accepted and tested results.  
Becker's VE theory is a modern version of the ancient Stoic notion of familiarization 
or oikeiosis.  He also discusses the value of stoic ideas for bioethics.   
Becker would like to modernize stoic VE.  He does this by using the language 
and applying the concepts of modern ethics to stoic ethics.  His project requires him 
to acknowledge the primacy of eudaimonia as the goal of a person’s life.  Thus, this 
acknowledgement together with his focus on rationality and reason as a means to 
achieving eudaimonia accords with the thesis of this dissertation.  
2.3.2.2 Ronald Sandler 
 Ronald Sandler offers a virtue-based defense of certain kinds of genetic 
engineering, consistent with stoicism108.   Although Aristotle and the Stoics disagree 
about the intrinsic value of external goods, that is whether external goods are 
constituents of eudaimonia, they both acknowledge an indispensable instrumental role 
for external goods in eudaimonia.  The cultivation of virtue requires physical 
conditions that sustain the person as a living being.  Many of these essential physical 
conditions such as oxygen, water, and food derive from ecosystems.  Therefore, a 
genuine virtue includes the goal of ensuring ecosystem sustainability.  Environmental                                                         
108  Sandler, Ronald, “A Virtue Ethics Perspective on Genetically Modified Crops,” in 
Environmental Virtue Ethics, ed. Ronald Sandler and Philip Cafaro.  Lanham, MD:  Rowman 
and Littlefied, 2005. 
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considerations assert themselves in both the development and the application of 
virtue.   From the virtue ethics perspective the environmental assessment of a 
particular agricultural biotechnology involves two dimensions.   
First, the environment is relevant to the development of virtue as it provides 
certain goods that are necessary for the cultivation and maintenance of virtue.  Are 
the technologies produced by the manipulation of the genetic sequence of plants used 
in agriculture likely to imperial the goods -- food, clothing, water, and so on -- 
requisite for the development and maintenance of moral agency?  Second, the 
environment is also relevant to virtuous action because there are virtues that pertain to 
human interaction with the environment.  Sandler discusses two distinctly 
environmental virtues, which he calls non-extensionist virtues.  One is 
conservationist, a disposition to maintain or increase the instrumental value of the 
environment.  The other is non-anthropocentric, a disposition to respect the value of 
natural entities for themselves.  Are we acting virtuously when we allow the use of 
genetically modified crops (GMC)?  Sandler takes an applied stoic VE approach to 
answering these environmentally based questions.  As such, he adds his voice to a 
new and growing body of research in applied VE.109 
2.3.2.3 Stephen Gardiner 
 Stephen Gardiner considers the place of moral rules within VE.  He takes a 
markedly different position on the moral rules compared to mainstream thinking in 
                                                        
109  See for example, Walker, Rebecca L. and Ivanhoe, Philip J (eds), Working Virtue: 
Virtue Ethics and Contemporary Moral Problems.  Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007. 
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VE.  In general, VE thinkers criticize the foundations of moral rules that we find in 
Kantian ethics.  They further argue that there seems no way to generate a completely 
exceptionless, universal moral principle everyone can apply.  Principles are too 
abstract to guide conduct.  The Stoics seem to be paradoxical on this point.  On the 
one hand, they are great proponents of the authority and privileged position of the 
sage.  On the other, they see moral life as structured by an elaborate system of 
principles and rules.  Gardiner argues that Seneca provides an insightful account of 
how virtue ethics can accommodate the existence of moral rules.  He offers a view of 
Seneca that contrasts markedly with the standard views such as those taken by Gisela 
Striker, Philip Mitsis, and Brad Inwood.110   
 Striker and Mitsis claim that rules are absolutely central to the Stoic account 
of ethics.  According to this interpretation, moral judgment is exclusively a matter of 
understanding and applying moral principles.  Sensitivity to particular situations is 
itself to be understood purely in terms of the grasp and application of rules.  For 
Mitsis, even the sage's judgment is structured by rules.  Rules have normative priority 
and the virtuous person is one who is the embodiment of the rules.   
 Inwood objects to Striker’s and Mitsis’s interpretation of Stoic ethics.111  He 
does not think that Stoic rules are universal, substantive, and without exception.  
Inwood argues that the Stoics, and Seneca in particular, asserts the primacy of the 
virtuous person while still allowing for a substantial, but subsidiary, role for moral                                                         
110  Gardiner, Stephen M., “Seneca’s Virtuous Moral Rules,” in Virtue Ethics Old and 
New, ed. Stephen M. Gardiner.  Ithaca: Cornell University, 2005. 
111  Gardiner (2005), pp. 36-42.  
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rules.  He bases this middle position on the division of moral reasoning into two 
levels.  At the lower level, ordinary moral agents make decisions in accordance with 
entrenched moral rules.  At the higher level, moral agents are allowed to set aside 
these rules, treating them as mere rules of thumb.  The Stoic will allow the wise man 
to reason correctly in particular situations and violate moral rules, if necessary.   
 Gardiner develops his own theory of Stoic ethics that he applies to virtue 
ethics.  He distinguishes between Seneca's precepts and doctrines.  Precepts rely on 
"features which are either quasi-descriptive and non-evaluative (such as natural 
properties, or easily identified cultural properties), or else involve low-level moral or 
evaluative concepts or properties."112    These principles are substantive but not in 
themselves without exception. Their main role is to give guidance to the novice.  
Doctrines are "firm beliefs deeply implanted, that apply to life as a whole, determine 
acts and thoughts, and supply the purpose and manner."113  Thus, precepts are 
manifest to all, while doctrines are hidden and available only to those with special 
knowledge i.e. the sage.  Doctrines pick out high-level structural principles in a 
general theory of ethics.  Thus, ordinary people can use precepts for simple everyday 
ethical problems.  However, one would need to be with a sage to learn about how to 
deal with complex moral problems because only the sage understands and embodies 
the doctrines.   
                                                        
112  Gardiner (2005), p. 47. 
113  Gardiner (2005), p.48. 
 85 
 Gardiner claims that his interpretation of Seneca provides the beginnings of an 
account of how the role of precepts and doctrines might be reconciled with the 
primacy of the virtuous agent.  How do we apply this interpretation to virtue ethics?  
It is coherent to give priority to the virtuous person and yet think that moral rules are 
necessary.  Precepts are useful at the general level and are accessible practical 
guidance for the novice.  Indeed the existence of moral rules that Gardiner calls 
precepts will likely reduce some of the criticism of VE that it does not provide 
guidance.  Doctrines are foundational and complex.  Understanding and absorbing 
them requires experience, practical wisdom, and knowledge of the ultimate end.  
Gardiner believes that Seneca shows a way for VE to accommodate the primacy of 
the virtuous agent with several kinds of moral rules. 
 Gardiner gives a good middle way between two positions: VE can 
accommodate rules for right action and in VE right action depends entirely on the 
virtuous agent.  However, his middle way still leaves some questions.  For instance, 
how do we distinguish precepts from doctrines?  It would appear that “do not kill” 
would easily be a precept but it could also be a doctrine.  In the end, distinction 
between the two concepts requires the use of reason in the form of practical wisdom.    
2.3.3 Aquinas 
2.3.3.1 Alasdair MacIntyre 
 MacIntyre is one of the most prominent philosophers in VE who in his later 
work is influenced by Aquinas.  His writings are primarily about the nature of human 
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reason and in his VE trilogy, he presents an account of tradition-bound rationality114.  
The term refers to MacIntyre’s claim that moral reasoning is necessarily imbedded in 
social context.  Thus, he places a great deal of emphasis on the community as the 
source of moral practices.  MacIntyre argues that the inquiry into virtues is bound to a 
particular time within a particular context.   
MacIntyre’s well-known thesis is that the Enlightenment project, particularly 
in the area of moral philosophy, has failed because it has entirely rejected the 
previous philosophical traditions on which moral philosophy is based.  It was as if 
moral philosophy was torn from its roots.  Following this rejection of tradition, moral 
language is in a state of grave disorder.  Moral language has become disconnected 
from its conceptual moorings.  Indeed, we only have fragments of a conceptual 
scheme, parts of which lack the contexts from which their significance derived.115  
MacIntyre divides moral philosophy into three distinct stages: the first stage in which 
philosophy was rooted in tradition and there was continuity in the tradition.  The 
second stage in which moral philosophy suffered catastrophe and the third stage in 
which moral philosophy was restored but in damaged and disordered form.  Thus, 
“…modern moral utterance and practice can only be understood as a series of 
fragmented survivals from an older past and that the insoluble problems which they 
have generated for modern moral theorists will remain insoluble until this is well 
                                                        
114  His trilogy consists of After Virtue (1984), Whose Justice, Which Rationality (1988), 
and Three Rival Versions of Moral Enquiry (1990). 
115  MacIntyre (1984), p. 2. 
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understood.”116  MacIntyre goes on to argue that the deontological character of moral 
judgments is actually derived from conceptions of divine law.  However, modern 
deontological theories reject a divine lawgiver.  This argument is familiar because 
Anscombe made it earlier in her influential article.117  Similarly, the teleological 
character is an echo of human nature and activity, concepts, which are not currently 
favorable in the modern world.  Modern moral philosophy has attempted to provide 
foundations to its moral theories that are mere shadows of the traditional foundations 
from which they are taken.  Modern moral philosophy’s groundings are shaky and 
assailable. 
MacIntyre wants to return to the first stage of moral philosophy in which it is 
tradition-constituted and tradition-constitutive.  Initially, he looks at Aristotle’s virtue 
ethics but finds problems with his metaphysical biology.  The latter cannot be 
accepted because it is false.  Others argue that Aristotle’s Nicomachean Ethics barely 
mentions his metaphysical biology, which in any case, does not have a significant 
role in the ethical theory.118  MacIntyre develops a definition and an account of virtue 
that remains teleological but does not require any allegiance to Aristotle’s 
metaphysical biology.  Instead, community and social practices determine teleology.  
It is a “socially teleological” account that can still support Aristotle’s general account 
of the virtues.  For MacIntyre, “A virtue is an acquired human quality the possession                                                         
116  MacIntyre (1984), p. 111. 
117  Anscombe, Elizabeth, “Modern Moral Philosophy,” in Virtue Ethics, eds. Roger 
Crisp and Michael Slote.  Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1997. 
118  Lutz, Christopher Stephen, Tradition in the Ethics of Alasdair MacIntyre.  Lanham: 
Lexington Books, 2004. 
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and exercise of which tends to enable us to achieve those goods which are internal to 
practices and the lack of which effectively prevents us from achieving any such 
goods.”119  The characteristic of internal goods is that their achievement is a good for 
the whole community who participate in the practice.  In contrast, external goods are 
always some individual’s property and possession.  The more someone has of them, 
the less there is for other people.   
In writings that follow After Virtue, MacIntyre, notes the shortcomings of two 
moral traditions: the Augustinian and Aristotelian.  Crucially, Aristotelian telos 
depends on the notion of essential nature.  MacIntyre argues that if we “take away the 
corresponding notion of what is good and best for members of a specific kind who 
share such a nature, and the Aristotelian scheme of the self which is to achieve a 
good, of good, and of pleasure necessarily collapses.  There remains only the 
individual self with its pleasure and pains.”120  MacIntyre’s return to ancient ethical 
theories, and therefore virtue ethics theories contributed to the start of the virtue 
ethics movement.  
The response to MacIntyre’s criticism that Aristotelian VE is based on 
Aristotle’s “metaphysical biology” is given in detail in section 5.1.2.  One response is 
that Aristotle makes little use of his biological theory.  His account of human nature 
seems more like empirical psychology than ancient natural philosophy.  Another 
response is we can well discard the so-called metaphysical biology and still arrive at a 
                                                        
119  MacIntyre (1984), p. 191. 
120  MacIntyre (1990), p. 138. 
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workable VE theory – Rosalind Hursthouse, for example has developed a systematic 
neo-Aristotelian VE theory.  Eudaimonia as the telos of human life can be grounded 
on human nature.  Notably, part of being a good human being is to ensure the good 
functioning of the social group.  This criterion is not so different from MacIntyre’s 
own basis for the virtues. 
In terms of MacIntyre’s criticism of essentialism and its incompatibility with a 
VE theory, it should be noted that there are thinkers who hold essentialist views of 
human nature.  Some of these thinkers such as Martha Nussbaum and Hursthouse (see 
above) do not have any dissonance being essentialists and proponents of virtue ethics. 
2.4 Focus and Foundations of Theories   
2.4.1 Virtues 
 Modern VE focuses on virtues.  However, modern virtue ethicists have some 
problems with the standard Aristotelian virtues.  The virtues Aristotle makes central 
include some which modern thinkers are inclined either to deemphasize or to 
reconstruct.  For example, Aristotelian courage is that of the citizen soldier on the 
battlefield in defense of his city from a desire for something noble (1116a28-29).  To 
most moderns the ideal of courage on the battlefield at the very heart of virtue will 
seem at least strange, and to some repugnant.  Most therefore, reconstruct courage 
into something like moral courage -- a readiness to withstand ridicule or contempt in 
defense of a belief or person.  In addition, there is a range of virtues that moderns 
uphold but which are absent in Aristotle's treatise.  For instance, there is no mention 
of kindness, compassion, forgiveness, apology, repentance, remorse, humility, or of 
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the theological virtues of faith, hope, and charity.  Thus modern virtue ethicists, 
especially those who model their views on Aristotle's usually downplay or jettison 
those features of Aristotle's thought, which they find uncongenial.  Some argue that 
these excisions, inclusions, and reconstructions have limited success.121   
2.4.1.1 Christine Swanton 
 Two prominent writers in VE take opposing approaches to virtues.  Christine 
Swanton and Michael Slote have developed their own versions of VE theories, but the 
theories are remarkably dissimilar.  Swanton looks at virtue, the bases and modes of 
responsiveness in their fields, in a pluralistic way.  Michael Slote focuses almost 
solely on the motive of benevolence as the standard on which to judge virtuous acts.  
Swanton, like her Kiwi counterpart Hursthouse has written an impressive book on 
VE.122  Her version of VE is inspired by Aristotle, Nietzsche, and depth psychology.  
Yet it differs from neo-Aristotelianism and aims at a theory that is pluralistic.  
Swanton argues for pluralisms in both the conception of virtue, and the view of 
rightness of action based on that conception.  Her intent is to propose a different kind 
of virtue ethics.  She argues against the Aristotelian claim that virtue is 
characteristically good for the agent.  Instead, there is a much weaker connection 
between virtue and personal good.   
                                                        
121  Cordner thinks that down playing and excising certain Aristotelian virtues is at the 
expense of distorting central themes of Aristotle's ethical thought.  See Cordner, Christopher, 
“Aristotelian Virtue and Its Limitations,” in Philosophy, Vol. 69, No. 269. (Jul., 1994), pp. 
291-316.  
122  Swanton, Christine, Virtue Ethics: A Pluralistic View.  Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 2003. 
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 Swanton defines virtue as, “a disposition to respond to or acknowledge, in an 
excellent (or good enough) way, items in the field of a virtue whether those items are 
people, objects, situations, inner states or actions”.123  The basis of her pluralistic 
virtue ethics lies in this conception of virtue.  It is an unusually broad definition of 
virtue that is applicable to a variety of virtue theories and virtue ethics, from 
pluralistic to monistic, eudaimonistic to non-eudaimonistic.  ‘Items’ cover a broad 
range of objects that may be “within the agent, for example, the bodily pleasures 
which are the focus of temperance, or outside the agent for example, human beings, 
property, money, or honours.”124  Her broad definition of virtues is, ironically, limited 
in usefulness because virtue is defined so generically that it seems unlikely that it can 
underwrite a powerful and distinct approach in ethics.125   The generality of her 
definition undermines the grounding role of virtue in the VE approach.  Her 
pluralisms range over so many areas (five) that it is hard to pinpoint the foundations 
of her VE approach.   
Swanton’s pluralisms are fivefold.  First, the bases of responsiveness to items 
in the fields of virtues are plural.  Second, the modes or forms of responsiveness to 
items in the fields of virtues are plural.  Third, the features that make a trait a virtue 
can be many.  Fourth, the standards for judging whether responses are excellent or 
                                                        
123  Swanton (2003), p.1 
124  Swanton (2003), p. 20 
125  Gardiner, Stephen M., “Virtue Ethics: A Pluralistic View” in Mind, Vol. 114, 453, 
January 2005, p. 211. 
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good enough are plural.  Lastly, her account of what constitutes right action is 
generated from a pluralistic notion of the right.   
Bases of moral acknowledgement are the morally significant features of the 
items responded to or acknowledged.  These features “partially ground or rationalize 
the form or mode of acknowledgement.”126  There are four main bases: value, status, 
good (or benefit), and bonds.  The modes of moral responsiveness include promoting, 
honoring, appreciating, respecting, being open to, and loving items which have value 
or status, are good, or to which one is bonded.  Swanton provides accounts of three 
central modes of moral acknowledgement that feature in all virtues.  These modes are 
love, respect and creativity.  They constitute what she calls the “profiles of the 
virtues.”127   
Her plurality of bases and modes rules out monistic conceptions of what 
makes a trait of character a virtue.  Thus, it rules out monistic forms of relationship 
ethics of love or care (Slotes’s version).  There may be a plurality of features that 
make a character trait a virtue.  Swanton argues that eudaimonia is just one of the 
features for determining if a disposition is a virtue.  There are other ends that we may 
pursue other than eudaimonia.  Under her framework, a trait may even qualify as a 
virtue when it is detrimental to an agent’s flourishing.  She gives the example of a 
manic-depressive whose creativity derives from this (abnormal) psychological 
                                                        
126  Swanton (2003) p. 2. 
127  Swanton (2003) p.15.  
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condition.  For the sake of her art she leaves her condition untreated.  Therefore, she 
sacrifices her well-being for her art.     
For Swanton, virtue is a “threshold concept.”  This means that standards for 
virtues depend on context and the individual’s own capacity.  In other words she 
lowers the demandingness for what it is to be a virtue.  She does not have an ideal, 
utopian and therefore impossible to attain view of virtue in mind but rather one that is 
suited to a “world characterized by considerable evil, neediness, and frequent 
catastrophe.”  The standards for judging whether an act is right are also varied.  A 
right act is “an excellent realization or attainment of the target or end of a virtue.”128   
The requirements for virtuous action are complex and pluralistic because the profiles 
of the virtues are themselves complex. 
Swanton’s main purpose in the pluralistic approach is to “accommodate the 
views of a wide variety of moral theories on what is morally significant,” including 
Kantian, consequentialist, depth-psychological, and Nietzschean approaches.  
Unfortunately, in attempting to be as all embracing as possible, Swanton’s attempts to 
explain and guide moral action are undermined.  She offers descriptions of problems 
that moral theories are trying to solve, rather than any kind of moral theory of her 
own.129  Gardiner has gone as far as to suggest that Swanton gives a framework for 
the virtue ethics genus but not a distinct species of the approach. 
                                                        
128  Swanton (2003) p. 29. 
129  Gardiner (2005), p.212. 
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Nevertheless, Swanton’s theory is instructive because she introduces the idea 
of pluralism into virtue ethics.  In addition, she attempts to give an account of 
flourishing that is based on a complex understanding of human psychology.  For a 
trait to count as a virtue, it must be “expressive of fine inner states.”  An account of 
these fine inner states relies on psychological theory.  For this Swanton turns to 
Nietzsche and to contemporary psychologists such as Karen Horney.  This paper will 
rely on some of Swanton’s psychological investigations in Chapter 3 in its discussion 
and analysis of eudaimonia and its role in virtue ethics. 
2.4.1.2 Michael Slote 
In contrast to Swanton’s pluralisms, Michael Slote wants to tighten VE theory 
by reducing the variables.  His theory takes a radical agent-based approach to VE.  
For Slote, “the moral or ethical status of acts [is] entirely derivative from independent 
and fundamental aretaic (as opposed to deontic) ethical characterizations of motives, 
character traits or individuals.”130  Thus, he bases virtue on motivations, in particular 
benevolence.  He takes an even stronger position than Swanton on the connection 
between virtue and good – he believes that there is no connection.  His agent-focused 
VE argues that the rightness of someone’s action depends entirely on the motives, 
dispositions, or inner life of moral individuals.  This proposition is a strong one and in 
Slote’s view, represents a radical and purer form of VE.  He further argues that this 
strong sense of agent based VE is not present in Aristotle.  However, his point that, 
for Aristotle the virtuous individual does what is noble because it is the noble and not                                                         
130  Slote, Michael, Morals from Motives.  Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001, p. 5. 
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because she is a virtuous individual is at best, contentious.  In any case, Slote 
classifies Aristotle’s VE theory as agent-focused, Plato’s as agent-prior, and his own 
as agent-based.131   
Historically, Slote’s agent-based VE is in the lineage of James Martineau’s.  
The latter has an agent-based conception of morality that treats compassion as the 
highest of secular motives.  Other philosophers such as Hume and Hutcheson have 
also placed a special emphasis on compassion.  Slote uses what he calls, a more 
general term, benevolence, as a motive.  Indeed, morality as universal benevolence is 
the foundation of Slote’s agent-based theory.  An action is right if it is motivated by 
universal benevolence.    Any agent-based VE that evaluates actions in relation to 
particular or single occurrent good motives is open to the objection that good motives 
(toward some) are insufficient to insure that one is acting morally (on the whole).  To 
counter this objection Slote’s agent based theory judges actions in relation to an 
agent’s total or overall motivation.  This holistic approach, Slote believes, is a better 
way of agent-basing.   
Ultimately, Slote defends a morality of caring, or “partial benevolence” 
according to which caring is a “fundamental form of moral excellence.”132  Slote 
emphasizes the virtue of a kind of balanced caring between those with whom we are 
intimate i.e. our family and close friends, and other people in general.  A caring 
person achieves a balanced concern among those for whom she cares in an intimate                                                         
131  Although he argues that Rosalind Hursthouse’s treatment of Aristotle makes his VE 
theory an agent-prior one.  
132  Slote (2001), p. 29-30. 
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fashion as well as a balanced concern between those she loves, and all others.  It is 
not clear from Slote’s explication how we decide which actions in which 
circumstances would express balanced concern.  Some critics suspect that Slote must 
rely covertly on intuitions about right and wrong actions in order to figure out which 
states of character are admirable.133  Another problem is how we should decide which 
character trait is fundamental and non-derivative.  For Slote, caring, or more 
generally benevolence is the character trait that is fundamentally admirable and lies 
on the “ground floor”.  It is used to explain or derive other ethical judgments.  
Honesty and strength of purpose are only derivatively admirable in his view.  They 
are only admirable to the extent that they are aspects of, or partly constitutive of, the 
right kind of balanced caring.  However, it is reasonable to argue that honesty seems 
to be admirable in its own right, under certain circumstances.  Slote turns aside from 
grounding virtues in a notion of eudaimonia because the result would not be a theory 
that takes character evaluations as fundamental.  It would not be an agent-based 
theory of the kind that Slote wants to develop.  This is hardly a substantive objection 
to using eudaimonia to ground the virtues.  In Chapter 3, we will develop this 
argument and further critique Slote’s VE theory, using it as an example of one that 
rejects eudaimonia but at a foundational loss. 
 
                                                         
133  Copp, David and Sobel, David, “Morality and Virtue: An Assessment of Some 
Recent Work in Virtue Ethics” in Ethics: An International Journal of Social, Political, and 
Legal Philosophy.  Vol.114, No. 3, pp 514-556, April 2004. 
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2.4.2 Naturalism 
 Some proponents of VE take the "Naturalism" route as the foundation or at 
least the rational justification for their VE theories.  This account claims that our final 
end and virtues depend on a particular view of nature, especially human nature that is 
understood in a broadly scientific way independent of the ethical claims themselves.  
The most developed and influential classical theories of virtue were naturalistic.134   
The best known modern virtue ethics theories are Hursthouse's and arguably Foot's.  
They characterize themselves as neo-Aristotelian, and this is the form of naturalism 
most commonly associated with classical virtue ethics.  Foot has done initial work on 
naturalism and Hursthouse, using this as a foundation, has built a more 
comprehensive model.135  Hursthouse defines ethical naturalism as "the enterprise of 
basing ethics in some way on considerations of human nature, on what is involved in 
being good qua human being."136   Ethical naturalism hopes to validate beliefs about 
which character traits are virtues by appeal to human nature.  It takes human beings to 
be part of the natural, biologically order of living things.  Its standard first premise is 
that human beings are a species of rational, social animals and thereby a species of 
living things -- which, unlike 'persons' or 'rational beings', have a particular biological 
make-up and a natural life cycle.137   
                                                        
134  Annas (2006). 
135  Hursthouse (2001) and Foot, Philippa, Natural Goodness.  Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2001. 
136  Hursthouse (2001), p. 192. 
137  Hursthouse (2001), p. 206. 
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 There are four reasons why naturalism seems to be a fitting basis for VE.  
First, VE locates the ethical within this world, and "requires no invocation of 
transcendence or other-worldliness".138  Second, having the virtues is necessary for 
living a characteristically human life, that is, for realizing human nature in the best 
way.  Third, VE is naturalistic by virtue of the connection between virtue and human 
flourishing.  Fourth, in regards to moral motivation, the virtuous person does the right 
thing 'naturally', without having to fight with emotions, inclinations or traits of 
character.  There is no conflict between reason and passion. 
 Hursthouse admits that Aristotelian naturalism is neither scientific nor 
foundational.  It does not seek to establish its conclusions from a neutral point of 
view.  However, for Hursthouse naturalism serves to provide rational credentials for 
our beliefs about which character traits are the virtues, not merely re-express them.  
Hursthouse takes many details and the whole idea of ethical naturalism from Foot.  
They both agree that 'good' is an attributive adjective.  They deny that this 
grammatical feature of the word 'good' (following Anscombe in 'Modern Moral 
Philosophy') and its related terms suddenly go through a mysterious change when we 
start doing ethics.  Thus, "what goes for 'good cactus', 'good knife', 'good rider', also 
goes for 'good human being' even when we use that phrase in ethics."139   
 Hursthouse evaluates social animals on four aspects in relation to four ends.  
The four aspects are: (i) parts, (ii) operations/reactions, (iii) actions, and (iv) 
                                                        
138  Cordner (1994), p. 291.   
139  Foot (2001), p. 195. 
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emotions/desires.  The four ends with respect to which these aspects are evaluated 
are: (i) individual survival, (ii) the continuance of the species, (iii) characteristic 
pleasure or enjoyment/characteristic freedom from pain, and (iv) the good functioning 
of the social group.  A good human being is one who is well fitted or endowed with 
respect to its four aspects.  Whether it is well fitted or endowed is determined by 
whether these four aspects well serve the four ends, in the ways characteristic of the 
species.  To be a good human being is to be well endowed with respect to the aspects 
listed.  Thus, to possess the human virtues is to be well endowed.  "The human virtues 
make their possessor good qua human being, one who is as ordinarily well fitted as a 
human being can be in not merely physical respects to live well, to flourish -- in a 
characteristically human way."140 
 As we are social animals, we will evaluate ourselves on the way in which, and 
the degree to which, we are fitted to serve the four ends.   However, we are rational 
animals and we therefore flourish in a different way from other social animals.  We 
use our reason to achieve the four ends.  Our rationality has a transforming effect on 
our basic naturalistic structure.  Hursthouse freely admits and indeed, takes up the 
point in her theory, that because we are rational animals we cannot identify what is 
characteristic of a good human life in the way that we can for other species.  There is 
too much variety.  Yet, we do have a characteristic (rational) way of going on, which 
distinguishes us from all the other species of animals.  A rational way is, "any way 
that we can rightly see as good, as something we have reason to do.  Correspondingly,                                                         
140  Foot (1999), p.208. 
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our characteristic enjoyments are any enjoyments we can rightly see as good, as 
something we in fact enjoy and that reason can endorse."141  Two points of note about 
this characteristic way of carrying on: first, most humans do not in fact carry on that 
way -- and are thus defective.  Second, the characteristic way of going on is at an 
extremely high level of generality.  It does not determine specific ways of life for us, 
in the way that characteristic ways of behaving do for other species.  Thus, although 
virtue must enable us to achieve our four ends, this allows for considerable variation 
in the lifestyles within which we develop the virtues.  Hursthouse gives the example 
of the celibate monk who may practice the virtues.  Whether he does so or not 
depends not on his lifestyle but on whether he lives his chosen way of life honestly, 
with charity and so on.  For as Hursthouse says, "a life lived in accordance with the 
virtues can take a great variety of forms, including those in which the exercise of at 
least one virtue figures much more largely and even at the expense of the exercise of 
others."142   
 Hursthouse’s naturalistic grounding for the virtues is a contemporary take on 
Aristotle’s naturalism.  I agree with the direction Hursthouse takes in basing the 
virtues on the good for human qua humans.  This move is not based on a 
metaphysical biology and is a rational basis for grounding the virtues.  However, 
Hursthouse does not consider psychological aspects of happiness, although this 
feature is part of (iii) – characteristic pleasures and freedom from pain.  Chapter 3 
                                                        
141  Foot (1999), p. 222. 
142  Hursthouse (1999), p. 216. 
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examines further Hursthouse’s naturalism and adopts her model together with 
psychological research on happiness to synthesize an expanded version of 
eudaimonia. 
2.4.3 Reason 
 Nancy Sherman, John McDowell, Henry Richardson, and David Wiggins 
belong to the category of VE thinkers who emphasize the role of reason.143  As 
mentioned earlier, Martha Nussbaum also wants to give reason and deliberation a 
larger role in moral life144.  She turns to Aristotle to give credence to the idea that not 
only beliefs, but also passions and desires, can be enlightened by the critical work of 
practical reason.  These writers share some common views.145  First, they tend to be 
dissatisfied with the utilitarian view that goods human beings pursue represent 
different quantities of the same thing.  They view goods to be plural and qualitatively 
heterogeneous.  Second, reason plays a central role in choosing means to ends, but 
also in deliberating about the ends themselves of a human life.  Third, emotion and 
desire are not devoid of any intellectual content.  They are directed towards goals and 
have intentionality.  Reason plays a role in guiding the emotions towards the good.  
Finally, existing ideas about the good result in misinformed passions and judgments.  
A rational critique of these mistaken passions can be undertaken and these critiques 
are likely to inform the passions themselves.  Wiggins and Richardson focus on the                                                         
143  Sherman, Nancy, Making a Necessity of Virtue: Aristotle and Kant on Virtue.  
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997.   
144  Nussbaum, Martha C., “Virtue Ethics: A Misleading Category?”  Journal of Ethics 3: 
163-201, 1999. 
145  Nussbaum (1999), p. 180. 
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first and second claims.  McDowell and Sherman focus on the third while Nussbaum 
agrees with all four claims.  Nussbaum's work has taken the idea of deliberative 
emotion in a political direction, in connection with the fourth claim.  She believes that 
we should aim to eliminate bad passions by teach young people the appropriate 
valuation of ends.  For instance, racial hatred is not a blind unreasoning force.  It is 
based on thoughts and evaluations that can be altered by teaching.146   
These writers base their arguments for putting reason at the forefront on 
Aristotelian grounds.  They are inclusivists in that they see that a flourishing life 
consists of goods that are pursued for their own sake and because they contribute to 
eudaimonia.  To pursue an end for its own sake means that it has its own distinctive 
kind of value.  Its value cannot be measured in terms of a further value such as 
pleasure or satisfaction.  These writers argue against the idea that we can render the 
goods of human life commensurable by considering them all as means to pleasure or 
satisfaction.  Thus, they are against the principle of utilitarianism that turns the value 
of all goods into one single value in order to make them commensurable.  Indeed, 
Richardson argues that we require more work on these goods in order to know which 
of these goods contribute to a flourishing human life.  One requires deliberation in 
order to organize the set of goods that each has its own distinctive value. 
2.4.3.1 Henry S. Richardson 
 Wiggins and Richardson argue that this process of deliberation is fraught with 
difficulty but they hold this difficulty as one of its virtues, suggesting that narrow                                                         
146  Nussbaum (1999), p. 186. 
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technical concepts of deliberation are attractive to people who want to evade life's 
complexities.  Some argue that the ultimate ends that are the components of 
eudaimonia must be grasped by non-rational intuition (see chapter 1).  Wiggins and 
Richardson argue, and I agree with their position, that Aristotle does not hold this.  
By advancing in a holistic manner, seeking the best overall composite picture of 
eudaimonia, one may hope to be deliberating in a genuinely rational way about what 
ultimate parts to put in the picture.  Most importantly we deliberate about how to 
conceive of those parts.  A great part of such deliberation consists of producing 
alternative specifications of highly vague and general ultimate ends, and then 
choosing among them.   
 Wiggins argues, against conventional interpretations, that Aristotle's notion of 
deliberation is the same in Books 3, 6, and 7.  It is the analysis of choice and 
deliberation that is widened, not the sense of the word.  He also argues that in Book 6 
and 7 Aristotle does not conceive of deliberation from a standpoint of choosing 
between various rules because Aristotle writes that there are no principles or rules in 
matters concerning conduct (1104a7).  Thus, there is no rule-case approach in 
Aristotle.  Wiggins also contends that we deliberate about the means to the end and 
about ends themselves.  Deliberation about the means takes two forms.  First, one 
deliberates about the efficient cause that will lead to a desired end.  Second, one 
deliberates about the constituents of the end, "something whose existence counts in 
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itself as the partial or total realization of the end."147  Practical wisdom in its 
deliberative manifestations is concerned with the attainment of particular formed 
objectives and with questions of what specific objectives to form.  We start with a 
vague conception of the eudaimon life but we must have a specification of what this 
sort of life is.  We continually deliberate about a better and more practicable 
specification of the end. 
 Richardson is most concerned with showing that deliberation can be of ends.  
Opponents of this view base their rejection on two claims.  The first is a pseudo-
Humean position that while reason is concerned with ascertaining the truth of 
statements or beliefs, desires are not such as to be true or false.  Although reason can 
deal with factual and logical questions, it cannot, settle purely prescriptive ones.  
Ends are in their view, essentially prescriptive and are not subject to the constraint of 
fitting with the facts.  The second claim is that commensurabilility is a prerequisite of 
rational choice.  This idea underlies the maximizing formulas of contemporary 
utilitarianism and rational choice theory.  The third claim is that deliberation cannot 
be of an ultimate end.  The latter is the source of rational valuation.  It is the 
ultimately fixed background against which all rational deliberation necessarily 
proceeds.  On this conception, the ultimate end  cannot be thrown into question by 
rational deliberation.  Richardson attempts to neutralize these claims, in my opinion 
successfully.    Essentially the core of his account of rational deliberation of ends is 
                                                        
147  Wiggins, David, “Deliberation and Practical Reason,” in Essays on Aristotle’s Ethics, 
ed. Amelie Oksenberg Rorty.  Berkeley: University of California Press, 1980, p. 224. 
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the holistic standard of rationality that he thinks is appropriate in the revision and 
specification of ends.  His holism refers to an absence of segmentation and mutual 
relevance of all members of the whole.  Richardson has two extended examples of 
such deliberation concerning the ultimate values of a life.  Chapter 4 goes in greater 
detail about Richardson’s arguments, focusing on his proposals of how deliberation 
works in determining the ends.   
2.4.3.2. John McDowell 
 Reason plays a role in determining our ultimate ends.  Desire and taste do not 
simply chose them for us.  At the same time, reason informs the structure of desire 
and emotion.  Virtue is a mean concerning both passion and action, because Aristotle 
expects that reason shapes the passions, as well as choice.  Another proponent of this 
view is John McDowell who provides a theoretical elaboration of how reason shapes 
emotion so that the latter come to embody virtue.148  Like Wiggins, he does not think 
that rules can unambiguously provide guidance to action for a virtuous person.  There 
will always be exceptions to a set of rules that are set up to guide virtuous behavior.  
Cases will inevitably turn up in which a mechanical application of the rules would 
strike one as wrong.  In any case, Aristotle consistently says that the best 
generalizations about how one should behave hold only for the most part.  Thus, 
McDowell rejects the claims of those who say that the virtuous person's behavior 
rides on rules and not rationality.  Wiggins, McDowell, and Nussbaum’s work on 
                                                        
148  McDowell, John, Mind, Value and Reality.  Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 
1998. 
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vastly reducing the role of universal rules in deliberation and choice are reactions to 
the non-cognitivists such as R.M. Hare as well as utilitarian conceptions of rules and 
commensurability of goods.   
2.4.3.3 Nancy Sherman 
 Sherman works on the thesis that habituation of virtue is not a mindless 
procedure but one that involves reason.149  She therefore argues against Burnyeat and 
Sorabji who claim that Aristotle’s theory on habituation is a mechanical one.150  If the 
habituation process is mechanical it ultimately makes mysterious the transition 
between childhood and moral maturity.  It leaves unexplained how the child goes 
from habituated virtue to a full moral virtue that involves practical wisdom.  Thus, 
Sherman necessarily focuses on character and how practical reason integrates the 
different ends of character.  Practical reason assesses character and the circumstances 
and issues judgments of what is best and finest to do.  Full virtue is excellence of the 
non-rational part as well as the combination of the intellectual and character 
excellences.  Aristotle says as much when he defines virtue in NE II.6 as a character 
disposition concerning choice as determined by the reasoning of the phronimos.  He 
clearly states that one cannot be good without practical wisdom nor wise without 
virtue (1144b30-3).  Sherman uses this uncontroversial definition of virtue to make 
her overall claim that if full virtue is to meet these conditions, then this goal must be 
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reflected in the educational process. The child must be seen as being educated 
towards that end.  This will require a “developmental conception of cognitive and 
affective capacities, as well as a conception of habituation as in varying degrees 
reflective and critical.”151   
2.4.4 Rejecting Reason 
2.4.4.1 Julia Driver 
There are thinkers in contemporary virtue ethics who disagree about the 
importance of practical wisdom in virtuous acts.  Driver holds that practical wisdom 
does not matter at all; an agent can have a virtue even if that disposition requires her 
to be ignorant or thoughtless.152  Driver identifies a class of moral virtues that either 
does not require the agent know what she does is right or, that actually requires that 
the agent be ignorant.  She calls this class of virtues, “virtues of ignorance.”  Modesty 
is one such virtue.  A modest person will underestimate her self-worth to some 
degree.  If she understates the truth, she does so unknowingly.  This entails that the 
modest person is ignorant, to a certain degree, with regard to her self-worth.  As 
modesty is generally considered a virtue, Driver concludes that this virtue rests upon 
an epistemic defect.  Driver’s argument rests on a mistaken view of modesty.  The 
virtue does not entail underestimating but not overestimating one’s abilities.  In doing 
the latter, knowledge is essential.  Practical wisdom allows us to see our abilities as 
relative to those of others.  For instance, I can competently invest money and achieve                                                         
151  Sherman (1989), p. 159-160. 
152  Driver, Julia, Uneasy Virtue.  Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001, pp. 16-
42. 
 108 
decent investment returns.  Yet, I realize that there are others who are far better at 
investing than I am, and who achieve higher returns.  I also have the knowledge that 
my investment returns are not necessarily explained solely by my abilities.  Luck 
plays a role too.  This knowledge enables me to be modest in my investing abilities.   
2.4.4.2 Maria Merritt 
 In contrast to Driver, Maria Merritt takes a moderate position on the necessity 
of practical wisdom in virtue ethics.  She argues that an agent can have a virtue even 
if reflection reveals that she has it for instrumental ends such as power, without her 
own reflective endorsement.153  In weakening or rejecting the role of phronesis in 
developing and exercising the virtues, dispositions become instruments for 
consequential ends. Thus, like Driver, Merritt takes a consequentialist approach in 
defining virtues.  We can argue that this approach is orthogonal to the very basis of 
virtue ethics, which is non-consequentialist.  This dissertation will fully discuss 
Driver’s and Merritt’s arguments for rejecting practical wisdom and refute those 
arguments.  It will argue that phronesis is necessary for a complete virtue ethics 
theory because of its role in leading a person from deliberation to action. 
2.4.5 Emotions 
 Virtue ethicists who emphasize the role of emotion in their theories are likely 
reacting to the perceived overreach of reason that was promulgated by Kant and 
Kantians.  Feminist writers on virtue ethics such as Annette Baier tend to focus on 
                                                        
153 Merritt, Maria, “Virtue Ethics and Situationist Personalist Psychology.”  Ethical Theory 
and Moral Practice 3: 365-383, 2000. 
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emotions.  Philippa Foot is one of the first philosophers to develop virtue ethics.  Her 
views are complex and have evolved over time.  Her version of VE owes some basis 
to Aristotle but she is uncomfortable with the concept of eudaimonia.  In her early 
work, she reduces the role of reason in VE theory.  Instead, she recognizes the 
importance of non-rational elements such as emotions and desires.154  Foot contends 
that the will is a part of virtue.  She is not clear about what she means by will but we 
gather that it is closely akin to desire or wish.  Thus she writes, “…the disposition of 
the heart is part of virtue.”155  She argues that wisdom, while being an intellectual 
virtue, also characterizes a person’s will because wisdom makes judgments on which 
attachments are worthwhile and which are not.   
 In “Morality as a System of Hypothetical Imperatives,” Foot argues that 
someone who does not have the desires that most others possess, have no reason to 
choose the things that most people consider good.156  The term “hypothetical 
imperatives” strongly suggest that she considers good choices to be means to the 
satisfaction of some agent’s desires.157  For Foot, morality is rooted in the nature of 
human beings, and thus, in human desires and passions.  She argues that we are 
naturally predisposed towards virtues such as justice and benevolence.                                                          
154  Her latest work, Natural Goodness (2001), gives a higher profile to practical reason.  
She suggests that it is because moral action is a requirement of practical rationality that it has 
a special connection with the will.  Her book is a sustained argument against non-cognitivist 
moral philosophy and for making naturalism a foundation of virtue ethics. 
155  Foot, Philippa, “Virtues and Vices,” in Virtue Ethics, eds. Roger Crisp and Michael 
Slote.  Oxford: Oxford University Press, p. 166. 
156  Foot, Philippa, Virtues and Vices and Other Essays in Moral Philosophy.  Berkeley: 
University of California Press, 2001, pp. 157-174. 
157  Nussbaum (1999), p.191. 
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“Considerations of justice, charity and the like have a strange and powerful appeal to 
the human heart, and we do not need bad arguments to show that no one could be 
indifferent to morality without error.”158  However, Foot offers little analysis of 
emotion and desire that would show, more precisely, how desires and passions are the 
results of man’s choices and values. 
2.5 Criticisms of Virtue Ethics Theories 
 It is instructive to note Rosalind Hursthouse’s attitude to a definition of virtue 
ethics.  She gives the following characterization of virtue ethics: it is (1) an ethics 
which is ‘agent-centered’ rather than ‘act-centered’ (2) concerned with Being rather 
than Doing (3) addressing the question ‘What sort of person should I be?’ rather than 
‘What sorts of action should I do?’ (4) taking certain areteic concepts as basic rather 
than deontic ones (5) rejecting the idea that ethics is codifiable in rules or principles 
that can provide specific action guidance.159  These characterizations give a broad and 
general definition of virtue ethics.  Hursthouse goes on to say that she gives these 
characterizations not because they are good ones but because they are commonly 
encountered.  Indeed, she thinks that these characterizations are seriously misleading.  
Later on, we discover that she thinks the characterizations are misleading because on 
these basis, virtue ethics cannot be a genuine rival to utilitarianism or deontology 
because it cannot tell us about right action, i.e. what sort of acts to do.  Thus, as with 
most writers in VE, Hursthouse is still (despite developing a virtue ethics theory) 
                                                        
158  Foot (1997), p.  
159  Hursthouse (1999), p. 25. 
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concerned with differentiating VE from its two main rivals.  This concern has led VE 
into describing itself as what it is not instead of giving a clear, consistent, and cogent 
description of what it is. 
 In contrast, Nussbaum provides three characterizations for virtue ethics (agent 
centered, focus on the inner life and character of the agent, and focus on the whole 
course of the agent’s life) but goes on to say that these characterizations are not 
unique to virtue ethics but can be applied to Kantian ethics.  Nor do they really 
involve a break with the great utilitarian thinkers such as Sidgwick and Mill.160  She 
argues that virtue ethics is not any unitary approach.  Kantians and utilitarians have 
always been thinking and writing about virtues.  Virtue ethics has different targets 
and different positive views.  While the common ground is significant, it can be 
pursued within Kantianism, Utilitarianism, neo-Aristotelianism or neo-Humean 
projects.  The inference from Hursthouse’s and Nussbaum’s insights is that VE lacks 
a cogent, consistent, and unitary approach.  The purpose of this paper is to give some 
coherence to virtue ethics theories by suggesting that there are a couple of necessary 
features that should be included in all theories that call themselves virtue ethics 
theories.   
Schneewind makes a similar criticism of VE when he writes, “It is not easy to 
collect from present exponents of virtue-centred views of morality an agreement 
                                                        
160  Nussbaum (1999), p. 170. 
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about what distinguishes their position from others.”161  Another critic of VE, Robert 
Louden,  writes, “One problem confronting anyone who sets out to analyse the new 
virtue ethics in detail is that we presently lack fully developed examples of it in the 
contemporary literature.  Most of the work done in this genre has a negative rather 
than a positive thrust.”162  In addition Louden gives other serious criticisms of virtue 
ethics.  First, VE is weak in applied ethics.163  Second, VE does not deal with 
mistakes made by virtuous persons (and presumably they do make mistakes).  Third, 
VE does not list intolerable offenses and indeed, does not answer the question of 
whether there are any of these in VE theory.  Fourth, how do we deal with character 
change when using VE?  Fifth, VE does not consider the possibility of moral 
backsliding.  Sixth, we live in a heterogenous, crowded, and democratic society.  Can 
we use VE, which is designed for a small polis?  Both Louden and Schneewind think 
that the one of the biggest problems with VE is that we do not know with any degree 
of certainty who really is virtuous and who vicious.164 
As noted in the introduction, contemporary VE is a relatively new areas of 
study.  Professionals in this area are continuously coming up with ideas that shore up 
weaknesses in VE theory.  For instance, the problem of applied VE that Louden 
mentions has begun to be addressed by many writers such as Noddings who writes on                                                         
161  Schneewind, J.B., “The Misfortunes of Virtue,” in Virtue Ethics, eds. Roger Crisp 
and Michael Slote.  Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1997, p. 179. 
162  Louden Robert B., “On Some Vices of Virtue Ethics,” in Virtue Ethics, eds. Roger 
Crisp and Michael Slote.  Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1997, p. 202. 
163  Louden, (1997), p. 205-210. 
164  Schneewind (1997), p. 199; Louden (1997), p. 210-213. 
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the virtue of caring in teaching, Radden who writes on VE in psychiatry, and Swanton 
who writes on VE in business ethics.165  Certainly, others have responded to some of 
Louden’s criticisms since he articulated them.  Louden’s sixth criticism is handled by 
writers such as Slote, Hursthouse, Swanton, and even MacIntyre.  Every community, 
big or small, has its set of moral virtues.  Through habituation, parents teach their 
children these values, regardless of a community’s size.  The problem of separating 
the virtuous from the vicious, assumes that the rightness of an act is determined by 
the particular individual who performs the act.  A possible and different way to judge 
the act is according to what an ideal virtuous agent would do.  Hursthouse seems to 
gesture in that direction.166  Louden’s criticisms are of course a challenge to VE 
theorists.  They are not insurmountable but they are beyond the scope of this 
dissertation.  What this dissertation does attempt to do is to correct the flaw in VE 
that Schneewind and Louden point to i.e., the lack of agreement about what 
distinguishes VE from other positions.  Agreeing on the necessary elements of a VE 
theory is an important step towards strengthening the field and addressing one of its 
weaknesses. 
2.6 Conclusion 
From the discussion in this chapter, we conclude that there is a broad array of 
VE theories each with differing emphasis of the many features of VE.  Hence, it is                                                         
165  Noddings, Nel, “Caring as Relation and Virtue in Teaching”; Radden, Jennifer, 
“Virtue Ethics as Profession Ethics: The Case of Psychiatry”; Swanton, Christine, “Virtue 
Ethics, Roles Ethics, and Business Ethics”, in Working Virtue: Virtue Ethics and 
Contemporary Moral Problems, Rebecca L. Walker and Philip J. Ivanhoe (eds).  Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 2007. 
166  Hursthouse (1999), Chapter 1. 
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difficult for an observer to ascertain the standard features of VE.  The theories of the 
three major VE thinkers who have developed VE theories described in this chapter 
(Hursthouse, Slote, and Swanton) are startlingly different.  To be sure, they have 
some common ground such as the ones given by Hursthouse and Nussbaum above.  
Yet, the differences are wide and it is difficult to put them into a single category that 
we can confidently call VE unless we broaden the term to a mere generality.  Even 
agreement on what constitutes virtues is hard to discern (compare the definition of 
virtue given by MacIntyre versus Swanton).  This conclusion appears to support 
critics who claim that VE lacks a single, cohesive strain of thinking.  In order to give 
more coherence to VE there must be more agreement on the necessary features for a 
comprehensive VE theory. 
Thus, we argue that eudaimonia and phronesis are two such features.  In 
chapters 3 and 4, this dissertation will focus on the VE theorists who disregard or 
reduce the significance of eudaimonia (Slote and Foot) and phronesis (Driver and 
Merritt) and argue that their theories are flawed because of this neglect. VE theories 
that downplay phronesis are flawed because they lack adequate explanation of how 
we move from determining virtue to action.  VE theories that ignore eudaimonia are 
flawed because they are unable to give a credible explanation of how virtues are 
determined and justified.  We will use the arguments developed in the theories of 
Hursthouse and Annas to support the proposition that eudaimonia is necessary for a 
comprehensive VE theory.  To support the proposition that phronesis is necessary for 
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a comprehensive VE theory, this dissertation will draw on the work of Richardson, 
and McDowell. 
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CHAPTER 3 
A FOUNDATION: EUDAIMONIA IN VIRTUE ETHICS 
 
3.1 Introduction 
Other moral traditions attempt to base morality on the emotions, on intuitions, 
on conscience, or on a social contract.  Virtue ethics must attempt to base morality on 
eudaimonia.  It is no less exciting and intellectually satisfying.  Eudaimonia grounds 
the virtues in the idea of human flourishing, in a teleological manner.  Thinking about 
the virtues leads to thinking of one’s life as a whole.167  This notion is crucial, and as 
we have seen, is prominent in all forms of classical virtue ethics, because the virtues 
make sense only within a conception of living that takes the life one lives to be an 
overall unity, rather than a succession of more or less unconnected states.  Cultivating 
the virtues is worthwhile because living virtuously will constitute living my life as a 
whole in a way that lives it well.168  Classical theories of virtue ethics claim that 
virtue is, more weakly (in the Aristotelian case), necessary for eudaimonia.  In the 
stronger (Stoic) case, virtue is sufficient for eudaimonia.169   
Thus, eudaimonia cannot be defined at the start, without reference to the 
virtues.  A life lived in accordance with the virtues is the best specification of 
eudaimonia.  From the previous chapter, we have seen that contemporary proponents                                                         
167 Annas, Julia, The Morality of Happiness, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1993, chapter 
1.  
168 Annas, Julia, “Virtue Ethics,” in The Oxford Handbook of Ethical Theory, ed. David 
Copp.  Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2006, p. 520 
169 Annas, Julia, “Virtue Ethics: What Kind of Naturalism,” in Virtue Ethics Old and New, ed. 
Stephen M. Gardiner.  Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2005, pp. 26-27. 
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of virtue ethics, largely, prefer to concentrate on the concept of virtue and to ignore 
the notion of eudaimonia with which it is historically and conceptually connected. 
While modern VE theories are analogues of Aristotelian VE, it is interesting to note 
that these modern theories call themselves virtue ethics and not eudaimonic ethics.   
Virtue ethicists are uncomfortable with the concept of eudaimonia for three 
main reasons.  First, they think the concept defies objective definition.  One can find 
many views of eudaimonia and we open the door to relativism if we depend on 
eudaimonia for the justification of virtues.  I think Hursthouse gives as a good an 
argument for the objectivity of eudaimonia as I have seen in the literature (see 3.1.2).  
In addition, in 3.3, I incorporate the subjective elements of eudaimonia by using 
research into modern views of happiness, as defined in the introduction of this 
dissertation, while still maintaining its essential objective feature, living according to 
the virtues.  Secondly, relying on eudaimonia as a motivation for being virtuous also 
opens us up to the accusation of moral egoism.  This misconception of the connection 
between eudaimonia and moral egoism is well countered by Annas.  A person aims at 
her own eudaimonia and not others in the sense that she is living her life and not 
others.  There is not implication that she is furthering her own interests at the expense 
of others.  Someone who has dispositions that further only her own interests in a way 
that could conflict with those of others cannot be considered virtuous.170  Third, 
Aristotle’s eudaimonia is based on his “metaphysical biology”, a term used by 
MacIntyre.  Yet, Aristotle’s ethics does not rely on his notions such as substantial                                                         
170  Annas (2006), pp. 522-523. 
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form, entelechy or on concepts that tie it explicitly to his biological theory.  
Aristotle’s account of human nature in Book 1 is remarkably modern depending more 
on empirical psychology than on his natural philosophy.  I therefore, reject these 
claims arguing that they are insufficient for discarding eudaimonia (see Chapter 5 for 
a detailed refutation).  If we ignore the concept of eudaimonia virtue ethics is unable 
to answer certain fundamental questions about the nature and value of virtue.  If the 
concept of virtue is disconnected from eudaimonia, virtue ethics runs the risk of 
turning into a variant of rival theories.171 
This chapter will draw on the definitions and role of eudaimonia given by 
Aristotle.  The paper takes Aristotle’s definition of eudaimonia as “rational activity in 
accordance with the virtues, in a complete life.”  Thus, there are three strands to 
eudaimonia:  reason (phronesis), a life lived according to the virtues, and a complete 
life.  Chapter 4 gives an account of the first strand, phronesis.   In addition, we agree 
with Aristotle’s view that the role of eudaimonia is to justify and validate the virtues.  
It is the telos of our activities.  To update the concept of eudaimonia, this dissertation 
also uses relevant material from Hursthouse and Annas.  
Hursthouse is a neo-Aristotelian who has written an impressive and one of the 
most comprehensive VE theories in contemporary literature.  In it she defends the 
necessity of eudaimonia to validate the virtues.  She takes a naturalistic view of 
eudaimonia and grounds human flourishing on what is good for human beings qua 
                                                        
171  Prior, William J., “Eudaimonism and Virtue” in The Journal of Value Inquiry 
35:325-342, 2001.   
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human beings.  We use her arguments based on a naturalistic account of ethics, to 
counter that eudaimonia cannot be objectively defined.  Annas is an unapologetic 
eudaimonist and a neo-Aristotelian.  Consequently, she holds the view that virtues 
must be located in a framework in which the overarching concept is eudaimonia.  She 
believes that more theorists will engage with eudaimonia if the perceived differences 
between the current and ancient views of eudaimonia are reduced.  We will attempt to 
do this in this chapter and build on the arguments of these theorists and psychological 
research to support its thesis that eudaimonia is necessary for a comprehensive VE 
theory because it determines which dispositions are virtues.   I will apply results from 
psychological research focusing on happiness that has been carried out in the past two 
decades in order to include into the concept of eudaimonia, modern views of 
happiness.   
Without eudaimonia, virtues, which everyone agrees are a primary focus of 
virtue ethics (VE), are left without a determinant of their status.  On the negative side, 
the latter part of this chapter attempts to show that Michael Slote’s VE theory is not 
comprehensive because it rejects eudaimonia and embraces the far weaker motivation 
of benevolence as a justification for the virtues.  I do the same with Foot’s attempt to 
justify the virtue of courage without recourse to eudaimonia.  Finally, Christine 
Swanton’s attempt at a pluralistic means of evaluating virtues is also examined.  The 
conclusion is that Swanton’s version of virtue recognition and validation is too 
permissive and can in the end be subsumed under the eudaimonic evaluative scheme.  
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Her pluralism and desire to accommodate a wide range of views undermines her 
attempts to explain and guide moral action.   
3.2 Eudaimonia 1.0: Aristotle’s View  
 Eudaimonia plays a foundational role in Aristotle’s ethics.  This role stems 
from eudaimonia being the telos of every human.  According to the definition given 
by Aristotle, eudaimonia is the reason we act virtuously.  Thus, it is the justification 
for the virtues.  In Chapter 1 we discussed Aristotle’s arguments that there is an 
ultimate end.  This ultimate end is the chief good.  The chief good is eudaimonia and 
all people seek it.    As the ultimate end, eudaimonia is the target towards which our 
actions are aimed: “…it is for the sake of eudaimonia that we all do everything else 
we do, and we lay it down that the principle and cause of goods is something 
honorable and godlike (1102a2-4)” Doing well is connected to the notion of 
proairesis or choice because the word praxis (action) is restricted to man and denied 
to other animals.  Proairesis is a deliberative desire to do something with a view of 
doing well (eupraxia).  McDowell with the support of Aristotle at 1095a19-20 states 
that “doing well” is a synonym for “having eudaimonia.”172   Continuing this line of 
argument, if praxeis are actions that issue from proairesis, then “we have it 
guaranteed, by implicit explanation of the restricted use, that all praxeis are 
undertaken for the sake of eudaimonia (i.e. eupraxia).”173   
                                                        
172  McDowell, John, “The Role of Eudaimonia in Aristotle’s Ethics,” in Essays on 
Aristotle’s Ethics, ed. Amelie Oksenberg Rorty.  Berkeley: University of California Press, 
1980 (1980), p. 361. 
173  McDowell (1980), p. 362. 
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The question then arises as to how everyone can be pursuing the same end.  
Surely everyone has her own end that differs from other’s.  I agree with McDowell 
that both the above characterizations of the end are correct.174  The appropriate 
answer depends on the level of specificity with which ends are formulated.  If we go 
down to specific details about what a particular person’s end is (e.g. having a 
fulfilling and enjoyable job that adds value to society) divergences are highly likely to 
appear.  (Section 3.2.1. gives a fuller discussion of this aspect of eudaimonia based on 
results of happiness research.)  However, on a broad based level, it is possible for 
something that we call eudaimonia to be the common end of everyone.  Aristotle says 
as much in 1095a17-28: “Pretty well most people are agreed about what to call it: 
both ordinary people and people of quality say ‘eudaimonia’, and suppose that living 
well and doing well are the same as being eudaimon.”  
Of course, eudaimonia needs further elaboration and definition.  The formal 
definition of eudaimonia is that it is both self-sufficient and complete.  It may be 
instructive to investigate the definition that emerges from the function or ergon 
argument.   
A human being’s function we posit as being a kind of life, and this life 
as being activity of soul and actions accompanied by reason, and it 
belongs to a good man to perform these well and finely, and each thing 
is completed well when it possesses its proper virtues: if all this is so, 
the human good turns out to be activity of soul in accordance with 
virtue (1) (and if there are more virtues than one, in accordance with 
the best and the most complete) (2).  But furthermore it will be this in 
a complete life (3).  For a single swallow does not make spring, nor 
                                                        
174  McDowell (1980), p. 360. 
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does a single day; in the same way, neither does a single day, or a 
short time, make a man blessed and happy. 
        1098a13-21 
 
In (1) Aristotle is saying that eudaimonia is rational activity in accordance with 
virtues.  Therefore, he is telling us that eudaimonia involves reason, actions, and 
virtues.  The reason to which Aristotle refers is one that deals with moral issues.  The 
distinctive sort of reason, “applies to a restricted class of bits of behavior which, 
because undertaken for that sort of reason, are of special interest in ethics.”175  
Aristotle’s definition describes that kind of life, which is most desirable for a human 
being.  It is a life that aims at virtuousness because it is by being virtuous that one can 
be eudaimon.   
That eudaimonia involves reason that deals with moral categories is perhaps 
less ambiguous or controversial than the second conjunct, virtue.  For there is some 
debate about which intellectual virtue, sophia or phronesis, Aristotle was referring in 
his bracketed statement (2).  As noted earlier in section 1.3.1, I do not subscribe to 
Aristotle’s purported claim that the theoretical and contemplative life is the most 
superior and therefore, the eudaimonistic.   The question which type of life is the 
archetype of eudaimonia is also linked to the dominant and inclusive interpretations 
of the ultimate end.  Aristotle does not give a definitive answer in Book X.  Chapter 7 
of this book seems to say that eudaimonia consists in the exercise of our highest and 
most distinctively human capacity, our capacity for rational thought.  It is a life 
devoted to nothing but the intellectual activity of theoria, contemplation.  However,                                                         
175  McDowell (1980), p. 364. 
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X.8 seems to say that eudaimonia consists in the many-faceted activities, which go 
into the life of a good public-spirited citizen.  The first of these interpretations is in 
line with the dominant interpretation of I.7, while the second, involving a large 
variety of virtuous activities, is one version of the inclusive interpretation.    
 The dominant view, which identifies eudaimonia with theoria, has to explain 
how it is that everything else is done for the sake of theoria.  This has been done but it 
is unsatisfactory, especially when we apply it to contemporary society.176  The 
inclusivist position in most of its versions fails to give the special place given to 
theoria, but it is correct in that it gives due weight to the fact that the Ethics is largely 
devoted to aspects of the practical moral life. Wilkes argues that Aristotle’ position is 
inconsistent and one cannot and should not try to juggle the texts so that the conflict 
of the two lives is resolved.177 
One intriguing possibility that could reconcile the two versions of the 
eudaimon life may be found in a Taoist approach.  Taoism is naturalistic in some of 
the same ways as Aristotle.  The latter grounds his definition of eudaimonia on 
human function, and what is most characteristic of human nature.  According to 
Taoism we must live according to our nature and with Nature.  The philosophy is also 
practical – every one of us cannot be philosophers or sages living in simple houses in 
the forests, contemplating first principles, all our lives.  Thus, a good Taoist lives the 
                                                        
176  Kraut, Richard, Aristotle on the Human Good.  Princeton: Princeton University Press, 
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first part of her life engaged in the polity, family, and society, while following the 
precepts of Taoism.  In the last part of her life, she disengages from the world, having 
contributed to it and having learned what she could from it.  She enters the 
contemplative part of her life and does philosophy.  Similarly, Aristotle’s two 
versions of the eudaimon life can be pursued in different stages of a person’s life.  In 
the first stage of youth and middle age, a person will pursue moral excellence while 
guided by the intellectual excellence of phronesis.  It is the practical, political stage of 
life where one has friends and the external goods that add to a eudaimon life.  In later 
life, one pulls back, gets rid of the unnecessary external goods, and lives a 
contemplative life in which theoria is the dominant end.  If one dies before the latter 
stage, then one simply does not achieve eudaimonia; not everyone can nor does.  This 
Taoist reconciliation of Aristotle’s two versions of the eudaimon life also accords 
with the latter’s last statements in the definition of eudaimonia, where it is clearly 
stated that eudaimonia is not achieved in a day, but is a result of a lifetime of activity 
aiming at virtue.  This reconciliation is one way of taking into account the 
contemplative life.  Otherwise, it is difficult to reckon how it can be recommended as 
the only form of eudaimonia in today’s cultural milieu.   
In (3), Aristotle proposes that eudaimonia is not achieved through a single 
action or in a short period of time.  A eudaimon life becomes one that works over 
time.  To achieve this, a person must analyze the notion of what a good life would 
and must have a true grasp of the ultimate end.  One must develop a life plan that 
integrates all of the desired pursuits so that it has the best distribution of desired 
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goods that gives the plan the most completeness and self-sufficiency.  On this view, 
Wilkes views eudaimonia as an ‘emergent’ property.178  Aristotle shows in the NE 
that virtuous activity is essential in every plan.  A person cannot attain the good life, 
the good for a human, unless she is a good person.  
3.3 Eudaimonia 2.0: Hursthouse’s View:  
 In Chapter 2 we reviewed some of Hursthouse’s basic views on eudaimonia.  
In answer to critics who argue that virtue ethics cannot tell us which right action to 
take, she suggests that virtue ethics can give an account of right action in such a way 
as to provide action guidance.  To reiterate from Chapter 2:  
P.1. An action is right iff it is what a virtuous agent would 
characteristically (i.e. acting in character) do in the circumstances. 
 
P.1a. A virtuous agent is one who has, and exercises, certain character 
traits, namely, the virtues. 
 
P.2. A virtue is a character trait a human being needs for eudaimonia, 
to flourish or live well. 
 
Hursthouse is concerned with validating virtues.  P.2. is her way of doing this, 
although she adds that it is more complicated than is usually supposed. Her definition 
of a virtue is: “A virtue is a character trait that a human being needs for eudaimonia, 
to flourish or live well.”179  (Hursthouse has problems with any translation of 
eudaimonia but settles for flourishing as the best alternative.)  This claim that virtues 
are required for eudaimonia encapsulates three theses: (1) The virtues benefit their 
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possessor, as we cannot be eudaimon without having the virtues, (2) The virtues make 
their possessor good qua human being.  The virtues are grounded in eudaimonia.  
Hursthouse further grounds eudaimonia in human nature, such that human beings 
need the virtues in order to live a characteristically good human life.  The third thesis, 
(3), is the features of virtue in (1) and (2) are interrelated.  She argues that (1) and (2) 
can validate our beliefs about which character traits are the virtues. 
 That the virtues benefit their possessor because they enable her to live a 
eudaimon life is the motivation for being virtuous.  However, this is not how 
Hursthouse primarily intends it.  She thinks the motivational reason is a red herring.  
Within ethical naturalism, a person does not look for motivating reasons to be 
virtuous.  Rather she is seeking validation of which character traits are the virtues so 
that she can live a eudaimon life in accordance with those virtues.  Thus, for 
Hursthouse, the more important role for eudaimonia is that it validates the virtues via 
thesis (1).  She takes the position that being virtuous is not sufficient to bring about 
eudaimonia in order to undercut arguments such as, if I do something courageous I 
may be maimed.  “The claim is not that possession of virtues will not guarantee that 
one will flourish.  The claim is that they are the only reliable bet.”180  Then of course 
there is Thrasymachus’s or the immoralist objection that the wicked may flourish 
without caring about the virtues.  Her answer is twofold: first, by claiming that virtues 
benefit their possessor, she is not claiming that virtue is necessary for eudaimonia.  
She is claiming that, “no ‘regimen’ will serve better – no other candidate ‘regimen’ is                                                         
180  Hursthouse (1999), p. 172. 
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remotely possible.”  Second, a few examples of the thriving wicked does not discredit 
her thesis.  There must be a clearly identifiable pattern in human history that shows 
that the wicked have thrived in a sustained manner.   
Notice that Hursthouse, while still holding on to eudaimonia as a means of 
validation and peripherally of motivation for the virtues, has weakened the 
Aristotelian position on eudaimonia.  It is no longer sufficient and complete.  
Hursthouse feels compelled to say virtue is not sufficient for eudaimonia to counter 
the argument that virtue can lead to one’s downfall.  She then adds that she does not 
claim that virtue is even necessary for eudaimonia.181  However, being virtuous is the 
best possible route to eudaimonia.  She brings in other arguments to counter the 
immoralist claim.  First, the majority of us, who have our children’s interests at heart, 
teach our children to be moral – for the child’s own sake.  Her answer to the 
immoralist’s argument is to look at our own lives and attitudes.  How do we feel 
about the wealthy and powerful who, cheat and are ruthless?  Not many of us, she 
thinks, envy these people.  Thus, she appeals to our human nature, which according to 
her view as a decent and good human being, is by and large, rather good and 
decent.182 
And this perspective is in line with her stand that there is “no possibility of 
justifying morality from the outside by appealing to ‘anything non-moral’, or by 
                                                        
181  Hursthouse (1999), p. 173. 
182  The cheating, ruthless villains are of course, humans, but they are not the majority 
and according to Hursthouse’s naturalism they are not examples of the good ones in the 
species. 
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finding a neutral point of view that the fairly virtuous and the wicked can share.”183  
Hursthouse takes a middle-of-the-road, sensible, view of eudaimonia.  She disagrees 
with McDowell that even if virtue leads to disaster, it will not be felt as a disaster by 
the truly virtuous.  She does not have the conception of eudaimonia such that no 
sacrifice necessitated by virtue counts as a loss.  Nor does she think like the 
immoralist that virtue brings with it suffering and helplessness.  Both positions are 
too extreme.  People who are by and large virtuous have joy, warmth, and enjoyment 
in their lives.  She calls this the ‘smile factor’.184  We teach our children, that a life 
lived in accordance with the virtues is for the most part, enjoyable and satisfying.  
Hare espouses morality as enlightened self-interest from a neutral point of view.  
Hursthouse says that virtue ethics is about enlightened self-interest but not from a 
neutral point of view but from the point of view of most people who share beliefs 
about human nature and the way human life works.  However, these are not “value-
laden” viewpoints.  They are viewpoints “from within an ethical outlook”.  She calls 
this view the Neurathian view, a view that McDowell and Quine also endorsed.185   
Hursthouse cautions that ethical naturalism is neither “scientific” nor 
“foundational”.  It does not seek to give an account of the virtues from a neutral point 
of view, but rather from within an ethical outlook.  However, ethical naturalism does 
provide rational reasons for beliefs about which character traits are the virtues.  
Within ethical naturalism, eudaimonia is grounded in our human nature.  We flourish                                                         
183  Hursthouse (1999), p. 179. 
184  Hursthouse (1999), p. 185. 
185  Hursthouse (1999), p. 165. 
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when we are good human beings qua human beings.  What does it mean to flourish as 
a good human being?  Hursthouse evaluates social animals on four aspects in relation 
to four ends.  The four aspects are: (i) parts, (ii) operations/reactions, (iii) actions, and 
(iv) emotions/desires.  The four ends with respect to which these aspects are 
evaluated are: (i) individual survival, (ii) the continuance of the species, (iii) 
characteristic pleasure or enjoyment/characteristic freedom from pain, and (iv) the 
good functioning of the social group – in the ways characteristic of human beings.  A 
good human being is one who is well fitted or endowed with respect to its four 
aspects.  Whether it is well fitted or endowed is determined by whether these four 
aspects well serve the four ends, in the ways characteristic of the species.  To be a 
good human being is to be well endowed with respect to the aspects listed.  Thus, to 
possess the human virtues is to be well endowed.  "The human virtues make their 
possessor good qua human being, one who is as ordinarily well fitted as a human 
being can be in not merely physical respects to live well, to flourish -- in a 
characteristically human way."186  In order to understand human nature and how 
human life works, we must employ phronesis.   
Hursthouse’s thesis (2) on the good of human beings is a slightly different 
take on Aristotle’s ergon argument.  Instead of ‘function’ she believes that there is 
‘characteristic way’ for a species X to behave in relation to which they are evaluated 
as good or defective.  The evaluation is based on how well a member of the species is 
endowed with necessary characteristics so that it achieves its ends.  In the case of                                                         
186  Foot (1999), p.208. 
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rational animals – human beings – Hursthouse proposes four aspects and four ends.  
To possess the virtues is to be well endowed and to therefore, be able to meet the four 
ends.  Thus, Hursthouse like Aristotle, envisages that good humans possess the 
virtues and live according to them. 
In summary, Hursthouse has two measures for validating which character 
traits are virtues.  First, virtues benefit their possessor.  Secondly, living in 
accordance with the virtues enables us to live as good human beings qua human 
beings.  These two features that spring from the claim that virtues are required for 
eudaimonia, are in turn interrelated.  Thesis (1) falls under thesis (2).  If a virtue 
makes its possessor well-endowed with respect to achieving its ends, it will also 
benefit its possessor.  Hursthouse’s project as explained above has been to modernize 
the concept of eudaimonia so that it can be a primary concept in virtue ethics theories.  
Thus, her inclusion of thesis (2), bringing in naturalism as a way to view eudaimonia 
as a essential part of being a good human being qua human being.  Annas is also of 
the view that eudaimonia must be a primary part of virtue ethics but differences in the 
modern and ancient notions of the concept must first be narrowed.                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                   
3.3.1 Annas View: Contrasting Eudaimonia with Happiness 
Chapter 2 discusses how Annas thinks the modern concept of eudaimonia or 
happiness as she translates it, is different from the ancient concept.  She believes first, 
that eudaimonia must be a primary concept in any virtue ethics, ancient or modern.  A 
virtue ethics that is bases solely on virtues does not have the architecture to support a 
comprehensive and cohesive theory.  In order for eudaimonia to be a primary concept 
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in modern virtue ethics theory, the gulf between the modern and ancient 
understanding of the term must be bridged as far as possible.  Annas tries to find 
commonality between the ancient notion of eudaimonia and our current view of 
happiness in the hopes that there is enough overlap in the two notions so that 
eudaimonia can also become primary in modern VE theories.   
She lists three main differences between the two understandings.  To recap: 
first, do moderns think that happiness is the ultimate end towards we should aim?  
Second, happiness, in the modern sense, is subjective, while the ancients regard it as 
objective. The final aspect of the ancient view of happiness that is in discord with our 
modern view is the rigidity of happiness.  According to Aristotle, virtue can transform 
a human life. Compared to the ancient notion of happiness, our modern conception of 
happiness is rigid and is not tolerant of much shifting of content, certainly not the 
wholesale redefining demanded by the thesis that virtue is sufficient for happiness.  
This third difference leads to a subsidiary difference that arises between modern and 
ancient views of happiness: the definition of happiness.   
According to Aristotle, eudaimonia is rational activity in accordance with 
excellence, in a complete life.  In other words, if we gave this definition of 
eudaimonia or happiness to an average modern, in user friendly language like, 
“happiness is possessing and practicing the virtues, with the help of reason, in a 
complete life, that would include external goods, such as health, family, friends, 
fulfilling work, wealth, status, and leisure activities”, would she balk?  The second 
part of the proposition would not be a problem for a modern.  Most people across the 
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world would not find it strange or disagreeable to aim for those external goods 
throughout one’s life.  The first part of the proposition may take a little explanation 
and discussion.  Yet, if we put it in comprehensible terms such as “being a good 
person” or “doing good and not causing harm”, would it cause a modern to reject this 
definition?  I should think it would not.  So we are likely to come up with a definition 
of happiness that would be pretty true to the Aristotelian version, and still be in tune 
with contemporary sensibilities.  Having a definition of happiness that moderns can 
agree with is one step towards modernizing the concept of eudaimonia.  Narrowing 
the differences that Annas has flagged and with the help of Hursthouse’s naturalistic 
account, we will attempt a modernization of the concept of eudaimonia so that it can 
be a primary concept in a modern VE theory. 
3.4 Modernizing the Concept of Eudaimonia 
3.4.1 The Inclusivist Interpretation 
Is it true that all people seek eudaimonia?  If eudaimonia is thought of as a 
dominant end, then according to Kenny and Hardie, it is the object of a single prime 
end, the pursuit of virtue through reason and balanced desire.  If it is thought of as an 
inclusive end, then eudaimonia consists in a number of different ends.  Knowing 
contemporary attitudes, it is more likely that everyone has inclusive ends rather than a 
single dominant end.  This view is therefore, more in line with contemporary attitudes 
and is defensible from an Aristotelian view as well.  For he writes, “Well, it is 
thought characteristic of a wise person to be able to deliberate well about the things 
that are good and advantageous to himself, not in specific contexts, e.g. what sorts of 
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things conduce to health, or to physical strength, but what sorts of things conduce to 
the good life in general (1140a25-30).”  This line of thought assumes that there are a 
number of choiceworthy and desirable elements that one wants or needs to include in 
one’s life, and at which one aims.  The condition is that these goods are capable of 
being coherently integrated with one another.   
An inclusivist interpretation of eudaimonia is in line with our modern 
sensibility of happiness.  As stated earlier, eudaimonia is not happiness, as we 
commonly know it in the modern sense of the word.  Eudaimonia is virtuous activity 
plus modern happiness.  An inclusivist view has happiness as one of the goods that 
make up the “complete life” Aristotle writes about.  Nor is modern happiness 
unconnected from virtuousness.  Research has shown that happy people are energetic, 
decisive, flexible, creative and sociable.187  Compared to unhappy people, they are 
trusting, more loving, more responsive.  Happy people tolerate more frustration.  
They are less likely to be abusive and are more lenient.   Whether temporarily or 
enduringly happy, they are more loving and forgiving.  Indeed, “in experiment after 
experiment, happy people are more willing to help those in need.  It’s the “feel-good, 
do-good phenomenon”.”188  Robert Browning wrote, “Oh, make us happy and you 
make us good!”  There seems to be a connection between happiness and altruism.  
The study above apparently shows that happy people tend to do good things.  No 
doubt happiness and eudaimonia are closely tied, one affecting the other.  Another                                                         
187  Myers, David G., The Pursuit of Happiness. William Morrow: New York, 1992 
(1992), p. 20. 
188  Myers (1992), p. 20-21. 
 134 
study shows that people who do good things also tend to be happy.  The subjects were 
asked to sort people they knew on two distinct bases: whether they seemed happy and 
whether they seemed unselfish.  The resulting correlations were striking: 70 percent 
of those considered unselfish were deemed happy, while 95 percent of those 
considered selfish were reckoned to be unhappy.189  (Of course, while the data are 
suggestive, we cannot take the results from one study to be in any way conclusive on 
the question of whether the good are happy.) 
There is however, more data on the goods contemporary societies consider as 
contributing to happiness.  Modern psychological research on happiness has been 
working on this question since the 1960s.   As Aristotle noted two and a half 
millennia ago, all people want to be happy.  This observation has not changed in the 
twenty-first century.  Nor is the desire for happiness a Western phenomenon.  The 
Dalai Lama writes, “[The importance of training the mind] arises from the 
fundamental fact that each and every one of us innately desires happiness and does 
not want misery.  These are natural human characteristics that don’t have to be 
created.  This desire is not wrong.  The question is, how do we achieve these 
objectives of realizing happiness and relinquishing misery?”190   Psychological 
research provides the data to attempt to prove the human desire for happiness.191  As 
with Aristotle, we find ourselves then asking, what is happiness?  Most people seem                                                         
189  Sumner, L.W. “Is Virtue its Own Reward?” in Social Philosophy & Policy.  Vol 15, 
No. 1, Winter 1998, pp.18-36. 
190  The Dalai Lama, Stages of Meditation, translated by Venerable Geshe Lobsang 
Jordhen, Losang Choephel Ganchenpa, and Jeremy Russell.  Ithaca, New York: Snow Lion 
Publications, 2001, p. 37. 
191  Argyle, Michael, The Psychology of Happiness.  London: Methuen, 2001, p. 1. 
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to know what it is.  Surveys have asked people what they mean by it, and they say 
either that is often being in a state of joy or other positive emotion, or it is being 
satisfied with one’s life.  These two components, positive emotion and satisfaction, 
are often measured.  Argyle thinks that joy is the emotional part of happiness while 
satisfaction is the cognitive part.  It is a reflective appraisal, a judgment, of how well 
things are going, and have been going.  What do most people think are the most 
important sources of satisfaction in their lives?  The most mentioned domains are: 
family and home life, money and prices, living standards, social values and standards, 
social relationships, housing, health, and work.192   
Argyle concludes that happiness is partly caused by objective features of life 
such as wealth, employment, and marriage, but also by subjective factors such as how 
we perceive those conditions.  Another cause of happiness is having the right kind of 
personality, but this can be changed by life experiences.   As noted earlier, studies 
indicate that normal, non-patients (who are not depressed) are seeking happiness all 
the time, although they may not know the true causes and so may not do it very 
effectively.193  Thus, it is not a stretch to conclude that happiness (in the modern 
sense) for most people is a goal or final end. 
3.5 Eudaimonia 3.0: Towards Comprehensive VE Theories  
 The basic premise of eudaimonia that is given through the ages does not 
change.  It defines the virtues.  It answers the question: “Is X a virtue?”  The answer 
                                                        
192  Argyle (2001), p. 41. 
193  Arglye (2001), p. 229. 
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is, X is a virtue if it promotes eudaimonia.  A human person is virtuous if her 
dispositions to act from reason, her emotions, and her desires, are likely to promote 
eudaimonia.  Why do we need virtue to be eudaimon?  The answer can be found in 
naturalism.  Eudaimonia, as we understand from a naturalistic standpoint, is 
determined by the standards of flourishing as a member of the human species.  Thus, 
whether a disposition is a virtue depends on whether it promotes: 
(i) her individual survival 
(ii) survival of the human species 
(iii) characteristic enjoyment and freedom from pain 
(iv) good functioning of the social group 
As we have seen the naturalistic version of eudaimonia espoused by Foot and 
elaborated by Hursthouse is derived from the function argument.  A thing’s 
excellence is conceptually connected to its function and thereby to its eudaimonia.  
We judge whether a thing is doing well by the degree of excellence in the 
performance of its main function.  What is the function that is peculiar just to human 
beings?  It is not the nutritive function because we share that with plants and animals.  
Nor is it the perceptual function because we share that with animals.  Humans are the 
only animals that can reason.  Therefore, reasoning is the activity that is peculiar to 
human beings.  If eudaimonia is living well and doing well, then according to the 
function argument, the achievement of these two goals is through the best use of our 
reason.  We must live a complete life of moral excellence or virtue guided by 
intellectual excellence or virtue, i.e., reason.  The good of a thing or activity is in the 
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excellent use of its prime function.  Thus, a human being is good who lives a life of 
virtuous activity according to reason. 
In the earlier section, Annas describes three differences between ancient 
eudaimonia and modern happiness.  One difference is that the former is objective 
while the latter is subjective.   Indeed a frequently cited objection to eudaimonia or 
happiness when considered in its contemporary understanding is that it connotes 
something subjective.  Whether we are happy depends on my view and that may be 
different from your view of happiness.  It is all too easy for me to be mistaken about 
whether my life is eudaimon, because self-deception is common and also because of 
the wrong conception of eudaimonia.  Some may believe that it consists largely in 
pleasure.  However, although there is some measure of subjectivity in the word 
“happiness” or “flourishing” (probably more the former than the latter), according to 
Hursthouse, we also have a more objective notion much closer to that of eudaimonia 
which, is “a notion of ‘true (or real) happiness’, or ‘the sort of happiness worth 
having’.”194  In our discussion of eudaimonia, we posit that eudaimonia has both 
subjective and objective elements.  Happiness is the subjective element in 
eudaimonia, but there is an objective element that justifies virtue.  However, it is 
objective to the extent that Hursthouse defines objective, i.e., from within an ethical 
outlook and not from a neutral point of view.  Ethical naturalism provides rational 
reasons for beliefs about which character traits are the virtues.  From the viewpoint of 
ethical naturalism, eudaimonism is grounded in our human nature.                                                         
194  Hursthouse (1999), p. 10. 
 138 
A eudaimon life does not have to be just one type of life.  Conceivably, one 
can be eudaimon as a teacher, boxer, investment banker, artist, monastic, and so on.  
A eudaimonic life is one that is fulfilling, flourishing, meaningful, and well lived over 
a lifetime.  Other adjectives that describe a eudaimonic life include thriving and 
satisfying.  Eudaimonists argue that these features result in large part, from a life of 
virtuous actions.  As shown above, there is a tight connection between the good life 
and goodness in humans – a connection grounded in our human nature.  Yet, virtue 
can be displayed in a variety of situations and lifestyles.  One need not only be a 
soldier to be courageous.  A person can be courageous in different circumstances – 
fighting a life threatening disease while still striving to keep a family together for 
instance.  An eudaimonic life is primarily morally good (the virtue component) and 
secondarily personally satisfying (the happiness component).  Virtues are necessary 
for eudaimonia but in some lives they are not sufficient.   For while a disposition is 
deemed to be a virtue if it contributes to the eudaimonia of an agent, yet it is also 
consistent to claim that the exercise of a virtue does not guarantee eudaimonia.195  
Aristotle emphasizes that the truths of ethics are truths for the most part.  A person 
may act virtuously but still have unfortunate luck in life.  Thus, Aristotle refers to 
Priam’s misfortunes (1101a5-10).   Aristotle and Hursthouse concede that one may 
act according to the virtues needed for eudaimonia, but still have such egregious ill 
fortune that when viewed as a whole, that life cannot be described as eudaimon.  
                                                        
195  See Swanton, Christine, Virtue Ethics: A Pluralistic View.  Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2003, Chapter 4, and Hursthouse (1999), Chapter 8. 
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Now, Hursthouse is more willing to give up the ghost than Aristotle.  She writes, 
“[T]he claim is not that possession of the virtues guarantees that one will flourish.  
The claim is that they are the only reliable bet – even though, it is agreed, I might be 
unlucky and, precisely because of my virtue, wind up dying early or with my life 
marred or ruined.”196  Aristotle, in contrast, holds that even if we suffer misfortune, 
we may still be eudaimon because of our virtuous disposition, “Nevertheless, even in 
these [unfortunate] circumstances the quality of fineness shines through, when 
someone bears repeated and great misfortunes calmly, not because he is insensitive to 
them but because he is a person of nobility and greatness of soul.  If one’s activities 
are what determine the quality of one’s life, as we have said, no one who is blessed 
will become miserable; for he will never do what is hateful and vile.  For we consider 
that the truly good and sensible person bears what fortune brings him with good 
grace, and acts on each occasion in the finest way possible given the resources at the 
time (1100b30 – 1101a5).”  What Aristotle is trying to say is that those who are 
virtuous manage misfortune with greater fortitude, equanimity, and grace.  All of the 
latter traits are unsurprisingly, virtues.  By acting virtuously, one becomes more 
virtuous.  Virtue begets virtue and this is especially important during difficult times.  
Thus, virtue may actually alleviate unhappiness; objective well-being influences and 
shapes subjective well-being. 
When the two components of eudaimonia are at odds with one another, which 
of the two should we choose?  We have already noted that there is a sort of                                                         
196  Hursthouse (1999), p. 172. 
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connection between moral goodness and personal happiness (see also 3.2.1).  On the 
optimistic view of VE, the components of a eudaimonic life are not only broadly 
integrated, but the virtues central to the moral worth of a life are also 
characteristically good for the agent.197  As Aristotle implies, ethics is an inexact 
science.  Our choice should be guided by our practical wisdom (see chapter 4). A 
practically wise person would choose virtue over happiness, but not to the extent 
where she would be reduced to a position where she cannot have the ability to be 
virtuous.  There are the easy cases – should a mortgage banker sell loans to people 
who do not have a prayer of repaying them, so that he can get the commissions and 
thereby enrich himself?  In other words, should he choose wealth over honesty?  A 
eudaimonist would say no.   On the Hursthouse model, choosing to be dishonest in 
this case would not lead to the smooth functioning of the social group.  And as we 
have seen in the recent global financial crisis, the social group has certainly suffered 
due to the personal greed of the few.  There are the tough cases.  Swanton gives an 
example.198  Should a dedicated aid worker give up her physical security and well-
being in order to work in the jungles of an impoverished country in order to help the 
underprivileged who live in these jungles?  In other words should she choose 
generosity (of her time and effort) over her own health?  First, this aid worker may be 
happy because she finds her life satisfying and meaningful, despite its physical 
vicissitudes.  Together with her act of selfless giving to the underprivileged, we can 
                                                        
197  Swanton (2003), p. 59. 
198  Swanton (2003), p. 82. 
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describe her life, if (as Swanton further hypothesizes) she dies at an early age, in the 
jungle, as eudaimon.  If she finds her life unfulfilling and not meaningful because of 
the physical difficulties of working in the jungle, then we must consider her 
overwhelming generosity of heart.  From the standpoint of eudaimonia as described, 
she is still leading a eudaimonic life.  Her disposition to help others at the cost of her 
own well-being promotes the survival of other humans.  This disposition is therefore, 
a virtue.    
Eudaimonia is the best route we have for justifying and validating the virtues.  
It is not an infallible way because there are cogent objections to its use as a primary 
focus of ethics. Yet, so far, there has been no better replacement for eudaimonia.  
There is agreement that virtues are a primary focus in virtue ethics.  There is 
however, little agreement over how we justify which dispositions are virtues.  Surely 
the determination is crucial for a virtue ethics theory to be a comprehensive one.  
Missing the criterion for a virtue, a VE theory will be incomplete because it does not 
answer a basic question: “Which disposition or character trait is a virtue?”  Aristotle, 
Hursthouse, Annas, and I propose that eudaimonia is this criterion.  It is better than 
others that have been offered so far in the VE literature.  Few if any have thought that 
virtue can do all the work in a VE theory; the question arises at some point as to how 
we are to locate virtue in a wider structure.199  Slote attempts to base virtues on our 
motivation.  However, this justification, we argue is weaker than a eudaimonistic one.   
                                                        
199  Annas, Julia, “Virtue and Eudaimonism” in Social Philosophy & Policy.  Vol. 15, 
No. 1, Winter 1998, 37-55, at p. 37. 
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3.6 Problems with Michael Slote’s Theory   
Slote does not accept the idea that eudaimonia can be the basis for justifying 
and validating the virtues.  In his book, Morals from Motives, Slote argues for two 
positions.  First he argues for an agent-based theory of virtue ethics.  Second he 
argues for his version of agent-based virtue ethics.  An agent-based version of VE is 
“one that treats the moral or ethical status of actions as entirely derivative from 
independent and fundamental ethical/aretaic facts (or claims) about the motives, 
dispositions, or inner life of moral individuals.”200  This represents a radical form of 
virtue ethics.   A primary feature of agent-based virtue ethics is that it admits one 
central or foundational virtue: benevolence or caring.  Slote takes his inspiration from 
the sentimentalist ethics of Hutcheson and Hume.  As the theory is motive-centered, 
attention should be directed inward at the states of character in question rather than 
outward at the states of the world.   As we saw in Chapter 2, agent-based virtue ethics 
and therefore, Slote’s theory are non-teleological.  According to his definition, virtues 
are character traits that are motivated by benevolence.  These character traits are then 
fundamentally admirable.  According to Slote, “an act is morally acceptable if and 
only if it comes from good or virtuous motivation involving benevolence or caring 
(about the well-being of others) or at least doesn’t come from bad or inferior 
motivation involving malice or indifference to humanity.”201  Using Hursthouse’s 
                                                        
200  Slote, Michael, Morals from Motives.  Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001, p. 7. 
201  Slote (2001), p. 38. 
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formulation, and according to Slote, an agent-based theory of right action would be as 
follows:  
P.1. An action is right iff it is what a virtuous agent would 
characteristically (i.e. acting in character) do in the circumstances. 
 
P.1a. A virtuous agent is one who has, and exercises, certain character 
traits, namely, the virtues. 
 
P.2. A virtue is a character trait that is motivated by benevolence or 
caring (about the well-being of others).    
 
Slote’s account is a sentimentalist view of morality that focuses on concern for 
human or sentient well-being.  Ultimately, Slote’s version of agent-based virtue ethics 
defends a morality of caring, or “partial benevolence”.  Slote distinguishes between 
those who are closest to us, whom we love, and others who are part of humanity in 
general.  Slote emphasizes the virtue of a kind of balanced caring between these two 
groups.  He says a caring person achieves a balanced concern among those for whom 
she cares in an intimate fashion as well as a balanced concern between her intimates 
considered as a class and all (other) human beings considered as a class.202  He 
chooses balanced caring over other virtues as the fundamental virtue, giving reasons 
why for instance honesty and strength of purpose are only derivatively admirable.  
They are admirable to the extent that they are aspects of or partly constitutive of the 
balanced caring.  However, it is easily argued that intuitively, honesty and strength of 
purpose are not derivatively admirable.  Indeed, it would be desirable if Slote had 
given a deeper explanation of why balanced caring is the fundamental virtue.                                                         
202  Slote (2001), p.70. 
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In agent-based versions of virtue ethics, the emphasis on motivation is then 
fundamental.  Yet, Slote does not give reasons why we should accept that universal 
benevolence should be the fundamental ground on which we must base moral 
judgments of actions.  He simply says that, “Every ethical theory must start 
somewhere, and an agent-based morality will want to say that the moral goodness of 
(universal) benevolence or of caring about people is intuitively obvious and in need 
of no further moral grounding.”203  This quick dismissal of a need to give valid 
reasons for grounding virtues on universal benevolence contrasts starkly with the 
well-argued reasons given by Aristotle and neo-Aristotelians like Hursthouse, as 
detailed earlier, for justifying virtues through eudaimonia.  Indeed, Slote appears to 
rely on intuitions about right and wrong action to direct his explication of balanced 
concern rather than relying on independent assessments of the virtues to help us 
decide among various explications of balanced concern.  Copp and Sobel are not 
convinced that Slote’s theory helps us to decide which actions are right or wrong by 
grounding virtues (or admirable traits) in balanced caring.  “We think that Slote must 
rely covertly on intuitions about right and wrong actions in order to figure out which 
states of character are admirable.”204 
                                                        
203  Slote (2001), p. 38. 
204  Copp, David and Sobel, David, “Morality and Virtue: An Assessment of Some 
Recent Work in Virtue Ethics” in Ethics: An International Journal of Social, Political, and 
Legal Philosophy.  Vol. 114, No. 3, pp. 514-554, April 2004, p. 518. 
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The general problem of non-teleological views of VE like Slote’s is that they 
have a serious problem in justifying the virtues.205  If the virtues are not tied to some 
larger theoretical framework, it is unclear how we can account for wrong judgments 
and acts.  In general, how would we know which traits are desirable while others are 
not?  If the criticism of deontological ethical theories is that principles are not 
anchored on any foundations, VE theories such as Slote’s may also be criticized along 
the same lines.   
Slote would argue that the validation of virtues according to his system is 
determined by which character traits are motivated by benevolence.  Those that are 
motivated by benevolence are thus justified as virtues.  The problem with basing 
virtues on the internal motivation of benevolence (it is even a problem to which Slote 
admits) is that our knowledge of the goodness and rightness of particular actions 
depends ultimately on our knowledge of the motivation behind them.  It is notoriously 
difficult to ascertain people’s motives as we are dealing with inner life of moral 
individuals.  Therefore we must assume that it is also frequently difficult to evaluate 
actions.  Slote writes, “However unwanted such a conclusion may be, it may 
nonetheless be realistic.”206  He counters that with most other ethical theories, it is 
also as difficult to tell right actions from wrong actions.  Therefore, he argues if we 
do not ignore those theories then neither can we discount his theory of virtue ethics.   
                                                        
205  Prior, William J., “Eudaimonism and Virtue” in The Journal of Value Inquiry 
35:325-342, 2001. (2001), p. 325. 
206  Slote (2001), p. 19. 
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However, the primary weakness in Slote’s theory must be acknowledged and weighed 
against the criticisms leveled at eudaimonism.   
3.7 Foot’s “Courageous” Murderer 
An illustration of eudaimonia’s role in validating virtues is seen in the case of 
Foot’s “courageous” murderer.  We can contrast this to Foot’s own argument against 
classifying the virtue behind the act as courage.  In Virtues and Vices, Foot 
acknowledges eudaimonia but does not give a full account of it.207  She accepts that 
there is a connection between virtue and eudaimonia (which she translates as human 
flourishing).  She writes: “It seems clear that virtues are, in some general way, 
beneficial.  Human beings do not get on well without them.”208   However, she does 
not commit, at least in Virtues and Vices, to a full-blown eudaimonist position.   She 
gives two reasons for her doubts about a eudaimonist stand.  Both problems involve 
the virtue of justice, with which Foot has wrangled in her writings for some time.209  
First, how can a virtue such as justice contribute to the flourishing of an individual 
when sometimes, the consequences of choosing the virtue is detrimental to the 
individual?  Virtue, conventionally defined, without regard to its contribution to the 
good of the agent may seem occasionally to be harmful or at least not beneficial.                                                          
207  Foot, Philippa, “Virtues and Vices”, in Virtues and Vices and Other Essays in Moral 
Philosophy.  Berkeley: University of California Press, 1978.  Reprinted in Virtue Ethics, eds. 
Roger Crisp and Michael Slote.  Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1997. 
208  Foot, Philippa, “Virtues and Vices”, in Virtue Ethics, eds. Roger Crisp and Michael 
Slote.  Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1997, p. 164. 
209  In “Moral Beliefs,” Foot argues that a justification of the virtue of justice is beneficial 
to the just individual and that justice is something everyone needs.  In “Morality as a System 
of Hypothetical Imperatives,” she abandons the attempts to show that justice is something 
that everyone needs and that it benefits the person who possesses it.  There she treats justice 
as an ideal that many people want to happen.    
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Second, in some cases justice, that is the pursuit of the rights of an individual, may 
even clash with the pursuit of the common good.  Perhaps because of these problems, 
Foot will only give a weak endorsement that virtues are in general beneficial 
characteristics, and “indeed ones that a human being needs to have, for his own sake 
and that of his fellows.”210  For Foot, the virtues are generally but not invariably 
beneficial qualities that depend for their beneficial nature on certain facts about the 
human condition, including facts about human nature. 
Foot gives the example of the murderer who may be said to be courageous.  
She hypothesizes the following:   
Suppose for instance that a sordid murder were in question, say 
a murder done for gain or to get an inconvenient person out of the 
way, but that this murder had to be done in alarming circumstances or 
in the face of real danger: should we be happy to say that such an 
action was an act of courage or a courageous act?  Did the murderer, 
who certainly acted boldly, or with intrepidity, if he did the murder, 
also act courageously?211 
 
For Foot this hypothetical puts forward a difficult issue.  Because Foot maintains only 
a loose connection between the virtues and human good, it is conceivable to count as 
virtues, traits that may be displayed in acts that are not good and that do not benefit 
the agent.  This possibility is ruled out in the eudaimonist account.  A virtue is 
defined as a quality that contributes to the eudaimonia of its possessor and as one that 
chooses acts in accordance with phronesis.  As we have seen in Chapter 1, ends are 
determined by virtue.  While phronesis also contributes to the determination of ends, 
                                                        
210  Foot (1997), p. 165. 
211  Foot (1997) p. 175. 
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it also determines the means.  Thus, virtuous activity is guided by reason in its 
selection of ends and in its deliberation about means.  Phronesis is the crucial link 
between virtue and eudaimonia.  Both virtue and eudaimonia are essentially 
characterized by reason.  Killing someone for my own benefit, such as to avoid an 
“inconvenience”, is not an end that virtue guided by reason would choose.  Thus, the 
courage of a murderer is not a virtue because it does not have a good end and thus 
does not contribute to and indeed takes away from a eudaimonistic life.  Courage, like 
the other virtues, involves the proper use of reason and the pursuit of the good.  The 
more appropriate adjective for Foot to use to describe the murderer would be 
“daring”.  It is not a word that we closely associate with virtue, at least not as much as 
we would the word “courage”.  We must also ask why a courageous man would 
choose to kill another just because the other is an “inconvenience”.  Would he not 
have shown more courage by facing up to the consequences if the other man had not 
been murdered? 
 Foot also does not agree that the act can be termed a courageous one.  She 
argues that ‘courage’ as a naming characteristic of human beings has a certain power, 
in the same way that we use ‘poison’, ‘solvent’, and ‘corrosive’ to name the 
properties of physical things.  “The power to which virtue-words are so related is the 
power of producing good action, and good desires.”212  But just as poisons, solvents, 
and corrosives do not always operate characteristically, so it could be with virtues.  If 
P is poison, it may not act as poison wherever it is found.  It may be natural to say                                                         
212  Foot (1997), p. 176. 
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that ‘P does not act as a poison here.’  “Similarly, courage is not operating as a virtue 
when the murderer turns his courage, which is a virtue, to bad ends.”213  This 
argument is one that turns on language, but yet it is fundamentally an eudaimonist 
position. 
 However, as Prior points out, this issue is not merely a matter of semantics.214  
It may seem from a non-eudaimonist standpoint that the murderer’s character trait and 
Aristotelian courage are psychologically and behaviourally identical.  The only 
difference is that the former is used to perform a bad act and the latter is used for a 
good act.  However, from a eudaimonist and Aristotelian perspective, the traits are 
different – the daring of a murderer is not connected with phronesis, which explains 
why it is not connected with the good.  Aristotle distinguishes natural virtue from 
virtue in the full sense (VI.13).  Natural virtue is virtue unguided by intelligence 
while virtue in the full sense is instructed by and united with intelligence.  Foot’s 
example of the courage of the murderer is an example of natural virtue and not virtue 
in the full sense. 
3.8 Problems with Christine Swanton’s VE Theory 
 Swanton’s pluralistic view of virtue status contains both teleological and non-
teleological elements.  Swanton does not disagree that eudaimonia is one way of 
identifying which character dispositions are virtues.  However, she disagrees that it is 
a necessary condition of a disposition’s being a virtue that it is characteristically 
                                                        
213  Foot (1997), p. 176. 
214  Prior (2001), p. 332. 
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constitutive of, or contributes to the eudaimonia of the agent.215  She argues that it 
may well be the case that at least some virtues contribute to aspects of a human’s 
goodness other than her eudaimonia.  There are some virtues that do not contribute to 
eudaimonia but do contribute to a person’s goodness.  She gives the three examples 
of lives, none of which seem to display features for a eudaimon life, but which 
display virtues, as they are lives that are characterized by habits of appropriate 
responses to values, bonds, benefits, and so on.  The first example described in 
section 3.3 is that of the selfless aid worker who dies prematurely in the jungle.  The 
second example is that of the manic depressive artist who refuses to take any 
medication.  Although the medication will alleviate her psychiatric disorder, the cure 
would also destroy her creativity.  Consequently, she goes through mental and 
emotional hell and commits suicide.  She dies unrecognized and does not achieve 
fame after her death.  Swanton argues that this is not a eudaimon life.  Yet, her 
creative drive is a virtue, says Swanton.  The third example is that of an 
environmentalist who keeps warning the world of impending environmental disaster.  
He has poor interpersonal skills and his message does not get through.  He becomes 
stressed due to this failure and eventually dies of a heart attack.  However, the world 
takes heed of his warnings posthumously.  Once again this life is not a eudaimon one 
but his care for the environment is a virtue.  Through these examples, Swanton hopes 
to show that virtues do not necessarily benefit their possessor, and therefore, 
eudaimonia is not the only way to validate the virtues.                                                         
215  Swanton (2003), p. 80. 
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 For Swanton, therefore, what makes a trait a virtue is that it is a “disposition 
to respond in an excellent (or good enough) way (through the modes of respecting, 
appreciating, creating, loving, promoting, and so on) to items in the fields of 
virtue.”216  This principle of virtue which, she calls (T) allows the possibility that the 
ultimate point of various virtues may be eudaimonia, admirability, success 
(worthwhile achievement), or meaningfulness.  What is the ultimate point depends on 
how the virtue is targeted at the good for, bonds, value, status, with respect to items in 
their fields.  She also thinks that principle (T) has the advantage of allowing for the 
possibility that some virtues are non-teleological.217  For instance, intuitions about the 
virtuousness of traits grounded in admirability can be accounted for by appeal to the 
idea of expressiveness.   
 In the three examples that Swanton gives, the lives are meaningful, 
worthwhile, and admirable but they are not flourishing (Swanton’s translation of 
eudaimonia).  Authors such as Susan Wolf argue that a meaningful life is a 
flourishing one.218  Lives that are meaningful are also beneficial to the agent.  
Swanton disagrees.  For meaningful lives are not always attractive ones.  There are 
worthwhile traits inimical to personal flourishing.219  The aid worker gave up physical 
health in order to help the impoverished.  The crazy artist gave up mental health to 
create works of art.  The environmentalist gave up peace of mind to warn the world of                                                         
216  Swanton (2003), p. 93. 
217  Swanton (2003), p. 92. 
218  Wolf, Susan, “Meaning and Morality”, Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 97 
(1997), 299-315, at 305. 
219  Swanton (2003), p. 86. 
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looming disaster.  These agents’ eudaimonia were diminished or even extinguished as 
a result of personal goods foregone.  Eudaimonists counter that a virtuous agent’s 
conception of eudaimonia enables her to see things virtuously foregone as not being a 
loss to her.  A persuasive proponent of this argument is John McDowell.  A virtuous 
person has a distinctive way of seeing things such that acting as his conception of 
virtue demands ‘silences’ competing considerations.  These silenced options are not 
seen as a loss.220  Swanton’s rejoinder is that this claim is false because we are 
confusing ‘silencing’ the knowledge of possible losses with seeing possible losses as 
‘irrelevant’.  We still feel a loss but we choose to forego personal goods because they 
are irrelevant compared to the greater good.  I do not disagree with Swanton that an 
agent feels the loss.  Indeed any normal human suffers a personal loss, but she chose 
to act virtuously despite the loss.  How she copes with the loss is a matter of her 
virtuous disposition.  If she is a virtuous person, then other virtues – fortitude, 
moderation, and wisdom – will start operating.  These virtues could very well ensure 
that her life is still in the end, eudaimon. 
 The problem with Swanton’s pluralism is that it casts the virtue validation net 
too broadly.  She takes issue with the eudaimonist thesis that it is a necessary 
condition of a trait being a virtue that it characteristically constitutes or contributes to 
the eudaimonia of the possessor of the virtue.  Evaluation of virtues based on this 
thesis is too limited.  Her principle (T) allows for the possibility that some virtues are 
non-teleological.  She claims there are other grounds for a trait’s being virtuous, such                                                         
220  McDowell (1980), p. 370. 
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as its being admirable, or contributing to a successful or meaningful life; “[Many] 
virtues are so not because they serve the ends of human flourishing but because they 
are expressive of human flourishing.”221  However, love, appreciation of beauty, 
worth, success and meaning contribute to a eudaimon life.  Why would you need 
other criteria to validate virtues?  She prefers to replace the eudaimonist thesis with 
her own Constraint on Virtue: “A correct conception of the virtues must be at least 
partly shaped by a correct conception of healthy growth and development which in 
part constitutes our flourishing.”222  Swanton believes this constraint to be weaker 
than its eudaimonist counterpart, but nevertheless sufficiently strong to ground a 
significant connection between prudential and moral worthiness concerns.  Swanton’s 
position is not as far from Aristotle’s as she appears to think.  I am not sure why the 
constraint on virtue is not compatible with the form of eudaimonia that I have already 
proposed in this chapter.   
 Swanton’s permissive definition of virtue opens the door to substantial 
pluralism.  Her main purpose is to enable a virtue ethics to “accommodate the views 
of a wide variety of moral theories on what is morally significant.”223  The views 
include Kantian, consequentialist, depth-psychological, Nietzschean and Asian 
approaches.  The extent of her pluralism opens the door to an ‘anything goes’ 
approach to the extent that her attempts to explain and guide moral action are 
undermined.  On the reverse side of this concern is that against the background of                                                         
221  Swanton (2003), p. 94. 
222  Swanton (2003), p. 60. 
223  Swanton (2003), p. 24. 
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permissiveness of her official approach, Swanton’s own stands on particular 
theoretical issues may come to seem arbitrary.224  
Her counterexamples of the three lives that show virtue but that do not lead to 
eudaimon lives are not convincing for the reasons given above.  We could also 
remark that the agents in the examples exhibited one virtue but apparently lacked 
others that would have given a greater opportunity for eudaimon lives.  The selfless 
aid worker showed one virtue – generosity.  However, she seemed to lack other 
virtues such as moderation.  She did not appear to realize that she needed time off to 
rest, in a non-jungle environment, so that she could continue helping more people in a 
long life.  The artist lacked friendship, because only a true friend would have helped 
her through her dilemma.  The environmentalist lacked patience and probably 
empathy, as he was poor at interpersonal relations.  All three of course, lacked 
practical wisdom because they were unable to choose the mean between excess and 
deficiency of a particular character trait, and did not have a clear vision of their final 
end.  The next chapter drills down into the concept of practical wisdom and its roles. 
3.9 Conclusion 
 Eudaimonia is the final end and therefore, guides our actions that must aim 
towards this end.  Aristotle’s definition of this final end is plausibly in keeping with 
modern sensibilities: it is to live a complete life guided by reason and in accordance 
with the virtues.  As such, eudaimonia justifies and validates the virtues.  From a 
                                                        
224  Gardiner, Stephen M., “Virtue Ethics: A Pluralistic View” in Mind, Vol. 114, 453, 
January 2005, at p. 212. 
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naturalistic standpoint, eudaimonia is determined by the standards of flourishing as a 
member of the human species.  The concept of eudaimonia provides overarching 
support for a theory of virtue ethics.  There is agreement that virtues are a primary 
focus in virtue ethics.  There is however, little agreement over how we determine 
which dispositions are virtues.  Surely the determination is crucial for a virtue ethics 
theory to be a comprehensive one.  Missing the criterion for a virtue, a VE theory will 
be incomplete because it does not answer a basic question: “Which disposition or 
character trait is a virtue?”  Aristotle, Hursthouse, Annas, and I propose that 
eudaimonia is this criterion.  It is better than others that have been offered so far in 
the VE literature.  Few if any have thought that virtue can do all the work in a VE 
theory; the question arises at some point as to how we are to locate virtue in a wider 
structure.  The acceptance of eudaimonia may be broader if it is modernized as this 
chapter has attempted to do.   
On the negative side, I argue that Slote’s theory of ‘virtue as benevolence’ is even 
weaker than eudaimonistic virtue theories.  I attempt to show through using Foot’s 
‘courageous’ murderer hypothetical that eudaimonia is a stronger way of validating 
the virtues than the one she has proposed.  Finally, Swanton’s preference for an 
evaluation of the virtues using broader measures is flawed in two ways.   First, her 
broader measures are not a departure from Aristotelian virtue ethics.  As such, they 
can be subsumed under a eudaimonist thesis advanced in this chapter.  Second, her 
pluralism and desire to accommodate a wide range of views undermines her attempts 
to explain and guide moral action. 
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CHAPTER 4  
A GUIDE: PHRONESIS IN VIRTUE ETHICS 
4.1 Introduction 
 Chapter 1 examined Aristotle’s conception of moral virtue and intellectual 
virtue and their connections with each other.  To recap, intellectual virtues are virtues 
of the mind and encompass our critical faculties e.g., practical wisdom and intellect.  
Moral virtues are dispositions that are engrained as character traits e.g. courage, 
magnanimity, and justice.  Unambiguously, Aristotle claims that there are strong 
connections and interactions between moral and intellectual virtues.  Moral virtues 
cannot be activated or operate effectively without the presence and guidance of 
intellectual virtues, in particular, phronesis or practical wisdom.  As we have argued 
with eudaimonia in the previous chapter, virtues are the central element of any virtue 
ethics (VE) theory.  To know which character traits are virtues however, we need 
eudaimonia because eudaimonia is the way we identify and justify the virtues.   
Yet, it is insufficient to simply justify the virtues.  For a virtue ethics theory to 
be comprehensive, it must also explain how and why virtues work and, in particular, 
how they work well.  Thus, phronesis is a necessary component of a comprehensive 
VE theory because it plays the crucial role of enabling the moral virtues to function 
properly.  This role is played out in four ways that I explain in the present chapter: (1) 
it determines the mean of a disposition (2) it determines the means to achieve 
proposed practical ends, (3) it contributes to determining these ends, (4) it helps to 
motivate actions.  On the positive side of the argument, the dissertation proposes and 
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argues for each of these roles with support from a philosopher in the specialty.  Thus, 
Zagzebski is given as an example of a writer who supports the role of phronesis as 
determining the means to achieve practical ends.  Richardson is a philosopher who 
argues that reason does play a role in determining the ends.  Chappell supports the 
argument that phronesis motivates action.  How do these four roles help moral virtue 
to function properly?  Practical wisdom guides us in the degree of feeling and action 
that a virtue requires for any specific situation (1).  It tells us how to achieve any 
particular virtuous end (2).  It deliberates on what is the ultimate goal of life and if 
other ends conduce to this final end (3).  Even though desire may be the final 
motivator of action, practical wisdom works with desire so that we act virtuously and 
it stops us from acting badly (4). 
 On the negative and refutational aspect of the argument, I disagree with 
Driver and Merritt who propose that practical wisdom should be given a much 
smaller role in VE or even can be discarded in some instances of virtue.  I attempt to 
refute their arguments underlining their thesis and thereby, hopefully, strengthen 
mine. 
4.2 Defining Phronesis 
 As discussed in Chapter 1, Aristotle regards the good of the agent as the goal 
of ethics.  The good of a person is the full development of our natural powers, and our 
highest power and one that distinguishes us from other animals, is our reason.  
Phronesis or practical wisdom is, according to Aristotle, an excellent dispositional 
state of the intellectual and rational part of the soul.  His succinct definition is given 
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in Book VI of the Nicomachean Ethics: “The necessary conclusion is that [practical] 
wisdom is a disposition accompanied by rational prescription, true, in the sphere of 
human goods, relating to action (1140b20-21).”  Phronesis is reason and rationality as 
applied to practical moral matters.  A person who possesses phronesis is a phronimos.  
This “wise person” is one who is good at deliberation.  All this leads to the 
conclusion that phronesis is an intellectual virtue, which contrasts with a moral virtue 
that is a dispositional state of the desiderative and appetitive part of the soul.  Unlike 
eudaimonia, there is far less controversy in translating phronesis into English.  It is 
generally accepted that phronesis is fairly captured by the concept of practical 
wisdom.  Thus, we will use the terms rather interchangeably in this chapter.  Our 
analysis of practical wisdom is largely guided and illuminated by Aristotle’s work, 
which is still relevant today. 
 From the definition given above, practical wisdom has four characteristic 
features.  First, the machinations of practical wisdom direct and result in action.  
Practical wisdom is aimed at the truth about practical human goods.  The possessor 
acts well and advices others about appropriate action.  For good action to occur, the 
person acting must choose appropriately.  Thus, the second characteristic feature of 
practical wisdom is that it involves choice.225  Aristotle writes, “Now the origin of 
action – in terms of the source of movement, not its end – is choice, while that of 
choice is desire and rational reference to an end.  Hence, intelligence and thought, on 
the one hand, and character-disposition on the other are necessary for choice; for                                                         
225  Broadie translates prohairesis as “decision”.  
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doing well and its contrary, in the context of action, are conditional on thought and 
character” (1139a32-35).  The efficient cause of action is therefore, choice and choice 
necessarily requires the third characteristic feature of practical wisdom and that is 
deliberation.  We do not deliberate about matters that we cannot change but about 
things on which we can act.  Aristotles’s line that “we deliberate, not about ends, but 
about what forwards those ends” (1112b12-13) is often quoted to support the thesis 
that practical wisdom’s role is to find the means to the end and not to determine the 
end itself.  More will be said about this in the following section.  There is little doubt 
that the means to an end are revealed in deliberation.  Thus, the fourth feature of 
practical wisdom is that it is directed towards an end.  The choice that results from 
deliberation is distinguished by deliberative desire, in that both reason and desire are 
on board with the decision.  This choice that has the agreement of reason and desire is 
the end point of deliberative thought and the starting point of action.226  The two 
features of practical wisdom work as follows:  through the process of deliberation or 
reflection a rational choice is made; from rational choice we then act.  The person 
with practical wisdom is able to deliberate on all the relevant data in a particular 
situation and then make the right choice. 
Richardson’s take on practical reason (his term) is along Aristotelian lines.  
Practical wisdom requires deliberation, which is the rational process that we 
                                                        
226  Broadie (1991), p. 185. 
 160 
undertake in order to answer practical questions about what to do.227  Deliberation is 
always a rational process.  Moreover, we can deliberate rationally about ends (more 
about this later).  Richardson’s lists three standards for rationality: (1) potential 
discursiveness or public expressibility, (2) orderliness, and (3) the absence of such 
general defects of thinking as inconsistency, vicious circularity, excessive close-
mindedness, and one sidedness.228  A deliberative process must be assessable and 
explainable.  It can also be justified and criticized publicly.  Rational deliberation 
involves a modicum of order and contrasts with floundering about questions of 
practice.  Rational thinking should also be devoid of the usual cognitive vices.  These 
standards should be kept in mind when using practical wisdom in virtue ethics theory.     
 Having listed the three standards and four features of practical wisdom, we 
can now highlight the main components of this intellectual virtue.  They are: (1) 
deliberation (2) comprehension (3) cleverness and (4) sense.  Correct sense, good 
comprehension, and good deliberation are all acquired through experience.229  We use 
these capacities whenever we are faced with difficult moral situations and they help 
us to decide what to do.  One needs good sense to “make the correct discrimination 
on what is reasonable” (1143a21-22).  Comprehension is required to take in all the 
relevant data in a situation, give the correct interpretation of these data, and 
consequently assign appropriate weightings to their importance.  Finding out exactly                                                         
227  Richardson, Henry S., Practical Reasoning About Final Ends.  Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1994, pp 4-5. 
228  Richardson (1994) p. 31. 
229  Hursthouse, Rosalind, “Practical Wisdom: A Mundane Account.” Proceedings of the 
Aristotelian Society Vol. 106, Issue 3, Sep 2006, pp 283-307.  
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about a moral situation involves judging what other people say, particularly about 
theirs and other people’s actions.  The young and inexperienced tend to be credulous 
but the experienced and wise should be able to use good comprehension to judge if 
the reports of others are likely to be true or false.  Comprehension and sense do not 
prescribe.  Rather they make judgments and are discriminative capacities (1143a9-
10).  Cleverness enables its possessor to find the effective means to proposed goals 
and is essential to practical wisdom.  Of course, the wicked can also possess lashings 
of cleverness.  However, they do not pursue good ends.  In choosing good ends, the 
wise are guided by moral virtue, which the wicked lack.   
Much of practical wisdom involves deliberation.  Deliberation is difficult 
because there is so much that it must get right.  It is a time-consuming process with a 
beginning and an end.  The beginning is when agents establish an end.  They then 
proceed to think about how and by what means it is to be achieved.  This involves 
choosing the most fine means if there is more than one way to achieve the end.  In 
some cases, deliberation must consider further means to achieve the means.  Good 
deliberation requires experience.230  From experience we get worldly knowledge that 
ensures expertise in deliberation.  The more experience we have the better our 
comprehension, sense, and deliberation.   
In sum, practical wisdom is the combination of deliberation, cleverness, 
comprehension, sense, and moral virtue.  This can be put into a heuristic formula:  
                                                        
230  Hursthouse (2006). 
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Practical wisdom = deliberation + cleverness + comprehension + sense + moral 
virtue. 
4.3 The Role of Phronesis in Virtue Ethics 
 A virtue is a disposition that guides our choices in accordance with the 
dictates of reason.  Virtuous activity is guided by practical wisdom I argue, in its 
selection of ends and in its deliberation about means.  Annas believes that the most 
crucial feature of virtue ethics in its classical version is the central role of practical 
wisdom.231  Similarly, practical wisdom should take on the same necessary role in 
contemporary virtue ethics.  A person is not virtuous unless she has thought through 
and understands the reasons on which she acts.  If we neglect the role of practical 
wisdom, we are left with virtues that are just dispositions to act.  Dispositions are 
developed and exercised through the agent’s practical wisdom.  If the role of practical 
wisdom is reduced or rejected, virtues simply become dispositions to act that may or 
may not be productive of good.   
In contemporary virtue ethics phronesis plays four roles: (1) it determines the 
mean of a disposition (2) it determines the means to attaining the end; and (3) it 
contributes to determining the end, and (4) it initiates action.  
4.3.1 Determining the Mean 
Perhaps this is the more controversial of the four roles.   The doctrine of the 
mean holds that moral virtue is a disposition (with regard to feelings and action) 
which is a mean.  Aristotle writes:                                                         
231  Annas (2006). 
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[Moral] Virtues, then, is a disposition issuing in decisions, depending 
on intermediacy of the kind relative to us, this being determined by 
rational prescription and in a way in which the wise person would 
determine it.  And it is intermediacy between two bad states, one 
involving excess, the other involving deficiency. 
       (II, 6, 1106b36-1107a3) 
 
Moral virtue is neither excessive nor deficient; it results in neither excessive nor 
deficient actions and feelings.   The location of the mean is “as the man of practical 
wisdom would determine it” (1107a1-2).  Practical wisdom would certainly play an 
important role in determining the mean.  To guide the emotions in order to develop a 
good disposition is to practice determining the mean or intermediate of each emotion.  
To be virtuous is to find the mean of every emotion and action in each particular 
ethical situation.  Aristotle believes that vice lies in the excess or deficiency of some 
virtue.  For instance, an excess of bravery is rashness and a deficiency is cowardice; 
an excess of generosity is wastefulness and the deficiency is stinginess.  It is 
important therefore to aim at the mean, a task that is not at all easy, in order to have 
virtue.  Not only should we aim at the mean of an emotion but we should also target 
the mean in our actions since virtue is both feelings and deeds.   
The mean is different for different people.  It is debatable whether the ability 
to make a judgment of the mean in specific cases can be explained or replaced by 
following a rule or principle.  It takes practical wisdom to decide how courageous one 
should be in a situation where someone is asked to do something unethical but not 
illegal at work.  Should she refuse and thereby risk losing her job in a bad economy?  
Or should she acquiesce and perform the unethical act?   What would be the mean, in 
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this case, to exemplify the virtue of courage?  Should the agent become livid and 
email the unethical request around the blogosphere?  This action would be an 
excessive show of rage.  Should she then submissively carry out the unethical task, 
without question?  This choice would show a deficiency of righteous anger.  Should 
she calmly confront the person who has made the request, point out its unethical 
nature and decide her action based on the ensuing discussion?   This action would 
appear to be the mean between excessive anger (rashness) and a deficiency of anger 
(timidity).  How does the agent arrive at the mean?  Obviously, practical wisdom 
must come to her aid.   
This view is also the one Urmson takes on the doctrine of the mean.232  
Excellence of character is a disposition to feel and display the right degree of emotion 
on each occasion and as the occasion demands.  In the mean the agent will feel and 
display each emotion at the right times, with reference to the right matters, towards 
the right people, for the right reasons and in the right way.  While Urmson and Hardie 
do not think that the doctrine of the mean is conceptually unhelpful, there are those 
such as Barnes, who argue that this doctrine is of little practical use in morals and 
conceptually empty.233  The discussion and example given above does not seem to 
bear this criticism out.  The doctrine is not one that promotes moderation, as some 
interpreters would claim.  It does not boil down to the empty maxim of “Act as you                                                         
232  Urmson, J.O., Aristotle’s Ethics. Cambridge: Blackwell Publishers, 1973, pp. 32- 37. 
233  Hardie, W.F.R., “Aristotle’s Doctrine that Virtue is a ‘Mean’” in Articles on 
Aristotle, Jonathan Barnes, Malcolm Schofield, Richard Sorabji (eds).  New York: St. 
Martin’s Press, 1977.  Barnes, Jonathan, The Ethics of Aristotle.  Harmondsworth, England: 
Penguin, 1978, Introduction. 
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should act.”234  It says that there is a mean or intermediate in feelings and action that 
is correct for each situation, agent, and object.  In particular, the doctrine is given 
more credence when practical wisdom comes into play as the arbiter of the mean.   
Another common criticism of the doctrine is that for every virtue there are two 
corresponding vices.235  I am not sure why this is wrong, except that it shows virtue as 
exhibiting, “extraordinary mathematical symmetry”.236  In any event, the excess or 
deficiency of a virtue may be termed as a vice but we may instead consider some 
excesses or deficiencies as bad character traits.  Some, such as indifference, are not 
always morally significant.  More importantly, we are considering whether states of 
character conduce to a eudaimon life.  A bad character trait is one that detracts from 
eudaimonia.  Finally, it is clear that the ethical mean is not a mathematical notion.  It 
is the mean determined by and is relative to all the circumstances in which the choice 
of actions has to be made.   
4.3.1 Determining the Means 
The second role of practical wisdom is not highly controversial among current 
practitioners.  Aristotle points to this function several times in NE VI.  Of the 
intellectual capacities, it is cleverness that helps determine expeditiously the means to 
achieve a proposed end.  It is the calculative or problem solving capacity.  As already 
mentioned, such capacity may be used for good or bad ends.  Literature and history                                                         
234  Barnes (1978), Introduction. 
235  See Ross, W.D., Aristotle.  London: Routledge, 1997, p. 206, and Hursthouse, 
Rosalind, “A False Doctrine of the Mean” in Aristotle’s Ethics, Nancy Sherman (ed.).  
Oxford: Rowman & Littlefield, 1999, p. 107. 
236  Hursthouse (1999), p. 108. 
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are liberally littered with villains with ample cleverness (Iago, Moriarty, and Genghis 
Khan, to name a few).  However, practical wisdom must further involve commitment 
to a good end.  This commitment is secured by the possession of moral virtue.  Moral 
virtue is the development of character such that we tend to choose appropriate things.  
To have a virtue such as justice or courage is to be committed to acting as the just or 
brave person should.  Moral virtue provides the orientation toward the end and 
presents the end to cleverness.  Cleverness and understanding in turn, decide on the 
process or means to achieving this end.  
4.3.2.1 Support from Zagzebski  
Linda Zagzebski takes an unusual position with regard to the status of 
intellectual virtues.  She argues that intellectual virtues should be considered as a 
subset of moral virtues and rejects the strict division between reason and passion that 
commonly exists in western philosophical tradition.237  She therefore, disagrees with 
the Aristotelian division of the soul into rational and desiring parts.  She also 
disagrees with Aristotle’s division of the rational part of the soul into three: 
intellectual accomplishment (sophia), intelligence (nous) and practical wisdom 
(phronesis).  She argues that the division of the rational soul ignores one of the most 
common uses of the intellect, namely, to find out what the world is like, and that 
requires certain practical abilities that are neither theoretical nor practical.  
Intellectual virtues do not differ from certain moral virtues any more than one moral 
                                                        
237  Zagzebski, Linda, Virtues of the Mind.  Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
1996. 
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virtue differs from another.  The processes related to the two kinds of virtue do not 
function independently.238  One problem with dividing the moral from the intellectual 
virtues on the grounds that the former handle emotions while the latter handle 
thinking is that there are areas that are blends of thought and feeling.  She gives as 
examples, curiosity, doubt, wonder and awe.  “Feelings are involved with intellectual 
virtues, and intellectual virtues are involved in handling feelings, but their operation 
shows how blurry the distinction between intellectual and moral virtues really is.”239  
Both intellectual and moral virtues have stages in between virtue and vie consisting of 
self-control and akrasia.   
While Zagzebski disagrees with Aristotle on the classification of practical 
wisdom and its epistemological role in justifying belief, she does not disagree that it 
plays a crucial role in moral action.  Indeed, she gives phronesis the same high 
standing that Aristotle does: “we ought to consider the virtue of phronesis, or 
practical wisdom, as a higher-order virtue that governs the entire range of moral and 
intellectual virtues.”240  For her, phronesis is the virtue for which all the features 
relevant to any virtue are relevant.  In addition she agrees with Aristotle that we can 
acquire practical wisdom ourselves, or until we are able to do that, we can imitate 
persons who have practical wisdom.  These persons use their well-developed virtue of 
practical wisdom to determine the means to good ends.  
                                                        
238  Zagzebski (1996), p. 139. 
239  Zagzebski (1996), p. 148. 
240  Zagzebski (1996), p. 229. 
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Determining the means has several aspects.  One aspect is to mediate between 
the different virtues (for Zagzebski, these would include intellectual as well as moral 
virtues).  Every situation requires virtue or virtues that are relevant to it.  If a situation 
calls for both courage and humility, phronesis must choose which is more salient in 
that particular situation.  It may be that in one situation it is more important to show 
humility while in another, courage is the required virtue.  Phronesis sifts through all 
the salient features of the situation and makes a judgment that is not only the 
judgment of a courageous person or humble person but is the judgment of a virtuous 
person.  Therefore, the ability to mediate between and among individual moral virtues 
is part of the function of phronesis as it determines the means to the end. 
Phronesis plays a further role of coordinating the various virtues into a single 
line of action or thought leading up to an act.  Human activity in the moral realm is 
characterized by a lack of known procedures and rules.  Aristotle implies as much 
when he says that ethics is not an exact science.  Good judgment is required in all 
areas of human activity.  Persons with practical wisdom learn when to trust certain 
feelings and they develop through experience the ability to make good judgments.  
Choice is not always derived from a procedure specifiable in advance of the situation 
in which action occurs.   
4.3.3 Contribution towards Determining the End 
The third role is contentious especially if one follows the Humean line in 
moral theory.  The latter’s infamous phrase that, “Reason is and ought only to be the 
slave of the passions, and can pretend to no other office, but to serve and obey them 
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(2.3.3).” summarises his emotivist view of moral action.241  Hume and his followers 
such as Simon Blackburn argue that reason cannot set ends, only desires do.242  His 
explicit view is that no action is rational or irrational because reason by itself is 
impotent to motivate anyone to act.  Passions are what move people to act, and the 
only thing contrary to a passion is another passion.   
However, Richardson refutes this view at complex length.243  In the first 
place, we should be skeptical about there being any hard and fast ways to divide the 
psyche into, say, reason on the one hand and passions on the other.  Recent 
philosophical and empirical work on the emotions, for instance, has tended to show 
that they combine desiderative, evaluative, and cognitive aspects in complex ways.244  
It is true that Aristotle tends to the view that the pursuit of human goods requires 
phronesis to determine the means for achieving appropriate ends.  It need not be 
supposed, however, that all means can be distinguished from the ends themselves.  
Aristotle observes that “the end of production is something distinct from the 
productive process, whereas that of action will not be; for, doing well itself serves as 
end” (1140b6-7).  Not only instrumental means are in question.   
As discussed in Chapter 1, Cooper holds the view that Aristotle thinks that 
there is an ultimate end, eudaimonia, which is pursued constantly.  However, the 
constant pursuit of this ultimate end does not rule out his having other ends as well,                                                         
241  Hume, David, A Treatise of Human Nature.  Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1978.  
242  Blackburn, Simon, Ruling Passions.  Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1998. 
243  See Richardson, Henry S., Practical Reasoning About Final Ends.  Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1994. 
244  Richardson (1994), p. 23. 
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that is, other things desired for their own sake245.  There is therefore, some textual and 
scholarly support for the view that phronesis contributes to determining the ends.  Of 
course, there is also scholarly rejection of this claim.  Based on a close reading of the 
same texts, Tuozzo’s interpretation of Aristotle’s position on deliberation is one in 
which deliberation has a limited role in the specification of ends limited to 
determining how to act in a particular situation so as to achieve one’s intermediate 
end.246   These counter arguments are well thought out.   However, in Chapter 1 (1.5.1 
(2)) I argue for a possible way in which phronesis can have a part in contributing to 
determining the final end.  In addition, there also is modern theory, not derivative of 
Aristotle, for the claim that reason can deliberate about ends.  This argument is 
provided by Richardson’s work on deliberation about ends. 
4.3.3.1 Support from Richardson 
Richardson sets out a case that we can reason about final ends, both as 
individuals and as members of groups in dialogue with one another.  His definition of 
the ‘final end’ as an end we pursue for its own sake has an Aristotelian flavor.  A 
common objection to the proposition that we can deliberate about ends is what 
Richardson calls the scope objection.  The scope of practical reasoning can only cover 
deliberation about means to given ends.  Genuine reasoning cannot be about whether 
to pursue ends except in so far as they are means to still further ends.  Richardson 
                                                        
245  Cooper, J.M., Reason and Human Good in Aristotle.  Indianapolis, Hackett 
Publishers, 1986, p.15 – 22. 
246  Tuozzo, Thomas M., “Aristotelian Deliberation in not of the Ends” in Essays in 
Greek Philosophy IV: Aristotle’s Ethics and Politics.  Buffalo: SUNY, 1991, pp. 193-212. 
 171 
accepts the internalist requirement that “an agent’s reasons for action must derive 
from motivations that the agent has or had.”247  However, Richardson argues that the 
rational process of specifying ends is compatible with this restriction.  Using reason, 
the agent can adopt new ends that, if achieved, would satisfy the ends the agent 
already has.  Richardson argues that the attainment of these new ends will guide 
action in ways the more general ends could not have.  The motivations to act on the 
specified ends can derive from prior motivations that the agent has.  Thus, the 
internalism requirement does not rule out reasoning leading to new ends.   He gives 
the example of Charlene, who has wanted to be the Surgeon General since her 
childhood.  When deciding what courses to take at college she discovers that those 
who do not cheat at Organic Chemistry all do poorly at it.  It further dawns on her 
that her grades in the sciences are rather mediocre.  She does not want to cheat in 
order to become a doctor.  She therefore decides to pursue a degree in law because 
her grades in history and philosophy, the prototypical pre-law classes have been 
rather good.  Richardson maintains that this is a typical course of deliberation.  It is an 
illustration of a multi-part (in this case three) reasoning process.  The first is when she 
deliberates on how to become the surgeon general based a final end that developed in 
her childhood.  The second is when she deliberates about how to get to law school.  
The third and pivotal part is the comparison of the two objectives, when she decides 
which to pursue.  She discovers that her overriding end is to be a person of integrity 
(thus cheating on an exam to become a doctor is unacceptable to her).  Thus, her                                                         
247  Richardson (1996), p. 67. 
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satisfaction of her new end (to be a lawyer) will be consistent with her more general 
end (to be a person of integrity). 
A second objection to the proposition that reason determines ends Richardson 
calls the system argument.  This argument says that rational choices can only be made 
if they are ordered or systematized by some commensurable good, e.g. pleasure, 
happiness.  Such a good has to be an unquestionable final end.  Practical reason on 
this account, depends upon holding some end fixed for each choice so as to 
commensurate the values that compete in that choice.  Thus practical reason resists 
any thoroughgoing deliberation of ends.  Richardson’s rejoinder is that the various 
possible values of commensurable good cannot function as inputs to deliberation.  
Rather, they are more likely (as in the case of preference orderings used by some 
decision theorists) to be the outcome of deliberation.  In addition, we can rationally 
choose between competing ends without giving them commensurable values if we 
reorganize and modify our ends to make them more coherent.   
The third objection to the idea that we can deliberate about ends is the 
“source” argument.  It suggests that all practical reasoning must proceed from some 
ultimate end, so that our most final ends would have to be beyond deliberation.  
Richardson argues that it is possible for an agent to start her deliberations from 
existing commitments to some final end.  She goes through a process of modifying 
and specifying those commitments so as to yield a more coherent overall set of ends.  
In other words, deliberating about ends is like a heuristic process.  Richardson agrees 
with Aristotle that there is no single solution to the ethical issues that arise in our 
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lives.  His strategy in arguing against the objections to the view that deliberation can 
be of final ends is modest.  His arguments are those of ‘relative rationality’ by which 
he means the primary point of practical reason is to develop methods of reflection that 
organize our norms and priorities into intelligible patterns that are subject to review 
and revision.248  Richardson offers a quasi-Aristotelian holism.249  Agents adapt their 
ends to their situations and through a process of adjustment, reason guides their 
choice and action. 
4.3.3.2 Eudaimonia 
 Thus, Richarson offers a modern theory of deliberation of final ends and how 
it is possible.  As mentioned in 4.3.3, that practical wisdom contributes to the choice 
of the final end and/or intermediate ends is consistent also with Aristotelian ethics.  
Cooper holds the view that there is an ultimate end, eudaimonia, which is pursued 
constantly.  However, the constant pursuit of this ultimate end does not rule out his 
having other ends as well, that is, other things desired for their own sake250.  (This 
view is consistent with an inclusivist view of ends discussed in chapters 1 and 3.)  It 
entails only that any such end is at the same time pursued as a means to the ultimate 
end.  Other things may be pursued as ends provided that, at the same time they are 
pursued as means to the ultimate end.  These subordinate ends may be deliberated 
about by considering whether they will contribute to the attainment of the ultimate 
                                                        
248  Richardson (1996), p. 25. 
249  Packer, Mark, “Practising Moral Philosophy.” Res Publica Vol.III, No. 1, 1997, pp 
97-103. 
250  J.M. Cooper, Reason and Human Good in Aristotle.  Indianapolis,1986, p.15 – 22. 
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end.  Therefore, the pursuit of these ends can be explained, and hopefully justified, by 
reference to the ultimate end, to which they serve also as a means.  
 In 1.5.1 (2), I put forward an argument supporting an interpretation of 
Aristotle where deliberation is involved with determining the ultimate end of 
eudaimonia.  In sum, the argument connects practical wisdom with the determination 
of the final end, eudaimonia, by showing the very intimate link between practical 
wisdom and moral virtue. Aristotle is quite clear that both practical wisdom and 
moral virtue are inextricably intertwined and one depends on the other (1144b31 – 
33).   Unquestionably, practical wisdom has the task of finding the ways of achieving 
the end given by moral virtue.  However, moral virtue is made complete by practical 
wisdom.  The respective functions of moral virtue and phronesis cannot be performed 
independently of one another, and at different times.  When moral virtue chooses the 
correct end, it does not do so without the presence of phronesis.  
  4.3.4 Motivates Action 
As we have seen, Aristotelian ethics takes the complex connection between 
reason and passions in his account of choice (of action).  Practical wisdom is 
intimately connected with the moral virtues.  No one can have moral virtues without 
practical wisdom and anyone with practical wisdom has the moral virtues.  “It is clear 
then, from what has been said that it is not possible to possess virtue in the primary 
sense without practical wisdom, nor to be wise without virtue in character” (1144b30-
33)”   There is the need for a cognitive element in moral goodness as no one acts 
without thought.  Practical wisdom is the coordinator and director in moral action.  In 
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directing moral action, practical wisdom combines both reasoning and desire.  
Aristotle called this combination rational desire (orexis dianoetike) or desiderative 
reason (orektikos nous).   
Chapter 1 went into some detail on how desire (orexis) according to 
Aristotelian metaphysics is the originator of action.  When it comes to moral action, 
the desire that pushes one to act is rational desire.  In this delineated view on the 
initiation of moral action, Aristotle and Hume are in some agreement.  Yet, for 
Aristotle desire alone cannot originate in good acts.  Neither reason nor desire is a 
sufficient condition of right action.  To put it in T.D.J.Chappell’s terms, “Belief plus 
desire does not equal action; but belief in combination with desire does.”251  This 
aptitude in combining the relevant desires and beliefs to initiate the performance of a 
consequent action is found in practical wisdom.  It is not sufficient that we have 
desires and reason, we must have the ability to combine the right desires with the 
right reason to come up with the resultant right action.  For Chappell, practical 
wisdom, at least to some minimal degree, is both a key ingredient of the theory of 
motivation, and a condition of voluntariness.252  Without practical wisdom it is 
difficult to imagine how an agent can deal intelligently with hard moral cases.  
McDowell argues that judgments are not rule-governed, not necessarily because there 
are no rules about practical matters.253  Indeed, practical wisdom makes judgments                                                         
251  Chappell, T.D.J., “Reason, Passion, and Action: The Third Condition of the 
Voluntary.” Philosophy Vol. 70. No. 273, (Jul., 1995), pp. 453-459, p. 455. 
252  Chappell (1995), p. 456. 
253  McDowell, John, “Virtue and Reason” in Mind, Value, and Reality.  Cambridge: 
Harvard University Press, 1998. 
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about when and whether practical rules, such as moral rules, apply or not.  It makes 
judgments on the question of when it is right to make exceptions to rules, which are 
admitted to apply.  McDowell navigates a middle way between the view that there are 
moral rules which, apply to practical matters and the view that there are none.  I 
believe this is to be a reasonable position not only because it is supported by 
experience but also because practical wisdom plays a role in deciding between rules 
in different contexts. 
Chappell thinks that practical wisdom is the ability to combine relevant 
desires and reasons to produce the correct action.  His is one interpretation of 
Aristotelian “rational desire”.  Similarly, for Annas and Nussbaum, practical wisdom, 
deliberation, and choice work together to produce the correct action and feeling.  
Nussbaum is among VE writers who would like to give reason and deliberation a 
larger role in moral life.254  She turns to Aristotle to give credence to the idea that not 
only beliefs, but also passions and desires, can be enlightened by the critical work of 
practical reason.  It is not within the scope of this dissertation to fully discuss the 
merits of Annas and Nussbaum’s position versus Chappell’s (subtle as the differences 
are).  Suffice to say that I am more in agreement with Nussbaum in separating desire, 
which is an emotion, from practical wisdom which, is an intellectual capacity.  Right 
action is a consequence of the two working together in harmony.  Conversely, I 
disagree with Chappell that practical wisdom is a combination of desire and reason.   
                                                        
254  Nussbaum, Martha C., “Virtue Ethics: A Misleading Category?”  Journal of Ethics 3: 
163-201, 1999. 
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However, it is fair to say that Chappell, Nussbaum, McDowell, and I are 
particularists.  We argue that there can be no rules of right conduct that can cover the 
gamut of situations.  What makes an agent’s conduct appropriate is an enormously 
complex issue, and one that cannot be codified.  Instead, how we act and our 
characters are shaped by judgment and discernment – correct thinking or correct 
perception (orthos logos).  It is sufficient to say that Chappell’s, Nussbaum’s, 
McDowell’s, and my positions view practical wisdom as essential in producing right 
action.  Consequently, practical wisdom is necessary in virtue ethics because it 
decides what course to take (the means), makes sure the course chosen is with the 
ultimate end, and together with the right desire, causes a person to take the right 
action.  Without phronesis, how is an agent to choose correctly between a variety of 
rules and actions in diverse practical situations?  One would be left with two options 
to guide right action – emotions (which are unpredictable and uninformed) or a strict 
abidance to a list of rules (which results in rigidity).  Neither are good enough guides 
to handle morally complex situations. 
Aristotle makes the point that possessing practical wisdom is not only a 
necessary condition for being good, it is also a sufficient condition.  Anyone who has 
practical wisdom will thereby be good.  You may have a variety of natural 
dispositions or trained habits for doing the virtuous thing, but unless you can see in a 
situation that acting virtuously is what is called for, your apparently good action will 
only occur because of that habit or disposition.  It will lack the motivation to 
goodness that perceiving the situation sensitively and seeing what you ought to do in 
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it brings with it.  In that way, phronesis is tune to the ultimate good or eudaimonia.  It 
ensures that actions result from virtues that lead one to achieving eudaimonia.  In that 
way, phronesis and eudaimonia are closely connected as the latter is the goal that 
guides the former.   
4.4 Julia Driver’s Objective Consequentialism  
There are thinkers in contemporary virtue ethics who disagree about the 
importance of practical wisdom in virtuous acts.  Some prefer to de-emphasize the 
role of reason.  Julia Driver argues that due to the enduring influence of Aristotle, 
reason has been given too much weight in virtue ethics.  Indeed the emphasis on 
correct perception (her translation of orthos logos) is mistaken.  For Driver, there is a 
significant class of virtues, the “virtues of ignorance”, that cannot be accommodated 
by the view that practical wisdom is necessary for a virtuous agent.255  An agent can, 
therefore have a virtue even if that disposition requires her to be ignorant or 
thoughtless.  These virtues of ignorance are a class of moral virtues that either does 
not require the agent know what she does is right or, that actually requires that the 
agent be ignorant.  According to Driver, modesty is one such virtue.  “For a person to 
be modest, she must be ignorant with regard to her self-worth.  She must think herself 
less deserving, or less worthy, than she actually is.”256  If she understates the truth, 
she does so unknowingly.  As modesty is generally considered a virtue, Driver                                                         
255  Driver (2001), p. xiv.  Driver does not appear to distinguish between the terms 
‘correct perception’ and ‘practical wisdom’ as she uses them interchangeably.  It may be 
argued that correct perception is one important aspect of practical wisdom but is not 
equivalent to practical wisdom. 
256  Driver (2001), p.19. 
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concludes that this virtue rests upon an epistemic defect.  Other virtues of ignorance 
that Driver uses to support her claim that correct perception is not necessary for virtue 
are blind charity, trust, forgive and forget, and impulsive courage. 
Driver disputes the views of Nussbaum and McDowell who argue that correct 
perception allows us to discern the morally relevant features of our situation.  This is 
a kind of perceptual knowledge, which is necessary for the good life.  Accordingly, 
Driver also takes issue with Aristotle whose view of moral virtue is a “strongly 
intellectualist view in that it requires knowledge and deliberation.”257  She believes 
that Aristotle wanted the virtues to be reliable.  Practical wisdom ensures this 
reliability by its ability to handle every situation in the right way.  However, she 
counters that if virtue is a disposition, reliability is already built into the concept.  
“Someone who lacks practical wisdom might be at a loss in an unusual situation.  
But, on my view, it will turnout that this does not mean that the agent lacks the 
relevant virtue, any more than the fact that a fishing rod will break when run over by 
a steamroller means that it lacks the quality of resilience.”258  Driver’s rejection of 
practical wisdom as necessary for virtue is a precursor for her broader thesis: that 
other specific psychological states (such as good intentions) that have been deemed 
necessary for virtue, are in fact, not.  Thus, “any account of virtue that defines virtue 
in terms of some specific sort of psychology will fail because such an account will be 
                                                        
257  Driver (2001), p. 5. 
258  Driver (2001), p. 10-11. 
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too narrow.”259  To accommodate the virtues of ignorance Driver offers a theory that 
is a supplement to standard objective consequentialism.  A virtue is defined as, “a 
character trait that leads to good consequences systematically.”260 In other words, as 
virtues of ignorance exist, practical wisdom is not necessary for virtue.  We, therefore 
require another way of defining virtues.  Driver recommends the consequentialist 
method.   
According to an Aristotelian account of virtue, modesty will not be a virtue 
because it does not require practical wisdom, indeed it is a virtue that depends on 
unknowing ignorance.  But if we use Driver’s consequentialist account of virtue, 
modesty will be a virtue because it leads to good consequences systematically.  The 
good consequences of modesty are largely social ones.  Modesty is “valued by those 
[the modest person] interacts with (e.g. an easing of tensions, lack of jealousies).261  Is 
this really a good state of affairs in the world?  Do people who like to interact with 
others who underestimate their abilities have a tendency to use the opportunity to 
overestimate their own merits unchallenged?  In addition, do those who are ignorant 
of their own true abilities and merits not likely to become permanently self-
deprecating and perhaps underconfident?  A systematically good state of affairs 
should certainly include one in which the agent also flourishes.   
                                                        
259  Driver (2001), p. 42. 
260  Driver (2001), p. xviii. Driver’s definition of virtue contrasts with Thomas Hurka 
(2001), another virtue ethics theorist who takes a consequentialist position.  For Hurka, virtue 
is loving of the good. 
261  Driver (2001), p. 26. 
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To counter Driver’s final recommendation for a consequentialist virtue ethics 
we must first tackle her virtues of ignorance.  Are they virtues in the first place and if 
so, do they lack practical wisdom?  Driver’s argument rests on a mistaken view of 
modesty.  According to the Oxford English Dictionary, ‘modesty’ is defined as 
“having or expressing a humble or moderate estimate of one’s own merit or 
achievements”.  Thus, the virtue does not entail underestimating but not 
overestimating one’s abilities.  In doing the latter, knowledge is essential.  Practical 
wisdom allows us to see our abilities as relative to those of others.  For instance, I am 
can competently invest money and achieve decent investment returns.  Yet, I realize 
that there are others who are far better at investing than I am, and who achieve higher 
returns.  I also have the knowledge that my investment returns are not necessarily 
explained solely by my abilities.  Luck plays a role too.  This knowledge enables me 
to be modest in my investing abilities.   
Thus putting the above in theoretical language, while Aristotle requires certain 
forms of knowledge as necessary for virtue in the full and proper sense, are these 
forms of knowledge really incompatible with the ‘ignorance’ that Driver says is 
characteristic of the modest person?  Every virtue in the full and proper sense 
involves phronesis and a virtuous agent must act knowingly.  There is no reason to 
believe that modesty cannot involve phronesis.  What must an agent know when he 
acts?   Perhaps she must know when to be modest, and when one must push oneself 
forward (see example below).  In regard to the virtues of ignorance, it may be argued 
that not all ignorance involves epistemic defect.  Nor does all ignorance constitute a 
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lack of wisdom.  It is questionable whether ignorance is compatible with the absence 
of phronesis.  Take Driver’s example of blind charity.  This is when an agent can see 
only the good points in another person but is entirely blind to any weaknesses or 
vices.  Is one blindly charitable because of ignorance or because a virtuous person 
knows the vices of another but prefers to be not ready to find fault?  Would the latter 
situation not involve phronesis? 
The other avenue for refuting Driver’s thesis is by denying that the virtues of 
ignorance described by Driver are indeed virtues.  Thus, blind charity is not a virtue.  
Instead a tendency not to be ready to find fault is a virtue.  Modesty is a debatable 
virtue; looked at in a certain perspective, it may even be a vice.  For example, there 
may arise a situation when someone with the best ability in defusing bombs is called 
upon when a bomb is discovered.   In being modest by not admitting to her 
unmatched skills in bomb defusing, an agent is not exhibiting modesty as a virtue.  
However, if she possessed practical wisdom, she would discern the morally 
significant facts and volunteer to defuse the bomb (modesty be damned.)  As Swanton 
points out, epistemic defect is a normative notion.  Moral considerations may 
determine what counts as such a defect.262 
Clearly, Driver’s theory separates eudaimonia and moral virtue.  This entire 
project has argued that the separation does not strengthen virtue ethics.  The close 
relationship between eudaimonia and virtue has an important role of attempting to 
                                                        
262  Swanton, Christine, “Book Review of Uneasy Virtue.” Mind  Vol. 112, No. 447, pp 
533-536, Jul 2003, p. 535. 
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guide those wanting to know how to live in the broadest sense, not just from the point 
of view of promoting the good for others, which is Driver’s characterization of moral 
virtue.  Virtue ethics is addressed to those who want to know how to live well.  
Driver’s approach renders virtue irrelevant to the person trying to decide how to live.  
Virtue can be involuntarily acquired.  If this is the case, it is hard to imagine how it 
can help in guiding character development.  Indeed, Driver does not mention 
character, a primary feature of virtue ethics.  Oddly, she commends Jane Bennett’s 
blind charity but muses that we would not recommend it to ourselves, or our children.  
If part of the point of virtue ethics is to help us shape our lives, it is questionable why 
blind charity (a character trait that we have no interest in developing) is a virtue. 
4.5 Maria Merritt’s Solution to the Situationist Challenge 
 Maria Merritt’s suggested approach to virtue ethics is an answer to the 
challenge posed by situationist personality psychology.263  It minimizes the role of 
practical reason in the virtuous person in order to accommodate situationist moral 
psychology.  The latter is inferred from empirical evidence from research on 
personality psychology.   The evidence suggests that character traits exhibited by 
agents are highly specific to the situations in which they are immersed.  For instance, 
an agent’s generosity is dependent on his mood, whether he is in a hurry, or whether 
there is any one else around.  Situationists (as psychologists and philosophers who 
follow this line of thought are, regrettably, called) conclude from this empirical 
                                                        
263  Merritt, Maria, “Virtue Ethics and Situationist Personalist Psychology.”  Ethical 
Theory and Moral Practice 3: 365-383, 2000. 
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evidence that we are in error to interpret behavioural consistencies in terms of robust 
traits.  According to situationists, individual behavior varies with variations in 
situations.  Indeed, situations are better predictors of consequent behavior than the 
concepts of robust traits.  In contrast, according to some high profile proponents of 
situationism (another inelegant label), virtue ethics posits that good character traits, or 
virtues, are dispositions that motivate us to act well.  The conclusion is therefore, that 
virtue ethics, particularly Aristotelian conceptions, have big problems with their 
descriptive accuracy of moral psychology.   
 The principle philosophers who have developed the situationist argument 
against virtue ethics are Gilbert Harman and John Doris.264  The latter has a more 
developed version of the argument.  Harman argues that while people may differ in 
how they perceive and react to situations, experiments such as those by Isen and 
Levin, and Milgram265 demonstrate that there is no evidence that they differ in 
character traits.266  We ignore the influence of situational factors and the lack of 
empirical evidence to support the existence of character traits.  We are making a 
“fundamental attribution error” when we infer that an agent’s behavior is primarily 
                                                        
264  See Harman, Gilbert, “Moral Philosophy Meets Social Psychology.”  Proceedings of 
the Aristotelian Society 1998-9, pp. 315-331, and Doris, John, Lack of Character: Personality 
and Moral Behavior.  Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002. 
265  Milgram’s famous experiment involved asking test subjects to administer increasing 
levels of electric shocks to other subjects (learners) who gave incorrect answers to selected 
problems.  At 300 volts, the learner would scream and pound on the walls, giving no response 
thereafter.  Of 40 subjects, only 5 stopped at 300 volts, four stopped at the next level, and all 
others went on to administer the maximum, 450 volts, despite the supposed learner’s silence. 
266  Harman (1998), pp. 329-330. 
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caused by personal dispositions rather than situational factors.267  Thus, Harman takes 
the strong position that, “there is no empirical evidence for the existence of character 
traits”.268   Harman’s conclusion is too strong to be warranted by the evidence that he 
cites.  It does not follow that even if situations principally determine behavior, 
character traits do not exist.269  
 Doris develops a more sophisticated version of Harman’s strategy.  He agrees 
that there can be consistency of behavior in similar types of situation.  While virtue 
ethics proponents would argue that this consistency is due to personality, Doris 
argues that this consistency is better explained by the consistency of situational 
factors.  He supports this argument by citing psychological experiments carried out 
by Isen and Levin.270  The so-called ‘phone booth experiments’ were designed to 
measure helping behavior and its variation with situational changes.   A person 
coming out of a phone booth is more likely to help a person who has dropped a folder 
full of papers that scatter in the caller’s path if the caller has found a dime in the slot.  
According to Isen and Levin, the caller was far more likely to help than if the slot was 
empty.  Doris points other studies that show mood as having a powerful impact on a 
wide variety of human functioning such as risk taking, memory, cooperative 
behavior, and problem solving.  In the phone booth experiment 13 percent of dime 
finders failed to help, whereas 96 percent of non-finders were similarly passive.                                                          
267  Harman (1998), pp. 323. 
268  Harman (1998), pp. 329-330. 
269  Fleming, Diana, “The Character of Virtue: Answering the Situationist Challenge to 
Virtue Ethics.”  Ratio XIX 1 March 2006, pp. 24-42. 
270  Doris (2002), pp. 30-31. 
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Thus, Doris concludes that the situation, “He found a dime”, is a more plausible 
explanation of an agent’s helping behavior, than an explanation based on robust 
character traits.271 
 Doris further argues that there is little evidence of consistent behavior under 
different circumstances (labeled, alas, as trans-situational consistency).  Virtue ethics 
proposes that a brave person will exhibit bravery in different situations that call for 
bravery: in the battlefield, in a political contest, or in a boardroom.   The little 
evidence that we have of this type of behavioral consistency is at best piecemeal and 
unsystematic.  Some trans-situational consistency is a product of the relatively limited 
range of types of situations and situational factors that are at play in most people’s 
lives.272  While Doris rejects Harman’s claim that there are no character traits, he 
thinks that we have local traits, including the virtues, limited to a type of situation.  It 
is a mistake of ‘over-attribution’ to think that we have global traits.  A person is not 
compassionate; rather she is compassionate when she has found a dime in the slot of a 
phone booth. 
 The empirical evidence given by Harman and Doris cannot be to ignored, but 
they can be refuted (see below).  Maria Merritt prefers however, to outline a virtue 
ethics theory that she suggests escapes the challenges put forward by situationism.   
She designs a three-prong test to determine if a virtue ethics theory can accommodate 
situationist personality psychology.  A practically interested, fairly reflective person 
                                                        
271  Doris (2002), p. 31. 
272  Fleming (2006), p. 35. 
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must be able to, “(1) undertake to follow in practice the theory’s recommendation to 
have the virtues, where that includes taking to heart its normative ideal of virtue; (2) 
accept a descriptive moral psychology that seems, in light of the evidence, to be 
closest to the truth; and (3) succeed in living as one should live by the lights of the 
theory.”273  She uses the awkward term “motivational self-sufficiency of character 
(MSC for short)” to describe the degree to which the virtues are independent of 
factors outside of the agent, such as situations and social relationships.274  Aristotelian 
virtue ethics has a strong ideal of MSC because genuine virtues are firmly secured in 
one’s character.  Merritt’s interpretation of Aristotle is that virtuous actions issue 
from as stable and firm constitution, with little influence from external contingent 
factors.  I will argue that this interpretation is mistaken (see below).  In any case, 
according to Merritt, if situationist psychology is right, then there will be dissonance 
between the Aristotelian normative ideal of virtue and the agent’s actual moral 
psychology.  Some of the situational factors that affect behavior are social 
relationships especially those that are important in an agent’s life.  Merritt observes 
that these relationships are subject to change.  Consequently, an agent’s behavior will 
change accordingly.  One can attempt to follow the Aristotelian ideal of virtue by 
becoming independent of all or most outer ethical resources in all or most spheres of 
                                                        
273  Merritt (2000), p. 375. 
274  Merritt (2000), p. 374.  
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one’s life.   However, this would be impractical and “may direct attention away from 
the real goods and evils to which the virtuous person should be sensitive.”275   
 To be uncommitted to any strong ideal of MSC and be in subsequent conflict 
with (2) above, Merritt recommends a Humean version of virtue ethics.  Her reading 
of Hume is that an agent may possess virtues, which are socially or personally 
beneficial qualities of mind.  It does not matter in Humean virtue ethics how virtues 
result in virtuous action.  If we behave well because of situational factors, we can still 
attribute the behavior to Humean virtue.  We can do this because a Humean approach 
does not depend on the “sustained psychological form”276 that is required in an 
Aristotelian account.  Humean virtue is much less demanding than Aristotelian virtue 
because there is no requirement of a “sage-like perfection of personal character.”277  It 
aspirations are “philosophically modest” because it carries “no commitment to defend 
a positive account of what ends are of genuine worth in life, and what priorities we 
should establish for ourselves among these ends.”278  Humean virtues are stable over 
time but if this is so because of situational factors, the theory still stands because it 
makes no psychological assumptions.  Thus, the theory can support the empirical 
evidence of situationist personality psychology.  “The Humean conception of virtuous 
character can accommodate reflective awareness of the sustaining social contribution 
more readily than the Aristotelian conception.”279                                                           
275  Merritt (2000), p. 376. 
276  Merritt (2000), p. 379. 
277  Ibid. 
278  Ibid. 
279  Merritt (2000), p. 380. 
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 Clearly, Merritt’s recommendation for a virtue ethics that can accommodate 
situationism is one that diminishes to a considerable degree, the role of practical 
wisdom.  We need not deliberate about means and ends, nor make a choice of action, 
if situational factors spur us to act, rather like Pavlov’s dog.  As moral agents (if we 
can be considered as moral agents in the situationist account) we are vastly more 
affected by emotional reactions to external factors and significantly less guided by 
reason.  Yet, the situationist explanation is unable to give an account of how any 
situational factor results in a particular behavior.  The moral agent becomes a black 
box, which issues actions that may be good or may not be.  Situationist theory 
belongs to the category of behaviorism and is therefore, not a new account of human 
psychology.  Of course behaviorism has been criticized for its deterministic character.   
 There are two ways to contest Merritt’s argument in favor of a substantially 
reduced role for practical wisdom.  The first is to diffuse the situationist argument by 
assailing the reliability of the empirical evidence in support of situationism and its 
interpretation.  The second is to argue that Aristotelian virtue ethics does not run 
counter to situationism and does in fact, acknowledge and consider situational factors.  
Fleming argues that the experimental method that is employed in the situationist 
studies is poorly suited to detecting the existence or influence of traits.280  The 
experimental method is designed to detect the variables that cause change in 
particular situations, not to detect behavioral consistency over extended periods of 
time.                                                           
280  Fleming (2006), p.38. 
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Trait measures predict trends in behavior over time; they do not claim 
to predict behavior in every single relevant situation.  So, having a trait 
does not mean your reactions are absolutely consistent or predictable.  
Because the situationist experiments fail to consider these problems, 
they bias the evidence in favor of situational factors.281 
 
There is another important consideration in reference to experimental reliability.  
Questions have been raised whether the results of the phone booth experiments, to 
which Doris devotes some attention, are repeatable and generalizable.  Blevins and 
Murphy employed the same experimental conditions and came up with the results that 
there is “no relationship between finding a dime and helping.”282  Finally, if 
situationists claim that behavior is more affected by situational factors than by 
character traits, then they must assume that agents must have the capacity to respond 
to situations.  In other words, agents must possess the trait of being responsible to 
situations.   
 It is a little naïve to think that a character trait can cause behavior without 
being affected by external factors.  It is an uncontroversial assumption that situational 
factors have an influence on behavior.  However, it is an unwarranted inferential leap 
to conclude that behavior is caused only by situational factors.  How an agent reacts 
to various situations and how she interprets these situations depends on her level of 
practical wisdom and virtuous disposition.  Even if the (flawed) experiments provide 
evidence that behavior is liable to be influenced by situational factors, it does not 
follow that character traits in the sense that is required by virtue ethics cannot exist.                                                           
281  Fleming (2006), pp. 38-39. 
282  Miller, Christian, “Social Psychology and Virtue Ethics.”  The Journal of Ethics 7: 
365-392, 2003, p. 390. 
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 Doris and to some extent, Merritt, take the view that character is fixed where 
the virtues are concerned and developed independently of activity.  According to their 
interpretation of Aristotelian virtue ethics, virtuous actions are simply a matter of 
habit and good upbringing.  Merritt says, “situationist personality psychology requires 
us to recognize that this good upbringing does not suffice to endow your, forever 
after, with the full motivational structure you will need, in order to display the 
specific virtues in every situation that calls for them.”283  However, as discussed at 
length in this dissertation, in the virtue ethics tradition, particularly those inspired by 
Aristotle, a virtue is a disposition to act on reasons.  It is exercised in making 
decisions and is built up not by mindless habit, but by deliberating and making 
choices.  For most thinkers in the tradition virtue is developed in the same way as a 
skill.284   
Thus, initially through imitation of a virtuous person and then through 
experience guided by practical wisdom we build up our virtuous character.  The more 
virtuous a person, the more she is able to deal with a myriad of situations.  Aristotle 
wrote that to perform a virtuous act one must do it to the right person, in the right 
amount, at the right time, for the right reasons, and in the right way (1127-30a).  This 
implies that a virtuous agent must take into consideration the situation in which she is 
engaged.  Annas agrees with this view when she writes that a firm and reliable 
character in the Aristotelian sense means that “It is reliably virtuous – but that is not                                                         
283  Merritt (2000), p. 376. 
284  Annas, Julia, “Comments on John Doris’s Lack of Character”.  Philosophy and 
Phenomenological Research Vol. LXXI, No. 3, November 2005, pp. 636-642.  
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just consistent with, but requires, constant openness and sensitivity to situations of 
exactly the sort Doris ascribes to the situationist.  The more you have developed a 
virtue through reflection and reasoning, the more, not less, aware you become of what 
is important in different situations.”285  Only if we neglect the role of practical 
wisdom in virtue can Merritt claim that a situationist is in a better position to 
appreciate the importance of particular situations than is the proponent of virtue 
ethics.  Virtue ethics does not tell us to ignore situations when we deliberate and 
choose.  The virtuous person is intelligent in practical matters, flexible and innovative 
when required.  Deliberation and sensitivity to situational differences are features of 
the virtue ethics tradition.  Annas astutely notes that, “[Doris’s] book contains no 
arguments against virtue ethics in the actual Aristotelian tradition; it sets up as 
opponent only a radically unintellectual version of virtue.”286  When situationists call 
for a model of deliberation that is sensitive to situations, this is perfectly consistent 
with the virtue ethics tradition.  Thus, just as Merritt recommends that Humean ethics 
because it can accommodate the empirical evidence that comes out of situationist 
psychology, we can also recommend Aristotelian virtue ethics because it can do the 
same.   Handling diverse moral situations, each with its own empirical evidence, and 
determining the right course of action is precisely why I recommend that phronesis is 
a necessary element in any virtue ethics theory.  A virtue ethics theory that 
                                                        
285  Annas (2005), p. 638. 
286  Annas (2005), p. 639. 
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incorporates phronesis enables an agent to use her reason to decide on the right action 
based on morally relevant data in each situation.    
4.6 Conclusion 
 The description of phronesis or practical wisdom has a distinctly Aristotelian 
cast to it because much of it is still relevant today.  Practical wisdom is reason that is 
applied to practical and moral matters.   It results in choice and choice leads to action.  
To arrive at choice necessarily requires deliberation.  Finally, practical wisdom is 
directed towards an end.  The definition of practical wisdom is that it is a combination 
of deliberation, cleverness, comprehension, sense, and moral virtue.   
I have provided a positive account of practical wisdom and the role it plays in 
a virtue ethics theory.  Practical wisdom has four important roles: it (1) determines 
the mean (2) determines the means to attaining the end (3) contributes to ascertaining 
the end and, (4) motivates action.  As the virtues are the focus of any contemporary 
virtue ethics, there must be an explanation of how they function well.  A 
comprehensive VE theory should include an exposition of phronesis because of its 
necessary roles in promoting the proper working of the virtues.  In its first role, 
practical wisdom ensures that emotions and actions are a mean and therefore, 
appropriate to the situation, the agent, and recipient of the virtuous deed.  For 
example, we determine how much to give to which deserving charities.  The amount 
should be enough to help the causes and yet not result in our own economic hardship.  
What we can give up for others is determined by how much we think we really need 
external goods.  This determination is made by practical wisdom.  Secondly, through 
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deliberation, practical wisdom also devices the way to achieve virtuous ends.  Going 
back to the example of generosity, practical wisdom judges how best we can 
contribute to those in need.  Do we, like Swanton’s aid worker, leave our family, 
ignore our health, and throw ourselves into the jungles to help the disadvantaged?  Or 
should we know our own limits and help in other ways, such as cooking dinners for 
the homeless in our own community?  The means to the ends are chosen by practical 
wisdom. 
In turn, the ends are determined with the help of practical wisdom.  We 
deliberate on the intermediate ends and those that contribute to our ultimate end of 
eudaimonia.  I aim for a virtuous life but wish to also help those in need with as much 
money as I can muster.  Finally, virtues cannot stand in theoretical isolation.  They 
must be realized through action.  While desire is the ultimate motivation of action, 
desire that is guided by the right reasoning leads to virtuous action.  Thus, I wish to 
be generous by giving to charity.  I do so in the right way, for the right reasons, at the 
right time, and to the right people, guided by practical wisdom. 
In this chapter I also have been concerned with the negative task of refuting 
virtue ethics theories that disregard or diminish the role of practical wisdom.   I have 
shown that Driver’s virtues of ignorance are either not virtues or do require practical 
wisdom.  In addition Merritt’s response to the situationist challenge is unnecessary.  
She recommends a Humean virtue ethics approach that she says accommodates 
empirical evidence of moral psychology.  Her recommendation is unnecessary first, 
because the challenges of situationism are not as grave as Merritt suggests – the 
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experiments and interpretation of their results are debatable.  Second, Aristotelian 
virtue ethics can accommodate the empirical evidence of situationism.  A virtue 
ethics that incorporates practical wisdom enables an agent to manage the different 
situations that situationists posit.  Practical wisdom considers the empirical data and 
morally relevant details in each situation.  Cognizant and targeting the ultimate end, 
practical wisdom, working with desire, gives the guidance that leads to right action in 
each situation.  Thus, through the four roles described in this chapter, practical 
wisdom helps moral virtues to function properly. 
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CHAPTER 5 
DENOUEMENT: OBJECTIONS AND RESPONSES, SUMMARY, CONCLUSION 
 
OBJECTIONS AND RESPONSES 
I have argued that both eudaimonia and phronesis are necessary for a 
comprehensive virtue ethics theory.  Objections to this thesis are likely to take three 
tracks.  First, eudaimonia is such a flawed concept that it cannot be necessary for a 
complete VE paradigm.  Indeed, including eudaimonia hinders rather than helps VE 
theory.  Supporting this claim, objections may take the form of a list of criticisms of 
eudaimonism.  Second, critics may argue phronesis is not a necessary concept in VE 
theories.   Emotivists may claim that emotion, not reason direct and motivate our 
actions. Third critics may contend the claim of this dissertation is too broad.  The 
contention may be eudaimonia and phronesis are not necessary at the same time.  We 
need only phronesis, but not eudaimonia, or vice versa.  Let me respond to the main 
criticisms contained in these tracks. 
5.1 Eudaimonism is a flawed concept and therefore, cannot be necessary for a 
virtue ethics theory. 
 5.1.1. “Eudaimonia is outdated” 
As noted earlier in this work, eudaimonism was common in ancient ethical 
thought.  Eudaimonism is teleological because it is the end or purpose towards which 
humans aim.  The teleological nature of eudaimonism is one reason that moderns 
view the concept as outdated.  This unease with teleology translates into objections to 
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eudaimonia and a rejection that it is necessary to complete a virtue ethics theory.  
Rather, eudaimonia muddies the water.  Aristotle, in the Nicomachean Ethics gestures 
to everyday belief about eudaimonia when he notes that most people would agree that 
the ultimate good of humans is eudaimonia.  He does not feel he has to justify this 
claim because it is accepted belief (1095a16-21).  The status of eudaimonia changed 
with the rise of Christianity.  Along with virtues, eudaimonism was eventually 
eclipsed by tenets of Christian moral theology.287   
Schneewind chronicles the decline of virtues in moral theory and the 
emergence of moral laws that emanate ultimately from divine commandments.  
Similarly, the purpose of humans no longer rested on naturalistic grounds, but rather 
on divine purpose.  The good of humans was not eudaimonia but to fulfill God’s 
divine plan.  Moral theology was itself overshadowed (in the intellectual space, 
anyway) by deontological and consequentialist views.  Finally, eudaimonia was 
silenced by Darwinism.  To speak of an ultimate goal for humans is mistaken.  There 
is no ultimate purpose to human beings because natural selection is random.  The 
very concept of human teleology is therefore, an outdated one.  It would be difficult 
to update the concept because there are too many problems with it.  Perhaps the 
difficulty some philosophers have with a teleological view is for the reason that Foot 
gives, “Philosophers are sometimes afraid of recognizing teleological language, 
thinking it must be something left over from a world-view in which all nature was 
                                                        
287  See Schneewind, J.B., “The Misfortunes of Virtue,” in Virtue Ethics, eds. Roger 
Crisp and Michael Slote.  Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1997.   
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seen as reflecting the will of the deity.”288  However, this is of course, not the only 
way to look at teleology.  In this dissertation, I ground the teleology of eudaimonia, 
not on divine direction, but on human nature. 
The other reason for the unfashionable standing of eudaimonia is the 
evolution of the concept over the centuries.  The meaning of the term has moved from 
one that was relatively objective to one that is widely considered to be subjective.  
The modern English translation, of eudaimonia to happiness, is a strong indication of 
this move.  Happiness is often seen as entirely a psychological affair.  Indeed, 
contemporary theories of happiness (also called well-being or welfare) appear to be 
direct competitors to ancient theories of eudaimonia.  There has recently been a 
plethora of “happiness” research that comes under the heading of “positive 
psychology”.289  This direction that happiness research has taken is a result of the 
shift in views about personal authority in matters of well-being.  This shift is one 
factor contributing to the decline of philosophical interest in eudaimonia.  The 
ancients did not view that individuals, in general, were authorities about their own 
welfare.  In contrast modern liberals tend to believe in the sovereignty of the 
individual in matters of personal welfare.  In general people know what is best for 
them and tend to act rationally in the promotion of their interests.  Haybron sums up 
contemporary attitudes to happiness well when he writes:                                                         
288  Foot, Philippa, Natural Goodness.  Oxford: Clarendon Press, 2001, p. 32. 
289  See the following:  Haidt, Jonathan, The Happiness Hypothesis: Finding Modern 
Truth in Ancient Wisdom.  New York: Basic Books, 2006; Eid, Michael and Larsen, Randy 
(eds), The Science of Subjective Well-Being.  London: The Guilford Press, 2008; Keyes, 
Corey L. and Haidt, Jonathan, Flourishing: Positive Psychology and the Life Well-Lived.  
Washington, D.C: American Psychological Association, 2003.  
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This sort of view does not eliminate the need for philosophical 
work on well-being – but it does diminish its importance.  People who 
are authorities about their own good don’t need enlightenment; they 
need empowerment.  They need economics, not philosophy (or, for 
that matter, psychology).  Thus, perhaps, did formal research on well-
being pass largely from the philosopher to the economist, who 
attempts to solve the arcane problems of how to get resources into 
people’s hands most efficiently.  Questions about the nature of well-
being and its psychology, and the most sensible way to live, have 
accordingly taken a back seat.290 
 
So it seems that eudaimonia in its original meaning is not so much outdated, as it is 
merely transmogrified in the past two millennia.   When asked (at a lecture at The 
Catholic University of America) if philosophy ever has new discoveries, Peter 
Strawson replied there were few new discoveries, just re-discoveries.  Eudaimonia in 
its traditional sense has been rediscovered by contemporary virtue ethicists, in 
particular by Hursthouse, Annas, and Nussbaum.   
Chapter 3 attempts to update the concept borrowing  from Hursthouse, who 
borrows from Aristotle.  Indeed, in this work I continue to ground eudaimonia in 
human nature.  There is not much in intrinsic human nature that has changed in two 
thousand years.  Our passions remain the same, as does our intellect.  Our ideas have, 
of course, changed over time and across cultures.  Thus, it may be difficult to argue 
that eudaimonia, a concept that derives from our human nature, is outdated if human 
nature has remained rather constant in the ensuing period of time.  However, deriving 
eudaimonism from human nature leads to another criticism of this work.  The other 
                                                        
290  Haybron, Daniel M., “Philosophy and the Science of Subjective Well-Being”, in Eid, 
Michael and Larsen, Randy (eds), The Science of Subjective Well-Being.  London: The 
Guilford Press, 2008, p. 21. 
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shortcoming that is pointed out by its detractors is that eudaimonia as a concept is 
flawed – one of the biggest obstacles to eudaimonism is its definition.  The other is 
the rationale for its grounding.   
5.1.2 “The thesis of this work grounds eudaimonism in naturalistic premises 
that are questionable.” 
 A criticism of this updated version of eudaimonia is that it is based on a 
naturalistic view that is untenable.  We begin by giving an account of human nature 
and we conclude with an account of the good human life.  Critics of naturalism argue 
that naturalists smuggle moral values into a factual discussion.  This criticism is 
leveled at Aristotle and the modern proponents of naturalism.  These philosophers 
claim that eudaimonia is grounded on human function and good.  Naturalists such as 
Aristotle do not illicitly bring in the good in their arguments.  In the function 
argument, Aristotle introduces a premise that if a person has a particular function, a 
good person or a person who possesses virtue will perform her function well.  This 
premise may or may not be true, but it is an explicitly evaluative premise in the 
argument.  There is no illicit smuggling of moral values.  The naturalistic fallacy 
accuses Aristotle and others who use the naturalistic argument (such as Hursthouse) 
of moving from what is good for human beings to what it means to be a good human 
being.  This criticism has been defused by the defense of the naturalistic argument by 
philosophers such as Wilkes.291  In particular, the most thorough explication and 
                                                        
291  Wilkes, Kathleen V., “The Good Man and the Good for Man in Aristotle’s Ethics,” in 
Mind, Vol. 87, Np. 348, (October, 1978), pp.553-571. 
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defence of Aristotle’s function argument may be found in Hutchinson.292  In addition 
a modern interpretation of naturalism is supported by environmental ethicists who, 
also take a view of eudaimonia that derives from biological considerations (see 
following sections).   
 Another criticism of the function argument attacks the crucial claim that 
human beings are among the kinds of things that have a characteristic function.293  It 
is comprehensible when addressing certain skills such as bricklaying to speak of their 
characteristic functions.  It is however, another matter to say that human beings have 
this characteristic.  Yet, it does not seem unreasonable to claim that reason is the 
highest order capacity for humans.  This capacity differentiates us from other animals.  
The function of a creature defines the creature.294  I find Wilkes’s defense of the 
function argument and against the naturalistic fallacy compelling: 
The exercise of practical reason is rendered possible by his lower-
order capacities an by the social circumstances in which he lives; his 
lower-order capacities function well partly because of practical 
reason’s guidance, and partly because of the social and economic 
conditions of the state.  The state, in turn, is organized by the practical 
reason of some of its members, and requires the intelligent assent of 
most of them; and so we have a complete circle, within which every 
exercise of practical reason is related to man’s other capacities by 
feedback.  The need to fit in with society will make it highly likely that 
the most successful man is one who has developed the moral (other-
regarding) virtues, such as justice, generosity, and fairness; indeed, 
there is a place in this kind of life for nearly all private or social goods 
– active virtue, honour, pleasure, stamp collecting and so forth…Thus 
we get a full and active life which we expect the ‘good man’ to lead                                                         
292  Hutchinson, D.S., The Virtues of Aristotle.  London: Routledge, 1986. 
293  Sumner, L.W., Welfare, Happiness, and Ethics.  Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1996, p. 
71. 
294  Wilkes (1978), p. 559. 
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well; and one that is moreover a life that must be good for man, since 
his practical reason is explicitly setting out to order all things for his 
overall advantage.295 
 
The rejection of the function argument is associated particularly with the criticism 
that eudaimonia makes metaphysical assumptions about the teleology of humans that 
are not supported by modern science296.     
From the metaphysical side, what is required to sustain a virtue ethics is a 
broadly teleological view of nature.  According to this view, explanations in terms of 
final causes are legitimate and necessary for understanding nature.  The telos is a 
justification for moral action and motivation that are supposed to contribute towards 
this metaphysically fixed end.  MacIntyre rejects this “metaphysical teleological 
biology.”297   In response to this criticism, we refer to Aristotles’s Nicomachean 
Ethics and argue that in Book I, Aristotle makes little use of his biological theory.  
Instead, Aristotle’s account of human nature seems more like empirical psychology 
than ancient natural philosophy.  Many of his proposals about friendship, wealth, 
family, and virtue appear to derive support from contemporary psychological 
accounts of human happiness298.   
 Moreover, the function argument is not as archaic as its detractors claim.  
Recent proponents of environmental ethics have adopted this argument.  Robin 
Attfield writes that the flourishing of an organism entails the development in it of the                                                         
295  Wilkes (1978), p. 560. 
296  Solomon, David, “Internal Objections to Virtue Ethics” in Virtue Ethics A Critical 
Reader ed. Daniel Statman.  Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 1997. 
297  MacIntyre, Alasdair, After Virtue.  Indiana: University of Notre Dame Press, 1984. 
298  Argyle, Michael, The Psychology of Happiness.  London: Methuen, 1987 and Myers, 
David G., The Pursuit of Happiness.  New York: William Morrow, 1992. 
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essential capacities of the organism.299  The principle does not rely in any obvious 
way on pre-Darwinian assumptions about natural ends or final causes.  For Attfield, 
the principle simply says that while we may be unable to locate the function of a 
particular organism, we generally have little difficulty determining when it is 
functioning well by the standards appropriate to its kind.300  This language is 
reminiscent of Hursthouse’s position on flourishing and its grounding for human 
beings.   
Paul Taylor argues in a similar vein.   He espouses a “biocentric outlook on 
nature”.301  This outlook includes a “certain way of perceiving and understanding 
each individual organism.  Each is seen to be a teleological (goal-oriented) center of 
life, pursuing its own good in its own unique way…a living thing is conceived as a 
unified system of organized activity, the constant tendency of which is to preserve its 
existence by protecting and promoting its well-being.”302  Each individual organism 
has its own unique way of responding to the environment, interacting with other 
individual organisms, and undergoing the transformations that are specific to the life-
cycle of the species.  The organism exemplifies all the functions and activities of its 
species in its own peculiar manner.  Even Sumner, who is a critic of objective 
                                                        
299  Attfield, Robin, The Ethics of Environmental Concern.  Athens: The University of 
Georgia Press, 1991, p. 142. 
300  Ibid. 
301  Taylor, Paul, Respect for Nature: A Theory of Environmental Ethics.  Princeton: 
Princeton University Press, 1986, p. 44 – 47. 
302  Ibid, p. 46. 
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theories of well-being, admits that arguments based on function cannot be defeated by 
accusing them of biological naivete.303   
5.1.3 “Defining eudaimonia is so fraught that it detracts from rather than 
completes a virtue ethics theory.” 
 The second criticism of eudaimonia is that it is difficult to define the 
term. This criticism is more relevant to subjective theories of well-being.  Sumner is a 
notable adherent to the subjective theory of well-being.  Subjective theories of well-
being  depend, at least in part, on some attitude of the welfare subject.304  The subject 
determines what is good for her depending on her preferences.   According to 
Sumner, to claim that well-being is subjective is to claim that it is mind-dependent.  
This subjective relativity accords more with our modern sensibility of well-being.  In 
this sense well-being is often equated with happiness.  Well-being or happiness is 
relative to the individual.   
Thus, Martin may be happy living in seclusion in the woods, writing epic 
poetry.  Pauline is happy as a mother of five, raising her children, and living in close 
proximity to her extended family.  It is difficult to define subjective well-being 
because the definition is subject dependent.  For Martin well-being is defined by 
solitude and creative freedom.  For Pauline well-being means close family 
relationships.  This subjective difference leads to the criticism of relativism.  The 
accusations made against eudaimonia are therefore, misguided in two senses.  First, 
                                                        
303  Sumner (1996), p. 74. 
304  Sumner (1996), p. 38. 
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these criticisms should not be directed to eudaimonia but to happiness, well-being, or 
flourishing as defined in these subjective theories.305  Second, criticisms of relativism 
in eudaimonia are actually criticisms of subjective theories of well-being and not 
eudaimonist theories. 
Objective theories of well-being, or eudaimonist theories, are not subject 
dependent.  Aristotle’s definition of eudaimonia is the activity of reason in 
accordance with virtue, in a complete life.  Aristotle’s eudaimonism is generally seen 
as an objective theory of flourishing or well-being.  Eudaimonist theories do not take 
significant consideration of the attitudes and preferences of welfare subjects.  Instead, 
objective theories claim that what is intrinsically valuable neither consists in nor 
depend on an individual’s psychological state.306  There seems to be little argument in 
connection to the definition of eudaimonia from the objective point of view.  Most 
eudaimonists such as Hursthouse, Annas, and Nussbaum are neo-Aristotelians who 
they derive their definition of eudaimonia from Aristotle.  Hursthouse says that her 
theory of eudaimonia is objective within the ethical paradigm that she espouses.   
Living in accordance with the virtues enables us to live as good human beings qua 
                                                        
305  Even within subjective theories of happiness, recent research has found a great deal 
of commonality amongst factors that subjects say make them happy.  Relationships (social 
and family) rank very high in the happiness table, along with fulfilling work, a belief system, 
and sufficient leisure time.  See Argyle (1987) and Myres (1992).  Indeed there are certain 
external variables that lead to greater happiness such as less noise, more control of the 
environment, and shorter commutes.  See Haidt (2006), p. 91-94. 
306  Sumner (1996), p. 41 (footnote 19). 
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human beings.  This good is common to us as human beings.307  This definition of 
eudaimonia is not at great variance to Aristotle’s.   
If there is any degree of subjectivity in the concept of eudaimonia, it would 
arguably be in the last part of Aristotle’s definition, “in a complete life”.  Within the 
inclusivist view of eudaimonia, the complete life takes into consideration factors such 
as wealth, family, and friends.  Individual preferences determine how much wealth, 
how many friends, and how deep our relationships ought to be in order to be 
satisfying.  Yet, the predominant emphasis of eudaimonia is that it is an objective 
goal that does not vary with individuals.  That goal is a life lived in accordance with 
the virtues guided by reason.  
5.1.4 “Eudaimonia cannot be necessary for a complete virtue ethics theory 
because the concept results in moral egoism, which runs counter to any 
ethical theory.” 
 The last but by no means least, final criticism of eudaimonia is that the 
concept results in moral egoism.  Is not moral philosophy the justification of action 
that is entirely objective and altruistic?  There cannot be a hint of selfish reasons.  If 
self-flourishing is the goal of virtuous action, moral egoism is the consequence and 
egoism is equated with selfishness.  In tackling this objection, we can argue that 
flourishing, as the aim of the virtues, is not antecedently specified independently of 
                                                        
307  Hursthouse, Rosalind, On Virtue Ethics, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999. 
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living virtuously308.  The person who aims at living a flourishing life by living in a 
fair, generous, and brave way is not aiming at her good, as opposed to the good of 
others.  Annas argues that it is a mistake to claim that the virtuous person’s 
motivation is egoistic because it is aimed at her flourishing and not someone else’s.  
There is no implication that she is furthering her own interests at the expense of 
another’s.  To accuse a person of acting selfishly because she is acting virtuously for 
the sake of a eudaimonistic life, is to misconstrue the meaning of a virtue.  Courage, 
for example, is to stand up for what is right, whether it benefits the virtuous person or 
others.  The charge that eudaimonia is egoistic seems to depend on the assumption 
that eudaimonia must be specified independently of the practice of the virtues.  
Proponents of eudaimonist virtue ethics do not share this assumption.  Virtues are a 
means to an independently agreed end that is eudaimonia.   
5.2 “Reason does not motivate action nor select ends, emotions do.” 
 This work proposes that virtue ethicists should include eudaimonia and 
phronesis as necessary elements in a complete virtue ethics theory.  I draw heavily on 
an interpretation of Aristotle that gives a primary role to phronesis.  The refutation of 
the proposal that practical wisdom plays an indispensible role in virtue ethics would 
therefore be based on an interpretation of Aristotle that significantly plays down the 
this role.  Walter and Fortenbaugh take this position.  Walter insists that goals are 
decided by virtue and that virtue is a state of the faculty of desire, which simply 
                                                        
308  Annas, Julia, “Virtue Ethics,” in The Oxford Handbook of Ethical Theory, ed. David 
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approves certain goals.  Thus, Aristotle is assimilated to Hume and the emotivists.309  
Fortenbaugh argues that the virtuous man can act virtuously without engaging his 
practical wisdom.310  The latter is used only in calculating the means to achieving a 
goal.   The more extreme view would be that virtue exists in someone who does not 
have practical wisdom.  Fortenbaugh’s view has been refuted by Sorabji, Cooper, and 
more recently Kakoliris.311  They cite ample textual evidence from Aristotle’s Ethics 
to support their refutations.  In addition, Sorabji makes the case that practical wisdom 
is required to keep immediate goals in line with our conception of eudaimonia.  Even 
if there is textual and other scholarly support for the roles of phronesis as given by 
Aristotle, this work still has to contend with the argument that moral judgments and 
motivation are given by emotions. 
 Emotivists argue that our actions are motivated by emotions.  This line of 
thought was given life by Hume and has been taken up by emotivists and 
prescriptivists like Simon Blackburn and Alan Gibbard, who work in the analytic 
tradition.  Even when we say that practical wisdom sorts out the reasons for doing 
something, and with deliberation decides which course of action to take, emotivist 
will say that an agent’s reason for doing something is itself dependendent on his                                                         
309  Sorabji, Richard, “Aristotle on the Role of Intellect in Virtue,” in Essays on 
Aristotle’s Ethics, ed. Amelie Oksenberg Rorty.  Berkeley: University of California Press, 
1980, p. 211-214. 
310  Ibid. 
311  Sorabji (1980); Cooper, John M., Reason and Human Good in Aristotle.  
Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing, 1986; Kakoliris, Gerasimos, “Refuting Fortenbaugh: The 
Relationship between Ethike Arete and Phronesis in Aristotle” in Philosophia: Yearbook of 
the Research Center for Greek Philosophy at the Academy of Athens, Vol. 33, 2003, pp. 183- 
193. 
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feelings, passions, or desires.  They will argue, if a moral judgement about what a 
person ought to do implies that he has a reason to act in the proper way, then that 
judgement will be based not only on rational reasons but also ultimately, on feelings 
and desires.  When people think they ought to do something, the ultimate motivating 
reason is a found in the person’s psychological state.  In other words, behind every 
reason (thought) lies a desire (feeling).  
For example, I may say that I am buying the shares of Apple because of good 
fundamental financial reasons.  In addition, I have reviewed the corporate 
responsibility of the company and found that it has so far, been a good corporate 
citizen.  Thus, I buy the shares in the company.  However, emotivists would argue 
that the ultimate reason for my buying the shares of Apple is to be found in my 
psychological state.  I desire owning stock in a “cool” and “hip” company that is 
innovative and anti-establishment, because I like some rebellion.  I am not sure why 
we must end the causal series at the emotional element of an agent’s psychological 
state.  Why not instead, as Foot argues, “take the recognition of a reason for acting as 
bringing the series to a close?”312  Foot’s argument would certainly be in line with the 
contention of this work i.e. we have reasons for acting virtuously and those reasons 
are ultimately aimed at eudaimonia.   
 In addition, I take Aristotle’s view that desire and intellect in a virtuous person 
act in unison.  Indeed we interpret Aristotle in such a way that we turn the Humean 
view around and claim that behind every desire is a thought.  Practical wisdom is                                                         
312  Foot (2001) p.22. 
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required to develop the means to an end.  When this means is determined, practical 
wisdom informs our desires so that we desire to do the right thing as guided by 
reason.  Aristotle calls this desire, deliberative desire.  It is desire that is informed by 
our reason.  Hence, one of the roles of practical wisdom is to contribute towards 
motivating an agent to act through stimulating the correct desire.   
5.3 “A comprehensive virtue ethics theory does not require both eudaimonia and 
phronesis.” 
5.3.1 Connections Between Eudaimonia and Phronesis 
 Phronesis and eudaimonia are, to use a new age term, inter-connected.  
Borrowing from Kant, eudaimonia without phronesis is blind; phronesis without 
eudaimonia is empty.  Phronesis is the crucial link between virtue and eudaimonia in 
Aristotle’s theory.  Both virtue and eudaimonia are essentially characterized by 
reason, which is what makes the connection between virtue and eudaimonia so close.  
According to eudaimonism, the good of the agent is the goal of ethics.  One primary 
good of the agent is the full development of the highest power of humans, which is 
reason.  Reason is used in theoretical and practical activity.   
A virtue is a disposition that guides our choices in accordance with the 
dictates of reason.  Virtuous activity is guided by reason in its selection of ends and in 
its deliberation about means.  Excellence in rational activity characterizes a good life, 
every act that makes excellent use of reason, every virtuous act, therefore, contributes 
to the eudaimonia of an agent.    
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 In sum, phronesis, practical wisdom, is connected to eudaimonia in two ways: 
first, it plays a role in determining the ultimate goal that is eudaimonia, or a 
flourishing life.  Second, this dissertation argues along Aristotelian lines that virtue is 
a means to and a part of eudaimonia.  Virtue is a disposition or state that runs deep in 
the person, and is a matter of their character, not a particular style of acting or living.  
The disposition involves two things, which develop together and are intertwined in 
practice.  One is practical wisdom, which is the ability to reason reflectively in the 
morally right way.  The other element involved with virtue is a developed habit of 
feeling and acting in the right way that accords with correct reasoning.  Ethics 
involves acting.  Practical wisdom is the element in virtue ethics that leads us to right 
action.  Thus, moral virtues work with practical wisdom to achieve a eudaimon life, 
which is the highest good.  All human goods bear a relationship to our ultimate good 
that is, eudaimonia.  Practical wisdom is the intellectual capacity for assessing how 
we can achieve eudaimonia through proper estimation of the contributions that 
various goods offer towards eudaimonia.   
Eudaimonism is less problematic than often supposed.  It does not depend 
upon accepting formal causes and essences.313  All that is needed is the allowance that 
humans act for purposes and that what enables them to achieve any of their human 
purposes of whatever sort is their capacity for thought and reflection.  Humans may 
sense-perceive and do various other things without thought, but to do whatever they 
                                                        
313  Polansky, Ronald, “ ‘Phronesis’ on Tour: Cultural Adaptability of Aristotelian 
Ethical Notions” in Kennedy Institute of Ethics Journal.  Vol. 10, No. 4, 323-336, p.331. 
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do in a human way it must be influenced by their capacity for thought and reflection.  
Eudaimonia is a life of good human activities.  Eudaimonia provides the purpose 
towards which practical wisdom aims.   Without a purpose, practical wisdom would 
be aimless.  Indeed it would no longer be practical ‘wisdom’ but practical 
‘cleverness’.  
SUMMARY 
The thesis of this dissertation is that eudaimonia and phronesis are necessary 
for a comprehensive virtue ethics theory.  By “comprehensive,” I mean thorough and 
complete.  Comprehensiveness mandates that a theory include all explanatory 
elements.  These elements should be connected in such a way that the whole theory 
stands up relatively well to the realities of everyday applications, and to reasonable 
challenges.  I argue that without eudaimonia and phronesis a virtue ethics theory 
cannot be comprehensive.   
Virtues are the central focus of any virtue ethics theory.  Few would disagree 
the virtues are therefore, the common feature to all iterations of the theory.  Other 
elements of a virtue ethics theory should relate to virtues.  In the first place we need 
to know how to justify the virtues.  Then we need to know why we should possess 
and practice the virtues. The upshot is that eudaimonia provides the basis for why we 
should be virtuous, and helps validate character traits as virtues.   
The virtues also must be chosen correctly in different situations and then acted 
upon.  How do we decide among various virtues in a moral context?  Phronesis, or 
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practical wisdom plays four roles in ensuring the proper functioning and realization of 
the virtues, one of which is determining the means to achieve a good end.   
I began in Chapter 1 by discussing one of the first models of virtue ethics, that 
is Aristotle’s Ethics.   We need to know how eudaimonia, virtues, and practical 
wisdom interact, influence, and determine each other in one of the primary, original 
models of virtue ethics.  In Chapter 2, with a broad review of the contemporary 
literature in the field, I laid out the problem that currently exists in virtue ethics.  
There is a diffuse and disparate array of work in that space.  Most are articles, and 
therefore, deal with only a small, particularized segment of virtue ethics.  As such, 
they are fragmentary like a single chair or bed in the Palace of Versailles.  Beautiful 
as that one piece of furniture may be, it stands alone as an idiosyncratic piece, hardly 
amounting to a thorough job of interior decoration.  So far, just three books are 
anything close to a thorough job, i.e., to an effort explore virtue ethics systematically 
and at length: Rosalind Hursthouse’s, Michael Slote’s, and Christine Swanton’s.  Yet, 
each offers a different version of virtue ethics.  
These authors approach what purports to be the same subject in almost 
opposite directions as if one were in Versailles, a second wandering about the 
Versailles Gardens, and the third venturing out to the nearby chateau of Marie 
Antoinette.  In particular, Slote wants to tighten the variables in a virtue ethics theory 
and therefore, distills the evaluation of virtues to one single factor: the motivation for 
any virtue should be benevolence.  We should evaluate whether a virtue is a virtue by 
determining if the motivation behind it is benevolence.  In contrast, Swanton 
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recommends a pluralistic approach to virtue ethics so that considerations of what 
constitutes a virtue are deeply contextual.  We must look at items in the field of 
virtue, the forms of responsiveness, the traits that make a virtue, the standards for 
judging virtues, and the notions of the right.  Evaluating a character trait to ascertain 
whether it is a virtue requires us to draw on these pluralities.  Hursthouse, in contrast 
to Slote and Swanton, is a neo-Aristotelian and a eudaimonist.  Slote is non-
teleological, Swanton is both teleological and non-teleological, and Hursthouse is 
teleological.  Virtue ethics is, therefore, diverse in views, generally fragmented in 
research focus, and deficient in agreement on how a virtue ethics theory should look.  
The sources of virtue ethics are myriad: Aristotle, Stoics, and Aquinas.  Among the 
focus and foundations of virtue ethics are virtues, naturalism, and reason.  From this 
cacophony, I suggest a distillation so that virtue ethics can have some common 
ground and agreed principles. 
One common principle I recommend is eudaimona.  Chapter 3 gave the 
arguments why eudaimonia is necessary.  It began by defining eudaimonia as a 
complete life, lived according to the virtues, that is guided by reason.  Why should we 
live according to the virtues?  Eudaimonia is the purpose of every human.   We start 
with the premises that: 
 1. There is an ultimate end that is the chief good. 
 2. This chief good is eudaimonia 
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Aristotle supports (1) with empirical evidence and argument.  The second 
claim rests on Aristotle’s use of the endoxic method.314  Section 3.1.2 discussed 
Hursthouse’s argument for eudaimonia being the purpose of every human being.  
Eudaimonia is a natural purpose for human beings qua human beings.315  Eudaimonia 
is grounded in human nature, such that human beings need the virtues in order to live 
a characteristically good human life.  This approach derives from ethical naturalism.  
We flourish when we are good human beings qua human beings.  
Eudaimonia is the reason we act virtuously.  A naturalistic understanding 
informs the definition of this element that is so critical to a comprehensive VE theory.  
The necessary part of eudaimonia is a life based on the virtues.   The function 
argument teaches that whether an activity is doing well is judged by the degree of 
excellence in the performance of its main function.  The function that is peculiar to 
human beings is reason.  If eudaimonia is living well and doing well, then its 
achievement is through the best use of reason.  Thus, eudaimonia is acting virtuously 
according to reason.  Flourishing as a human being requires we act virtuously because 
we need the virtues to live a characteristically good human life.  To be a good human 
being requires that we ensure our individual survival and the continuance of our 
species.  We need to have pleasure and freedom from pain.  Finally, good humans 
work at good functioning of the social group – in the ways characteristic of human 
beings.   
                                                        
314  See Chapter 1 for a full explication of these arguments. 
315  Hursthouse (1999). 
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A key interdisciplinary innovation, which modernizes the concept of 
eudaimonia, is to add psychological and economic research on happiness to it. The 
definition of eudaimonia has three elements:  
(1) a complete life  
(2) a life lived according to the virtues 
(3) a life guided by reason.   
A complete life is the subjective part of the concept, while a life lived according to 
the virtues is the objective part.  Thus, whether we wish to be soldiers, sailors, tinkers 
or tailors depends on our intrinsic interests.  However, to be fully eudaimon, we must 
be virtuous soldiers, sailors, tinkers and tailors.   
In Chapter 3, I proceeded to critique a virtue ethics theory that rejects 
eudaimonia.  Michael Slote relies on the motivation of benevolence as the 
underpinning of the virtues.  I argued this foundation is even weaker than 
eudaimonia.  Indeed, Slote depends on intuitions about right and wrong action to 
direct his explication of balanced concern rather than relying on independent 
assessments of the virtues to help decide among various perspectives on balanced 
concern.  In the end, Slote fails to provide a convincing theory that helps decide 
which actions are right or wrong by grounding virtues (or admirable traits) in 
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balanced caring.  Slote must rely covertly on intuitions about right and wrong actions 
in order to figure out which states of character are admirable.316   
Finally, the last part of Chapter 3 critiques the other systematic book length 
explication of virtue ethics – Christine Swanton’s.  Swanton does not disagree that 
eudaimonia is one way to identify which character dispositions are virtues.  However, 
she disagrees it is a necessary condition of a disposition being a virtue that it is 
characteristically constitutive of, or contributes to, the eudaimonia of the agent.317  
She argues it may well be the case that at least some virtues contribute to aspects of a 
person’s goodness other than her eudaimonia.  There are some virtues that do not 
contribute to eudaimonia but do contribute to a person’s goodness.  Swanton prefers 
to have a pluralistic approach to select what characteristics are virtues.  
Unfortunately, Swanton’s preference for an evaluation of the virtues using expanded 
measures is vulnerable in two respects.   First, her measures do not depart from 
Aristotelian virtue ethics.  As such, her measures can be subsumed under the 
eudaimonist thesis advanced in Chapter 3.  Second, her pluralism and desire to 
accommodate a wide range of views undermines her attempts to explain and guide 
moral action.   
In Chapter 4, I posit that phronesis works in four ways to reach eudaimonia as 
the final end goal.                                                           
316  Copp, David and Sobel, David, “Morality and Virtue: An Assessment of Some 
Recent Work in Virtue Ethics” in Ethics: An International Journal of Social, Political, and 
Legal Philosophy.  Vol. 114, No. 3, pp. 514-554, April 2004, p. 518. 
317  Swanton, Christine, Virtue Ethics: A Pluralistic View.  Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 2003, p. 80. 
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1. It determines the mean of a disposition. 
2. It determines the means for achieving the end. 
3. It contributes to determining the end. 
4. It contributes to motivating action to fulfill this end. 
 That is, without phronesis it would be impossible to see how to reach eudaimonia, or 
even determine whether eudaimonia is the ultimate goal.   
Section 4.3.1 argues that phronesis determines the means to achieving 
eudaimonia.  Zagzebski’s view lends considerable support to this argument.318  She 
stresses that practical wisdom mediates between different virtues and chooses the 
most salient one in a given moral situation.  Phronesis also plays a role in 
coordinating virtues into a single line of action or thought directed towards an end.   
In brief, the arguments for phronesis determining the means to achieving the 
end are as follows.   
1. Deliberation is integral to phronesis.  
2. Choice proceeds from deliberation.  Choice is also an intellectual feature.  
Choice and deliberation are tied to each other.  Reasoning and thought 
accompany choice. 
3. Every virtuous act involves exercising choice.   
4.  Choice is therefore, a combination of reason and desire. 
                                                        
318  Zagsebski, Linda, Virtues of the Mind.  Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
1996. 
 219 
5.  Just as deliberation seems to consist in working out the means, in particular 
situations, or types of situations, of achieving given, relatively concrete ends, 
so therefore, choice because it follows deliberation, also is about what 
forwards the end.  Choice is about what best promotes the end. When we have 
judged what best promotes the end, our desire to do it expresses our wish.  We 
wish for eudaimonia.  We deliberate about what will promote it.  We desire to 
do it, and that deliberative desire is a choice.  
It is therefore, practical wisdom that deals with what leads to the end, i.e., the means. 
Section 4.3.2 gives arguments for the proposition that phronesis contributes to 
determining the end.  This proposition is supported by Richardson, who argues we 
can deliberate rationally concerning final ends.319  Practical wisdom helps to 
determine the ultimate end.  The following argument supports the latter proposition. 
1.  Practical wisdom and moral virtue are intimately linked and 
interdependent.   
2.  Practical wisdom works through deliberation, which gathers and processes 
the relevant data e.g. the right time, the right way, for the right reasons. 
3.  Practical wisdom without moral virtue ends up as cleverness, while moral 
 virtue without practical wisdom is simply natural virtue. 
Therefore, moral virtue and practical wisdom determine the end, because the two are 
interdependent. 
                                                        
319  Richardson, Henry S., Practical Reasoning about Final Ends.  Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1994. 
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Section 4.3.3 gives the arguments that practical wisdom helps to initiate 
action.  These arguments are supported by Chappell’s views.320   The following gives 
the arguments for practical wisdom initiating action. 
1. Achieving eudaimonia requires action. 
2.  The cause of action is an object of desire. 
3.  The immediate mover is desire itself. 
4.  However, the object of desire can either be the good or the apparent good. 
5.  Practical wisdom guides and directs our action intelligently to choose the 
right end. 
6.  Practical wisdom and desire combine to form deliberative desire. 
7.  Deliberative desire initiates moral action. 
In the last two sections of Chapter 4, I undertook the negative task of refuting 
virtue ethics theories that disregard or diminish the role of practical wisdom.  Julia 
Driver and Maria Merritt claim that practical wisdom should be given a diminished 
role in virtue ethics. For Driver, there is a significant class of virtues, the “virtues of 
ignorance”, that cannot be accommodated by the view that practical wisdom is 
necessary for a virtuous agent.321  An agent, therefore, can have a virtue even if that 
disposition requires her to be ignorant or thoughtless.  These virtues of ignorance are 
a class of moral virtues that either does not require the agent know what she does is                                                         
320  Chappel, T.D.J., “Reason, Passion, and Action: The Third Condition of the 
Voluntary.”  Philosophy Vol. 70. No. 273, (Jul., 1995), pp. 453-459. 
321  Driver (2001), p. xiv.  Driver does not appear to distinguish between the terms 
‘correct perception’ and ‘practical wisdom’ as she uses them interchangeably.  It may be 
argued that correct perception is one important aspect of practical wisdom but is not 
equivalent to practical wisdom. 
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right or, that actually requires the agent be ignorant.  I showed that Driver’s virtues of 
ignorance are either not virtues or do require practical wisdom.  I argued Merritt’s 
response to the situationist challenge is unnecessary.  She recommends a Humean 
virtue ethics approach that she says accommodates empirical evidence of moral 
psychology.  Her recommendation is unnecessary first, because Aristotelian virtue 
ethics can accommodate the empirical evidence of situationism.  Second, the 
challenges of situationism are not as grave as Merritt suggests because the 
experiments and interpretation of their results are debatable. 
CONCLUSION 
 Aristotle observes that ethics is not a precise subject.  When investigating the 
good, we can only speak of things that are true in general.  With that counsel in mind, 
the present Chapter has responded to the main criticisms that may be made against the 
thesis of this dissertation.  These responses ought to suffice to overcome the 
objections so that further research in eudaimonia and phronesis as essential features 
for virtue ethics theories can be continued.  I argue that the focus on virtues is the 
common denominator of virtue ethics theory.  However, for a virtue ethics theory to 
be comprehensive i.e., complete and thorough, it must explain how virtues are 
justified.  Eudaimonia provides the means, because it is the best basis for virtues thus 
far available.  The grounding for eudaimonia as a basis for virtues is our human 
nature.  We need to be virtuous in order to have eudaimon lives.  That is because 
virtues ensure our thriving as individuals and as part of a community.  No other basis 
given for virtues is as strong as eudaimonia.   
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Another facet of virtues that must be explained in a virtue ethics theory is how 
virtues function properly.  It is simply not enough to say we have virtue x that it is a 
virtue because it leads to a eudaimon life.  Virtue x is used in practice in a moral life.  
It is crucial to know how virtue x is put into action, how it is chosen over virtue y in a 
given situation, and how we know that virtue x leads to eudaimonia.  Thus, I argue 
that phronesis, or practical wisdom, is also necessary for a comprehensive virtue 
ethics theory.  Phronesis ensures the proper functioning of virtues.   
While I argue, in this dissertation, that eudaimonia and phronesis are 
necessary for a comprehensive virtue ethics theory, I have not discussed to any great 
extent, what other elements are necessary.  In turn, I have not laid out the package of 
elements that are both necessary and sufficient.  Again, simply put, I have urged 
nothing more – but nothing less – that both eudaimonia and phronesis are 
indispensible.  In so doing, I have highlighted not only the inchoate state of VE 
theory, but also its disappointingly variegated and even incoherent condition.  
Indubitably, a comprehensive virtue ethics theory will need to incorporate a well 
thought out theory of the virtues that gives a thorough definition of each one.  In 
addition, a virtue ethics theory could well profit from a considered discussion of 
emotion and its relation to action and reason.   Thus, like a grand palace ready for 
careful furnishing, virtue ethics remains a rich area for future research and discussion 
as long as it is built on the necessary foundation of eudaimonism and phronesis. 
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